Dimayuga vs Hon Desierto et al : 141472_75 : February 14, 2000 : Atty. Carreon : Third Division

[G.R. No. 141472-75. February 14, 2000]

MARIA CHONA M. DIMAYUGA vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 14 2000.

G.R. No. 141472-75 (Maria Chona M. Dimayuga vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto & Sandiganbayan.)

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein petitioner seeks to annul the Memoranda dated January 18, 1999 and October 1, 1999 of the respondent Ombudsman and to order the Office of the Special Prosecutor to withdraw the Informations filed against petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. 2510, 2511, 2512, and 2413 before the Sandiganbayan.

The antecedents are: On October 26, 1992, petitioner Maria Chona M. Dimayuga was Appointed Executive Director II to head the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), a government agency created by virtue of P.D. 1112. Sometime in 1997 and 1998, complaints were filed against petitioner Dimayuga, Paulino Gueco (chief administrative officer of the TRB) and Hermilo Corpuz (fiscal comptroller of TRB) for alleged immoral conduct and illicit relationship and for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. In a Memorandum dated December 2, 1998, the Office of the Special prosecutor recommended the filing of Informations in four (4) cases, i.e.: OMB-0-97-2386 (illegal exaction of benefits), and OMB-0898-0366 to OMB-0-98-0268 (unauthorized use of TRBH vehicles and claims for reimbursement). This Memorandum was approved by the Ombudsman in the Memorandum dated January 18, 1999. Thus, Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2510, 2511, 2512 and 2513 were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Reinvestigation but the Ombudsman in the Memorandum dated October 1, 1999 denied the motion, thus maintaining the four (4) Informations already filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the aforesaid Memoranda of the Ombudsman but the said petition was later withdraw "after realizing that the Sandiganbayan has to be impleaded as a necessary party". Petitioner further alleges that her arraignment scheduled on January 28, 2000 was reset to March 28, 2000 and therefore prays, among other things, for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of the criminal cases.

Hence, the present petition alleging that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in capriciously and whimsically finding probable cause against petitioner and in declaring conspiracy between petitioner and Paulino Gueco despite the glaring absence of evidence against her. She further claims that the findings of the Ombudsman against her was based on "recycled complaints already dismissed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court."

The petition should be dismissed.

In Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,1 225 SCRA 725. we held that the "courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form." We find that the instant petition fails to show a grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent Ombudsman finding probable cause against petitioner. Neither is it whimsical nor capricious. It is in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s power based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. As held in the Ocampo case:

"x x x. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of the investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same was that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complaint."2 at p. 730, ibid.

Furthermore, it is alleged that the Informations were already filed with the Sandiganbayan and the arraignment has been reset to March 28, 2000. Clearly, petitioner has not yet exhausted her remedies before the Sandiganbayan. In the Ocampo case, we ruled:

"It should however be reiterated that, while it is the Ombudsman who had the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without the approval of the said court."

It is axiomatic that the special civil action of certiorari is a remedy to be used only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3 Section 1, Rule 65; Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222. Moreover, the determination of probable cause or the finding of conspiracy in this case are factual issues which are not proper subjects for certiorari.4 San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68. On certiorari proceedings, the inquiry is limited to the issue of whether or not the respondent official acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and the Court will not review conclusions of fact.5 Holy Cross of Davao College. Inc. vs. Joaquin, 263 SCRA 358.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court