[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. January 22, 2002]
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a
resolution of this Court dated JAN 22 2002.
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 (People of the
Philippines vs. Romeo G. Jalosjos.)
Accused-appellant
seeds to reconsider the November 16, 2001 Decision of the Court convicting him
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape and six (6) counts
of Acts of Lasciviousness.
Accused-appellant
raises points and arguments that merely reiterate the thrust of his appeal. The
question relating to Ma. Rosilyn Delantar’s credibility, her age, as well as
the issue of whether accused-appellant’s acts in Criminal Case Nos. Nos.
96-1985 and 96-1986 amounted to rape or to a lesser offense of acts of
lasciviousness, have already been thoroughly passed upon and extensively
discussed in the assailed decision. The Court sees no reason to disturb its
finding of accused-appellant’s guilt.
Still grasping at straws, accused-appellant contends that, assuming he
was guilty, the mitigating circumstances analogous to those mentioned in
paragraphs 4, 6, and 9 of Article 13[1]
of the Revised Penal Code should have been considered by the Court to mitigate
his criminal liability. With resounding absurdity, accused-appellant pictures
himself as a captured, helpless and submissive prey enslaved by an overpowering
passion instigated and provoked by an 11 year-old experienced sex worker. He
desperately depicts himself as a victim prevailed upon by physical and psychological
dysfunction that diminishes the exercise of will power.
Accused-appellant’s contention is untenable. Settled is the rule that
the victim’s unchaste character is neither a defense nor a mitigating
circumstance in rape. Likewise, whatever consent or “provocation” an
eleven-year old girl gave to a sexual congress is no consent or “provocation”
at all. The very essence of the crime of statutory rape is the carnal knowledge
of a woman below twelve years old. Being of such tender age, she is presumed
not to have a will of her own. The law does not consider any kind of consent
given by her as voluntary.[2]
The same goes for children exploited in prostitution defined in Republic Act
No. 7610. The Child Abuse Law was enacted precisely to protect children, who as
set forth therein, mean male or female below 18 years of age. Their consent or
“provocation” in the sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct occasioned by
their prostitution is not mitigating. Thus, accused-appellant’s contention that
consent or provocation can mitigate his criminal liability is misplaced.
Moreover, the spirit of lawlessness that impelled accused-appellant to
commit the felonious acts at bar does not merit a mitigating circumstance
analogous to “having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion.” In the old but
relevant case People v. Sanico,[3]
the Court held that the accused who raped a woman is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion just because he “finds himself in a secluded
place with a young ravishing woman, almost naked” [and therefore] “liable to
succumb to the uncontrollable passion of his bestial instinct.” The Court then
held that: “The correct and sound interpretation given by the courts and the
commentators limits the application of said circumstance to causes which
originate from lawful feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions.”
Accused-appellant’s reliance on the alleged mitigating circumstance
analogous to “illness as would diminish the exercise of the will power” suffers
from an utter lack of basis which does not merit any consideration by this
Court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED
with FINALITY.
Very
truly yours,
Clerk of
Court
(Sgd.)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst.
Clerk of Court
[1] Article 13. Mitigating
Circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
proceeded the act.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
or obfuscation.
xxx xxx xxx
9. Such illness
of the offended party as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
10. And,
finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned.
[2] People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA
463, 482 [1997]; citing People v. Morales, 94 SCRA 191 [1979].
[3] 46 O.G. 98, May 27, 1948.