[G.R. No. 134963-64. July 3, 2002]

LONG & ALMERIA vs. BASA, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 3 2002.

G.R. Nos. 134963-64 (Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria vs. Lydia Basa, et al.); G.R. Nos. 135152-53 (Lim Che Boon, et al. vs. Lydia Basa, et al.); and G.R. No. 137135 (Lim Che Boon, et al. vs. Lydia Basa, et al.)

For resolution are the Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioners Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria in G.R. Nos. 134963-64, and the Motion For Reconsideration And To Refer The Case To The Honorable Court En Banc filed by petitioners Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and Liu Yek See in G.R. Nos. 135 152-53 and G.R. No. 137135.

The motions seek a reconsideration of the September 27, 2001 Decision of this Court (1) denying the instant petitions and affirming the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated May 29, 1998; and (2) lifting the Special Order dated December 18, 1998 issued by this Court which enjoined the respondents from preventing petitioners to enter the church premises.

Essentially, petitioners assert in their instant motions that this Court erred in holding, among others, that (1) their expulsion as members of The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Inc. is valid even without prior notice and hearing since its By-laws do not provide such requirements; and (2) they were given sufficient notice of their impending expulsion.

On March 19, 2002, the Court En Banc DENIED petitioners’ motion to refer to it the instant motions.

It bears stressing that under Article VII (paragraph 4) of the By-laws of the church, the Board of Directors has the power and absolute discretion to expel its members who do not espouse its doctrines and teachings and that no notice is required to be given to the erring or dissident members prior to their expulsion. The same By-law is even explicit in emphasizing that the expulsion need not state the reason for such action. That is the clear and unmistakable procedure adopted by the church which the petitioners have expressly adhered to as members thereof. As this Court held in its assailed Decision:

“The CHURCH By-law provision on expulsion, as phrased, may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. But that is how peculiar the nature of a religious corporation is vis-à-vis an ordinary corporation organized for profit. It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latter’s absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissention in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is conclusive upon the civil courts. As far back in 1918, we held in United States vs. Cañete (38 Phil. 253) that:

‘...in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member who is expelled from the membership by the church authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy In the civil courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals (at p. 260).’

“Obviously recognizing the peculiarity of a religious corporation, the Corporation Code leaves the matter of ecclesiastical discipline to the religious group concerned.

“Section 91 of the Corporation Code, which has been made explicitly applicable to religious corporation by the second paragraph of Section 109 of the same Code, states:

‘SEC. 91. Termination of membership. - Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.’ (Emphasis ours)”[1]

Petitioners argue that the subject By-law is contrary to the due process clause of the Constitution. For their part, respondents contend that: “The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, including the due process clause, is not meant to be invoked against private individuals as what is involved in the instant case. The Bill of Rights governs only the relationship between the individual and the State; it can only be invoked by private individuals and entities as against acts committed by the State.[2] In the instant case, the due process clause was erroneously invoked in relation to acts of private individuals.”[3]

Suffice it to say that petitioners have no reason to bewail the lack of prior notice of their expulsion. They have waived such notice by adopting the clear procedure for expulsion laid down in their very own By-laws. They joined the church voluntarily, entered into its covenant and subscribed to its rules. Indeed, they are bound by their consent.[4]

At any rate, records show that petitioners were duly notified of their expulsion by the Board of Directors. We have discussed this matter thoroughly in our September 27, 2001 Decision and we find no compelling reason to alter our finding.

WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reasons to warrant a modification or reversal of our Decision, the instant motions for reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY. (J. Carpio took no part.)

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Asst. Clerk of Court

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[1] Decision, pp. 17-19; Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1614-1616.

[2] Citing People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 (1991) and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the subject.

[3] Respondents' Consolidated Opposition to the Motions for Reconsideration, Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1727.

[4] United States vs. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253, 261-262 (1918).