[G.R. No. 143804. April 4, 2001]

ESLAO vs. BACNOTAN CEMENT CORP.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 4 2001.

G.R. No. 143804 (Agripino O. Eslao vs. Bacnotan Cement Corporation.)

Before this Court is a petition seeking to annul the Resolutions dated June 7, 2000 and July 5, 2000 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58869.

The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner Agripino Eslao, a supervisor of respondent Bacnotan Cement Corporation, was among those terminated by the said corporation in the course of its reduction of personnel due to mothballing of its wet line operations. Petitioner filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando City, La Union which was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-1-06-1100-98. The case was set for mandatory conference and thereafter the parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. Petitioner decided to terminate the services of counsel and informed the NLRC RAB 1 asking for an extension of time to submit the position papers. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner’s complaint has no cause of action since petitioner has executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and has in fact received the amount of P240,798.39. Petitioner filed his Opposition to the motion to dismiss while respondent filed Reply thereto. The Labor Arbiter resolved to grant the motion and dismiss the complaint. The order of dismissal dated December 17, 1998 was received by petitioner on January 15, 1999. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC on January 25, 1999 docketed as NLRC CA 020107-99. NLRC denied the appeal in its Resolution dated November 25, 1999 which was received by petitioner on January 3, 2000. On January 12, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in the Resolution dated February 15, 2000 for lack of merit. Said resolution was received by petitioner on March 28, 2000. On May 25, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In the Resolution dated June 7, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the following grounds: (1) the timeliness of the filing of the petition could not be determined as petitioner did not state the date when he received the copy of the resolution of November 25, 1999 denying the appeal; (2) petitioner did not attach to the petition all pleadings which he mentioned; and (3) there is no explanation for service of the petition upon respondents registered mail. On June 23, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated July 5, 2000 reiterating that the petition was filed eighty-three (83) days late and thus beyond the reglementary period.

Hence, the present petition raising the sole argument that in determining the timeliness of the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, the same should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

In its Comment, respondent alleges that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements in filing the petition for certiorari. Respondent avers that petitioner filed the petition seven (7) days beyond the reglementary period; that petitioner failed to indicate the material date when he received the NLRC-resolution denying the appeal; that even if the date of receipt was stated in petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, it would appear that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period; and that petitioner’s failure to attach an explanation as to why service or filing of pleadings was not done personally violated Section 11, rule 13. Respondent further mentions the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim which petitioner executed before the Department of Labor and Employment after receiving P240,798.39 representing one and a half (1 1/2) months’ pay for every year of service which the Labor Arbiter and NLRC both ruled to be valid document.

In his Reply, petitioner insists that the petitioner was filed within the reglementary period counting from March 29, 2000 when he received the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration until May 25, 2000 when he filed the petition.

The ruling made by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July 5, 2000 that the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner was “83 days late” applied the old rule contained in Section 4, Rule 65. When petitioner received the NLRC-Resolution denying his appeal on January 3, 2000 and a Motion for Reconsideration thereto was filed on January 12, 2000, a period of 8 days had already elapsed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 22. ¹ SEC. 2. Effect of Interruption. – Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.When petitioner received on March 28, 2000 the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, he had until May 19, 2000, the expiry date of the 60-day period, within which to file the petition for certiorari. The petition was filed only on May 25, 2000, which is beyond the reglementary period under the then applicable rule.

However, A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Resolution of July 21, 1998) and this amendment took effect on September 1, 2000. It provides:

“SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it related to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.”

We have ruled in the cases of Systems Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 143789 (promulgated on November 27, 2000) and Unity Fishing Development Corp and/or Antonio Dee vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 145415 (promulgated on February 2, 2001) that the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a petition for certiorari is reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration should now be deemed applicable. We reiterate the remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statues. ² Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208.Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. ³ Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229; Tinio vs. Mina, 26 SCRA 512.The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. ⁴ Billiones vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 674.

The above conclusion is consonant with the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that “(T)hese Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”

The foregoing notwithstanding, we note that the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals was dismissed not merely on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period but also for failure to attach to the petition below copies of all the pleadings which petitioner mentioned therein in violation of paragraph 2, Section 3, rule 45 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 and there was no explanation why service upon respondents of the petition was made by registered mail in violation of Section 11, Rule 13. Petitioner inexplicably failed to refute these matters in the present petition and even in his Reply to respondent’s Comment.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED and the case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Asst. Clerk of Court