[G.R. No. 136820. January 31, 2000]

BABYLONIA SORDILLO vs. PHOTOKINA MKTG. CORP.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 31 2000.

G.R. No. 136820 (Babylonia Sordillo vs. Photokina Marketing Corporation.)

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision dated November 15. 1996 of the Court of Appeals1 Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago with the concurrence of Justice Fidel P. Purisima (Both are now Associate Justices of the Supreme Court) and Justice Ruben T. Reyes. in CA-G.R. CV No. 47083.

Respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation conducted a raffle promotion, a form of advertisement, denominated as "5 Milyong Piso Hati-hati Tayo Raffle Promo ng Agfacolor Service Center" which was originally scheduled to run from November 1989 to May 1990 but was extended up to the second part of August 1990. On August 16, 1990, Stub No. 414958 was announced as the winner of the Grand Prize of P500,000.00 in Metro Manila. Upon knowing that the holder of Stub No. 414958 was herein petitioner Babylonia E. Sordillo, respondent Photokina sent her a telegram reading as follows:

"CONGRATULATIONS OUR AGFA 5 MILYONG STUB NO. 414958 PA WON P500,000 PLS PRESENT STUB IDS AND TAX ACCOUNT NO. TO THE AGFACOLOR SERVICE CENTER YOU GOT YOUR STUB PLS BRING 2X2 PHOTO W/ YOU FOR PRINT AD. POLLY PANGANIBAN P500,000 AGFACOLOR."

Petitioner complied with the telegram message and submitted to respondent the requirements mentioned. However, petitioner was not awarded the prize on the ground that she was disqualified to join the promo under the rules and regulations issued by the Department of Trade and Industry, that:

"All photo enthusiasts may join this nationwide event except the employees and staff of Photokina Marketing Corporation, its service agencies and their relatives up to the second degree by (sic) consanguinity or affinity. Authorized Agfacolor/Eurocolor Film Dealers, their staff and relatives up to the second degree by (sic) consanguinity or affinity may not participate as photo enthusiasts."2 p. 4, CA-Decision, p. 40; p. 3, Comment, p. 95, Rollo.

In view of respondent’s refusal to award the prize, despite demand, petitioner was constrained to file a complaint for sum of money with damages against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

In its Answer, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as well as for moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, plus attorney’s fees.

The trial court rendered a Decision dated December 28, 1993 dismissing the complaint but awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing the Complaint; and plaintiff is hereby ordered to:

1. Pay defendant the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;

2. Pay the defendant the sum of 100,000 (sic) as and by way of exemplary damages;

3. Pay the defendant attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00;

4. Pay the costs of the suit."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment on November 15, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision being appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the award of moral and exemplary as well as attorney’s fees and costs be DELETED."

Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:

"A.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT BASED UPON THE ALLEGED LETTER-OPINIONS OF MS. IMELDA MADARANG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, AS THE BASIS FOR DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF AS THE GRAND PRIZE WINNER SINCE MS. MADARANG WAS NEVER PRESENTED IN COURT TO IDENTIFY AND AUTHENTICATE THE SAME, AND, THEREFORE, ANY EVIDENCE THEREON IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING HEARSAY.

B.

EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE LETTER-OPINIONS OF THE DTI ASSISTANT SECRETARY WERE ADMISSIBLE, THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THE CONCLUSIONS MADE THEREIN WERE BASED UPON A FALSE AND/OR MISLEADING STATEMENT OF FACTS SUPPLIED TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY BY THE DEFENDANT AND WOULD, THEREFORE, BE UNREALIABLE.

C.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WHICH WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE (EXHIBIT ‘7’ INCLUSIVE OF SUBMARKINGS AND THE PURPORTED AFFIDAVIT OF BABYLONIA SORDILLO DATED FEBRUARY 25, 1991) WHICH WERE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL OF THE INSTANT CASE.

D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE INTENDED OWNER OF THE RAFFLE STUB DRAWN AS THE GRAND PRIZE WINNER.

E.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFRIMING (THE) TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT RESULTING TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF."

Petitioner claims that she was a former salesgirl of the Technics Photo Center, a supplier of photography products and processor of photographic film, at its branch in Quiapo. Agfacolor film is owned by respondent and Technics is allegedly a dealer of said film. Petitioner was employed at the Quiapo branch only until January 1989 and thereafter, she was transferred to the Alabang branch. She stayed at Technics (Alabang) until June 30, 1990, after which she resigned and went to work at her uncle’s photo studio known as the "Mutya Studio" located at Quiricada St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleges that while she was employed at Technics, she never joined the raffle promo because she allegedly knew that employees of Photokina or Agfacolor dealers and their relatives are barred from participating in the promotion.

