Quazon & Plaza vs. Dagui & CA : 143326 : July 31, 2002 : Atty. Carreon : 3rd Div.

[G.R. No. 143326. July 31, 2002]

QUAZON & PLAZA vs. DAGUI & CA

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 31 JULY 2002.

G.R. No. 143326 (Teresita T. Quazon and Aurora Plaza vs. Honorio Dagui and Court of Appeals.)

The case at bar is an offshoot of a complaint for illegal dismissal[1] filed by private respondent HONORIO DAGUI against petitioners TERESITA T. QUAZON and AURORA PLAZA corporation which this Court finally decided in 1997. In said case, it was established that in 1953, private respondent was employed by Doña Aurora Tanjanco to take care of the maintenance and repair of the Tanjanco apartments and residential buildings. He performed carpentry, plumbing, electrical and masonry work. Doña Aurora died in 1982 and her daughter, petitioner Teresita Tanjanco Quazon, took over the administration of the Tanjanco properties. She continued utilizing the services of private respondent. He was paid a daily wage of P180.00.

On June 8, 1991, after serving petitioners for 38 years, private respondent was dismissed by petitioner Quazon. On August 19, 1991, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora and obtained a favorable decision in 1992. Petitioners were ordered to pay separation pay to private respondent. On appeal to the NLRC, the amount of separation pay was reduced.

On January 2, 1997, we affirmed the finding of illegal dismissal and directed the petitioners to pay the private respondent: 1) separation pay for nine (9) years (i.e., from the date private respondent was re-employed by petitioner Quazon in 1982 until his illegal dismissal on June 8, 1991). The separation pay to which private respondent would have been entitled for his 29 years of employment with Doña Aurora, i.e., from 1953 to 1982, was disallowed for his failure to file the money claim against the estate of Doña Aurora, and 2) full backwages, inclusive of all allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent pursuant to Art. 279, as amended by Section 34 of R.A. 6715, computed from the time he was illegally dismissed on June 8, 1991 up to the finality of the decision.

On February 24, 1997, private respondent filed another complaint[2] with Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario where he sought payment of retirement benefits[3] under R.A. No. 7641 (the Retirement Pay Law).[4] He alleged that he was sixty-seven years old and has served petitioners for 45 years, i.e., from 1953 up to 1997. He argued that even if he was dismissed from service in 1991, he should still be deemed employed during the pendency of his case until its final resolution in 1997. Thus, his putative years of service is from 1991 when he was illegally dismissed until 1997 when the decision in the illegal dismissal case became final.

On March 27, 1998, the labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondent and awarded him P60,750.00 as retirement pay based on his 17 years of service with petitioner Quazon, i.e., from 1982 until May 9, 1997 (the finality of our decision in the illegal dismissal case).[5]

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC.[6] In its Decision,[7] dated March 16, 1999, the NLRC initially affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. On motion for reconsideration, it reduced private respondent’s retirement pay to P48,600.00 based on 12 years of service, i.e., from 1982 until his compulsory retirement in 1994.[8]

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but their petition for review[9] was dismissed on the ground that its Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping were signed only by petitioner Quazon and not by the duly authorized representative of petitioner Aurora Plaza corporation, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

On the procedural aspect we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for review filed by the petitioners. In the recent case of Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[10] we ruled that where there are two or more petitioners represented by the same lawyer, a petition signed by only one of them is defective unless he was authorized by his co-parties to represent them and sign the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping on their behalf as it cannot be presumed that the petitioner who signed had personal knowledge that his co-parties had not filed a similar action in another venue. In the case at bar, it does not appear that petitioner Quazon was duly authorized by the petitioner corporation to sign for it. Petitioner Quazon’s claim that she has authority is not supported by any proof. Neither did petitioner corporation show any reason to justify its failure to sign the Certification and Verification.

On its substantive aspect, we affirm the NLRC.

Petitioners still contend that private respondent is not their employee from whom he can collect retirement pay. They further argue that, assuming they are employers of private respondent, they cannot be held liable for retirement pay for the following reasons: first, his claim for retirement pay is deemed covered by the separation pay awarded to him in the 1997 case; second, his claim for retirement pay would also be covered by the amount adjudged as backwages corresponding to the period after private respondent reached the age of 65. As private respondent reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 in November 1994 and the backwages awarded to him covered also the period from November 1994 until 1997 when he was already supposedly retired, the amount of backwages for this span of three (3) years is also more than enough to cover his claim for retirement pay; third, private respondent cannot invoke R.A. No. 7641 (the Retirement Pay Law) as the decision of Labor Arbiter Nora in the illegal dismissal case awarding him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was rendered on May 25, 1992, before the effectivity of said law in 1993; and fourth, granting that he is covered by said law, his claim for retirement pay is barred as it was not filed within three (3) years from the effectivity of the law on January 7, 1993.

