THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 24 2002.

G.R. No. 132051 (Tala Realty Services Corporation, petitioner, vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, respondent.)

For resolution are : the motion for partial modification of our Decision filed by petitioner Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala); and respondent Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration of the same Decision.

On June 25, 2001, we rendered a Decision finding that the period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) years which has not yet expired; and that respondent Banco Filipino may be ejected for non-payment of rentals. Thus, we ordered the bank to vacate the Iloilo City site and to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00 corresponding to the period from April, 1994 up to the time respondent shall have left the premises.

In its motion, petitioner prays that respondent bank be ordered to pay not only the rentals but also interest thereon at the legal rate. Invoking the rule on stare decisis, petitioner contends that in G.R. No. 137980,[1] this Court ordered respondent bank to pay such interest.

Upon the other hand, respondent bank contends that since petitioner’s cause of action in the present complaint for illegal detainer is expiration of the period of the lease, it cannot be evicted from the premises on the ground of non-payment of rentals. The bank also claims that it has paid in advance the rentals corresponding to the 11^th year to the 20^th year (from September 1, 1992 to August 31, 2001) of the lease. Assuming there were unpaid rentals, respondent bank cannot be held liable therefor because of the occurrence of a fortuitous event – the closure of the bank by the Central Bank on January 25, 1985, declared illegal by this Court in G.R. No. 70054.

On petitioner Tala’s motion that respondent Banco Filipino should pay interest on the unpaid rentals for the period from April 1994 until the latter vacates the premises, we find the same meritorious. In Eastern Shipping Lines, vs. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court held that “when an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, and interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.” Consequently, respondent’s non-payment of rentals, constituting a breach of its obligation to petitioner, entitles the latter to interest at 6% per annum on such unpaid rentals.

Concerning respondent bank’s instant motion, paragraphs 8 and 9 of petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer read:

“8. As a result of said unwarranted refusal, in a letter dated April 14, 1994, plaintiff sent defendant a letter informing the latter that at the end of the month the lease over the premises shall no longer be renewed and likewise demanding the payment of the outstanding amounts due plaintiff from the defendant. xxx

“9. As of April 30, 1994, defendant has failed to pay to the plaintiff by way of rent alone the amount of One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Three Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,243,340.00). This amount has increased to One Million Six Hundred Eighty Six Thousand Eight Hundred Ten and 50/100 Pesos (1,686,810.50).”[3] (emphasis ours)

It is thus clear that petitioner, in its complaint for illegal detainer, also alleged therein the ground of non-payment of rentals.

In G.R. No. 137980,[4] this Court (First Division) ruled:

“Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April, 1994, it gave petitioner good ground for instituting ejectment proceedings. We reiterate the ruling in T & C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate, it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner.”

We are not persuaded by respondent bank’s assertion that it had paid the rents due. In the same G.R. No. 137980, this Court held:

“In demanding that its security deposit be applied to the rentals for the 11^th to the 20^th years, respondent conveniently overlooks its unpaid obligations for the earlier period for which the said security deposit was actually applied. Does it expect to have such unpaid rentals merely written off? Evidently, that is exactly what respondent intended. Respondent also argues in its present Motion for Reconsideration that, inasmuch as it was closed and under receivership, it should not be answerable for its unpaid rentals over the leased premises during such time, passing the responsibility instead to the Central Bank. Respondent relies on the argument that its closure and consequent lack of access to its funds to pay off its obligations, including the rentals on the leased premises, was a fortuitous event which should excuse it from liability. Granting, without conceding, that liability should not lie with respondent for unpaid rentals on the leased premises while it was under control of the Central Bank, this matter is not an issue in the instant case, where the subject matter is merely ejectment. As the lessee of the premises, respondent had the exclusive obligation to settle any unpaid rentals. Petitioner dealt directly with respondent, and therefore had the right to enforce the lease contract against respondent only. Any right of action that respondent may have against the Central Bank is a matter that can be best ventilated in the proper forum.”

It bears stressing at this point that an event to be considered fortuitous, an thus exempt the obligor from liability for breach of obligation, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.[5] In the case at bar, the take-over of respondent bank by the Central Bank can hardly be categorized as a fortuitous event.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioner Tala’s motion is GRANTED. Our Decision dated June 25, 2001 is modified in the sense that respondent Banco Filipino is ordered to pay petitioner a monthly rental of P21,100.00 corresponding to the period from April 1994 up to the time it vacates the premises, with interest thereon at 6% per annum. Respondent Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Panganiban, J. – No part).

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

[1] Involving the same parties and the same causes of action, except that the premises or site is at Davao City.

[3] Annex “A”, Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 294-295.

[5] Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 14, 21-22 (1999); Huibonhoa vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 625, 651-652 (1999).