[G.R. No. 128845. February 12, 2001]

ISAE vs. HON. QUISUMBING, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 12 2001.

G.R. No. 128845 (International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, Dr. Brian McCauley and International School, Inc.). -

This Resolution treats of the Motion to Declare Private Respondents in Contempt of Court and to Direct the Secretary of Labor to Execute Judgment filed by petitioner on October 25, 2000.

In our Decision dated June 1, 2000 we disposed of the petition as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED. ¹ Rollo, pp. 14-15.

On July 4, 2000, private respondent International School Manila, Inc. filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, which was followed by a Motion for Clarificatory Order on August 8, 2000. Petitioner filed its Comment thereon on August 15, 2000.

On August 30, 2000, the Court resolved, among others, to deny reconsideration with finality. ² Id., at 591.

On September 22, 2000, private respondent School filed a motion to Certify to En Banc and Second Motion for Reconsideration moving for Remand.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the motion under consideration. The motion to cite the School, its Board of Trustees and Superintendent in contempt of court is premised on two grounds: (1) a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and (2) private respondent School was deliberately ignoring if not defying the orders of the Court by refusing to pay backwages to the local hires.

In a Resolution dated November 20, 2000, the Court resolved to deny for lack of merit the motion of private respondents to certify the case to the Court En Banc and as well as second motion for reconsideration. In the same Resolution, the Court required private respondents to comment on the motion of petitioner to declare them in contempt of court and to direct the Secretary of Labor to execute judgment.

Prior to the issuance of the Resolution, however, on November 14, 2000, private respondents had already moved for leave to file an Opposition to petitioner’s motion. On December 26, 2000, private respondents filed their Comment/Opposition.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the motion to declare private respondents in contempt.

It is true that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

This provision also applies to the Supreme Court per Section 2 (a), Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. ³ Sec. 2. The procedure in original case for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rule, subject to the following provisions:

a) All references in said Rules to the Court of appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme Court; xxx.

In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, ⁴ 254 SCRA 234 (1996).applying then Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, ⁵ Section 1. Motion for rehearing. – A motion for re-hearing or reconsideration shall be made ex parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order or judgment. No more than one motion for re-hearing or reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court. A second motion for reconsideration may be presented within (15) days from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending.the Court held:

A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained. The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of “new” grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be starved off indefinitely, depending on the party’s ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating “additional flaws” or “newly discovered errors” therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights of the movant for reconsideration. “Piece-meal” impugnation of a judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so included are deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions.

For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with established rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy, courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their role in the administration of justice, they should brook no delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or maneuverings of parties or their lawyers. The Court recently had occasion to reaffirm these basic postulates in “In Re Joaquin T. Borromeo[“] x x x.

xxx

The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated, deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (sec. 14, ART. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already been passed upon, or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.

The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application, whether it be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification" or "plea for due process" or "prayer for a second look," or "motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgement,' or "motion to refer case to Court En Banc," etc.

It is relevant at this point to remind everyone that the Court En Banc is not an appellate tribunal to which appeals from Divisions may be taken. The judgment of a division is as authoritative and as final as that of the Court En Banc. Referrals of cases from a Division to the Court En Banc do not take place as a matter of routine, but only on specified grounds and in the Court’s discretion.

xxx

The petitioner in Ortigas and Company was found guilty of contempt of court for willful disregard and disobedience of the Resolutions of the Court and was fined P1,000.00.

It is clear that petitioner was bent on pursuing her claims despite the Court’s unequivocal declaration that her claims were lacking in merit, that the proceedings were terminated, and that no further pleadings, motions or papers should be filed. Her persistence constitutes a deliberate disregard, even defiance, of these Court’s plain orders, and an abuse of the rules of procedure to delay the termination of these cases.

Her reiteration of her rejected arguments cannot obliterate their essential and egregious speciousness; and under no circumstances may she or any other litigant or counsel be allowed to engage the Court in interminable squabbling about the correctness of its orders and dispositions.

Molina has had more than her day in court. She was accorded more than ample opportunity to present the merits of her case. Her every argument was heard and considered. The Court cannot countenance defiance of its authority on repetitious assertions of the meritoriousness of a party’s cause, no matter how sincerely or genuinely entertained. There has been a final determination of the issues in these case and petitioner has been a final determination of the issues in these cases and petitioner has been repeatedly directed to abide thereby. Her deliberate violation of the orders of the Court are unjustified and inexcusable. The refusal of petitioner Molina to concede defeat, manifested by her unceasing attempts to prolong the final disposition of these case, obstructs and administration of justice and, therefore, constitutes contempt of Court.

We clarify, however, that the mere filing of a prohibited pleading is not per se contemptuous. In Ortigas and Company, for instance, it was evident that petitioner intended to delay the termination of the case, as manifested by the filing of a number of motions in addition to her second motion for reconsideration, despite repeated orders for petitioner to abide by the Court’s decision.

The present case is, therefore, distinguishable from Ortigas and Company in that we discern no intent on the part of private respondents herein to delay the termination of the case, as motion for reconsideration, despite repeated orders for petitioner to abide by the Court’s decision.

The present case, therefore, distinguishable from Ortigas and Company in that we discern no intent on the part of private respondents herein to delay the termination of the case. The filing of a motion subsequent to the denial of the (first) motion for reconsideration in this case hardly compare to the dogged persistence displayed by petitioner in Ortigas and Company and which inevitably breached the Court’s patience.

Petitioners also submit that private respondents have refused to pay the local-hires backwages in alleged defiance of this Court’s decision. It does not appear, however, that a writ of execution has been issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Hence, the Contempt charge is premature and lacks factual basis.

Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective principle to vindicate the authority and dignity of the courts and the administration of justice. ⁶ Esmeralda-Baroy vs. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1 (1998); Pacuribot vs. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 (1997); Adorio vs. Bersamin, 273 SCRA 217 (1997).The power to declare a person in contempt of court, however, must be wielded sparingly. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. ⁷ Panado vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 110 (1998).In this case, we conclude that private respondents’ alleged acts and omissions did not diminish the authority and dignity of the Court nor did it impair the administration of justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the motion to cite private respondents in contempt of court. Let entry of judgment be made in this case.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANIO

Clerk of Court