We find no merit in petitioner’s contentions. The status of private respondent as an employee of the petitioners is a settled issue. We held in the illegal dismissal case that private respondent was petitioners’ employee as they had control over the manner by which he performed his job as a maintenance crew which job was necessary and indispensable to their business.[11] We reiterate our findings in said case, thus:

“x x x The establishment of petitioners is engaged in the leasing of residential and apartment buildings. Naturally, private respondent’s work therein as a maintenance man had to be performed within the premises of herein petitioners. In fact, petitioners do not dispute the fact that Daqui reports for work from 7:00 o’clock in the morning until 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. It is not far-fetched to expect therefore that Daqui had to observe the instructions and specifications given by then Doña Aurora and later by Mrs. Teresita Quazon as to how his work had to be performed. Parenthetically, since the job of a maintenance crew is necessarily done within company premises, it can be inferred that both Doña Aurora and Mrs. Quazon could easily exercise control on private respondent’s work whenever they please.”[12]

These factual findings have long attained finality and can no longer be disturbed.

Next, petitioners urge that the full backwages awarded by this Court in its 1997 decision is excessive. Allegedly, it should have covered only the time when private respondent was illegally dismissed in 1991 until November 1994 when he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 and not until the finality of this Court’s decision in 1997. Thus, petitioners argue that the three-year “overpayment” of backwages to private respondent is more than enough to cover his claim for retirement pay. In the alternative, petitioners maintain that the claim for retirement pay may also be deemed covered by the award of separation pay to private respondent.

We disagree. The award of backwages and separation pay as a consequence of illegal dismissal is distinct from the retirement pay to which an employee is entitled on account of his faithful years of service. There are different reasons for the grant of these monetary awards. Backwages is designed to restore an employee’s income that was lost because of his unjust dismissal. It is also intended to penalize the employer who caused the unjust dismissal. Separation pay is awarded to provide the employee financial assistance during the period in which he will be looking for another employment as a consequence of his dismissal without just cause.[13] Retirement pay is given to respond to the financial well-being of workers during the twilight years following their life of labor.[14] The awards therefore do not exclude each other.

Again, petitioners are reviving a dead issue with respect to our award of backwages. This award has long become final. Petitioners never raised the fact that private respondent has reached the retirement age of 65 in November 1994, hence, is not entitled to backwages beyond that period. He is estopped from raising the issue now.

We also reiterate that the grant of separation pay does not exclude the award of retirement pay. There is nothing in the Retirement Pay Law that precludes the award of separation pay.[15] The separation pay awarded to private respondent has a distinct purpose, i.e., to tide him over while he may be looking for another employment. The fact that an employee has reached the retirement age of 65 does not prevent him from seeking other employment. Article 287 of the Labor Code acknowledges this possibility when it provided that “the employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age x x x.”

Neither can we sustain petitioners’ contention that private respondent cannot invoke the Retirement Pay Law as he was adjudged entitled to separation pay by Labor Arbiter Nora in 1992, while the law took effect a year later, in 1993. For purposes of the Retirement Pay Law, private respondent should still he considered an employee of petitioners even after his dismissal which we held to be illegal and until he reached his retirement age of 65 in November 1994. The Court cannot allow petitioners’ illegal act of dismissal to interrupt private respondent's continuous service and deny him full retirement pay.

Finally, we hold that private respondent’s claim for retirement pay, which was filed in February 1997, was within the three-year prescriptive period as his cause of action accrued only in November 1994 when he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.

In sum, we affirm the Decision of the NLRC resolving petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and awarding retirement pay to the private respondent in the amount of P48,600.00 based on his 12 years of service with petitioner Quazon, i.e., from 1982 until November 1994, when he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated September 28, 1999, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

[1] Aurora Land Projects Corporation vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 48, 69-70 (1997).

[2] NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-02-01570-97; RoIlo, pp. 19-20.

[3] In the amount of P182,250.00, computed at P180 daily rate x 22.5 days per year of service x 45 years of service.

[4] Took effect in 1993 while private respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal was still pending before the NLRC.

[6] Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 43-47.

[8] September 28, 1999 Decision; Rollo, pp. 71-77.

[11] Aurora Land Projects Corporation vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 48 (1997).

[13] Aurora Land Projects Corporation vs. NLRC, supra.

[14] Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency vs. NLRC, 271 SCRA 209, 214 (1997).

[15] University of the East vs. Ministry of Labor, 152 SCRA 676, 682 (1987).