Petitioner claims that when she joined the raffle promo, she was no longer an employee of Technics Photo Center, an Agfacolor dealer, as of June 30, 1990 and that the drawing of the winner was done on August 19, 1990.

The core issue is whether or not petitioner is qualified under the pertinent rules to join the raffle promotion. That is a question which would call for an examination and evaluation of the evidence presented. Time and again we have rules that this Court is not a trier of facts3 Ropali Trading Corporation vs. NLRC, 296 SCRA 309. and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision.4 Trade Unions of the Philippines vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 576.

It would appear that during the period of the raffle promo (which run from November 1989 to May 1990 and was extended to August 1990), petitioner was an employee of an Agfacolor film dealer. Photokina sent a letter-inquiry to the DTI dated October 15, 1990,5 See p. 26, Rollo. in view of the complaint of petitioner, to determine whether petitioner is qualified "inasmuch as during the period covered by the raffle, the winner was employed by one of our dealers." The first opinion of the DTI dated October 22, 1990,6 See pp. 27-28 & p. 40, Rollo. ruled that petitioner is disqualified; thus:

"Your letter stated that your winner was an employee of your dealer in Metro Manila, therefore, the entry is disqualified. Another winner should be drawn in the presence of a DTI representative as soon as the previous winner has been informed of the disqualification."

In the second opinion of the DTI dated March 5, 1991,7 See p. 31, Rollo. it was ruled that petitioner is not the owner of the stub but her former employer, Technics Photo Emporium, a dealer of Agfacolor films. Thus:

"The rules and regulations of the promotions approved by this office on November 13, 1989 states that authorized Agfacolor/Eurocolor Films Dealers and Agfacolor Service Centers, their staff and relatives are disqualified from participating in the promotion as photo enthusiasts. However, in the affidavit complaint signed by Ms. Babylonia E. Sordillo, she admitted that she used the stubs issued by Technics Photo Emporium as her entries for the raffle draw. Those stubs are intended for the consumers who are the owners of the film submitted for developing and printing.

In view if the above reasons, the entry of Ms. Babylonia E. Sordillo is disqualified from winning in the said promotion" (underscoring supplied).

Since the DTI is the administrative agency charged with regulating raffle promotion activities, and which approved the rules and regulations of the subject raffle promo, its interpretation of the promotion rules should be respected as it was issued in the sound exercise of its official discretion. No cogent reason has been adduced to show that its decision on the matter is arbitrary. We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals as follows:

"x x x it bears stressing that the DTI is the government agency tasked with overseeing and regulating such raffle promotion activities in the country. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that ‘[A] long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies’ (First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117680, 9 February 1996) and the principle is well-settled that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired the expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but finality (Sesbreno v. Ala, 208 SCRA 359 [1992], citing Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 309 [1991]. Corollarily, it also would not be remiss to point out that all administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence (Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 215 SCRA 808 [1992].

Concededly, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means (Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 [1992], citing Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 [1962]. Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter or spirit of the legislative enactment (Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, supra, citing Sagun v. PHHC, 162 SCRA 411 [1988]. There, however, is no cogent reason to depart from the general rules given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in the case at bench. Verily –

‘By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of the DTI and public respondent over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in affirming the ruling of the DTI. There is no reason indeed to rule otherwise.’ (Metal Forming Corporation v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 111386, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 731, citing Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112844, 2 June 1995, 244 SCRA 770)."8 p. 11, CA-Decision, p. 47. Rollo.

With respect to the admissibility of the two letter-opinions of the DTI, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in admitting the same, which were hearsay as the same was not formally offered in evidence during the trial. This is untenable.

The DTI letter-opinions are considered public documents since they were written official acts of official bodies or public officers.9 Sec 19, Rule 132 provides: "x x x Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; x x x" The admissibility of these letter-opinions, absent the testimony of the official or public officer, may be considered as entries in official records, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.10 Section 44, Rule 130. As observed by the Court of Appeals:

"x x x these letters-opinions are impressed with a public character and their admissibility in evidence is based on two (2) grounds namely, 1.) necessity and 2.) trustworthiness. "(T)he necessity consists in the practical impossibility of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions occurring in the course of his duty and requiring to be evidenced. The trustworthiness arises: First in the sense of official duty which has led to the making of the statement; secondly, in the penalty which usually is affixed to a breach of that duty; thirdly, in the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements; and fourthly, in the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.’

x x x x x x x x x

In the case at bench, while concededly the DTI Assistant Secretary was not presented in court, defendant’s counsel of record was examined in open court and he identified the two (2) letter-opinions as those received by defendant from the DTI pursuant to their earlier request for an opinion on the matter (see TSN of 2 October 1991.)"

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (J. Purisima-No part)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court