[G.R. No. 140636. January 19, 2000]

NOEL P.G. ONG vs. NLRC, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 19 2000.

G.R. No. 140636 (Noel P.G. Ong vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.)

This treats of the petition for review assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 11 August 1999 dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari on the ground of tardiness, and the Resolution of the same court dated 7 October 1999 denying petitioner’s motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company dismissed petitioner from employment after the later was allegedly caught extorting money from one of its contractors. Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal suspension and dismissal before the labor arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter found no merit in petitioner’s claim that he was framed, giving credence instead to the affidavit of the NBI agents, who were entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. The labor arbiter, thus, dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.

Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which initially rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position. The NLRC gave weight to the affidavit of desistance executed by petitioner’s alleged extortion victim.

Upon motion by private respondent, however, the NLRC set aside its decision and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, holding thus:

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that a clear, direct and positive statement prevails over a mere denial. Complainant did not, because he could not, deny the categorical statements of the NBI operatives that he walked towards the parked car of Mr. Pacatang, boarded it and once inside was handed the marked money, alighted therefrom, was about to return to his office when accosted, and upon questioning took the money from his right front pocket and readily handed the same to them. If there was no pre-arrangement between complainant would not have voluntarily gone to the area where Mr. Pacatang was obviously waiting for him. Certainly under that scenario, complainant could not give us the impression that their meeting, which was apparently during office hours, was accidental.

Now, did complainant freely receive that marked money or not? We note that in his ‘Sinumpaang Salaysay’ before the NBI on June 28, 1994 (p. 89), complainant would simply say ‘No Comment’ when categorically asked, when in fact he could have vehemently denied the accusation if such was the case. But then again, he could not deny because on the same day he was accosted, his hands were found out by the NBI to have ‘yellow fluorescent specks and smudges’ (p.690. Certainly, no amount of denial could negate that fact. If indeed he ‘refused to receive’ as he would later swear (Counter- Affidavit, p. 113), why did the money reach his hand the first place? Specially, who placed the money in his right front pocket?

Neither could his claim that he could not return the same as Mr. Pacatang suddenly sped away, hold water, because how could the latter sped away when complainant was inside the car? Besides, for an under-the-table transaction as the one agreed, complainant would certainly prefer to accept the money inside the car and safe from the plain view of spectators rather than outside thereof where there was a great risk of being noticed by passersby.1 Rollo., pp. 238-240.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution, dated 25 February 1999.

On 7 June 1999, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, upon motion of private respondent, dismissed the petition in a Resolution, dated 11 August 1999 for having been filed out of time:

Going by the material dates alleged in the petition itself, the Court notes that petitioner received a copy of the assailed NLRC resolution on December 4, 1988. Ten (10) days later, or on December 14, 1988, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, thereby leaving a balance of fifty (50) days out of the original 60-day period for filing the petition. On April 8, 1999 within which to file the petition. As it turned out, however, the petition was actually filed with this Court only on June 7, 1999, or exactly ten (10) days past its due date.2 Id., at 335.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution. Counsel for petitioner claimed that "he had no inkling that [Section4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court] was already amended [by Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 21, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803]."3 The pertinent paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65, as corrected, reads:

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgement, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceed fifteen (15) days. The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution, dated October 1999.

Petitioner is now before this Court seeking the reversal of the two adverse Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. As the Court of Appeals succinctly ruled in its Resolution, dated 7 October 1999:

When petitioner’s counsel filed via registered mail the dismissed petition on June 7, 1999, the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was already very much in force, the same having been effective as of September 1, 1998, or for almost nine (9) months prior to the filing of the petition. Counsel cannot, therefore, plead ignorance thereof.4 Rollo, p. 361.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith,5 Article 3, Civil Code. especially lawyers, who are obliged to keep abreast of legal developments and participate in continuing legal education programs.6 Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility. Failing in that duty, counsel risks prejudice to his client. The latter is, nevertheless, bound by the negligence of counsel.7 Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388 (1998).

Neither is the Court, for the sake of "substantial justice," inclined to overlook the delay in the filing of the petition for petition for certiorari since both the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the NLRC dismissing petitioner’s complaint are supported by substantial evidence.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolve to DENY the petition.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court