[G.R.
No. 129079. February 15, 2000]
REP.
OF THE PHILS. vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted
hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 15 2000.
G.R. No. 129079
(Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Lucenito N. Tagle, Presiding
Judge Of RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 120; and Helena Z. Benitez.)
In her Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent contends that “the State has
wielded its power of eminent domain capriciously and arbitrarily,” because the
Petition for Expropriation was instituted in order to frustrate the ejectment
suit she had earlier filed against PHRDC.
Citing Sulit v. CA (268 SCRA 441, February 17, 1997), she further
argues that “the special and peculiar circumstances of this case should favor
the non-applicability of the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of
possession in expropriation proceeding in the light of Section 7 of EQ 1035.”
In her Supplemental Motion, private respondent further invokes Filstream v.
CA (284 SCRA 716, January 23, 1998), in which the Court struck down the
expropriation suit filed by the City of Manila for failure to comply with all
the requirements under RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992). Respondent argues that, in the
present case, petitioner violated Section 5 of EQ 1035, which required the
State to first negotiate with the
landowner before filing an expropriation suit.
These were reiterated in its Reply received by this
Court on January 19, 2000.
The arguments are not convincing. As already explained in our Decision, the
pendency of an ejectment suit filed by the property owner does not by itself
render the State’s exercise of eminent domain “capricious or whimsical.” We
will not repeat here the reasons already stated in said Decision. Suffice it to stress that the
expropriation suit was not at all attended by caprice or whim.
Sulit v CA is
not applicable. First, that case
involved the foreclosure of a mortgage, not the exercise of eminent
domain. Second and more
important, while the Court held that “special or peculiar” circumstances may
bar a judge from exercising its ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession,
respondent failed to show that such peculiar circumstances are present in this
case.
Likewise, respondent’s reliance on Filstream v. CA is
misplaced, because there is no showing that petitioner failed to comply with
the applicable statute, Executive Order No 1035. We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, in its
Comment, that PHRDC offered to purchase the land, but respondent had not acted
on the matter. Indeed, respondent’s
complaints -- that the negotiations dealt with the 7-hectare land, not the
10-hectare land subject of this suit, and that there was a five-year hiatus
between the date of PHRDC general manager’s offer to purchase in 1991 and the
institution of the eminent domain case in 1996 -- would have been addressed had
respondent answered the offer.
Respondent, however, opted to ignore it. Clearly, there is no factual basis for respondent’s
insistence that “petitioner was never interested in negotiating for the
purchase of the land.”
In any event, respondent failed to raise this point
below. The well-settled rule is that no
new matters or issues may be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court
in a petition for certiorari, let alone in a motion for reconsideration (Manalili
v. CA, 280 SCRA 400, October 9, 1997; Mendoza v. CA, 274 SCRA 527,
June 20, 1997; Abella v. CA, 257 SCRA 482, June 20, 1996; Tay Chun v.
CA, 229 SCRA 151, January 7, 1994).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court DENIES with finality the
Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. No further pleadings
will be entertained. Buena, J.,
on leave.
Very truly yours,
Clerk
of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst.
Clerk of Court