[G.R. No. 159286.
TACARDON vs. ANG
EN BANC
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated APR 5
2005.
G.R. No. 159286 (Rolando Tacardon, Hernan V. Fermin, Reynaldo M. Vargas and Jose Y. Ojoylan, vs. Ramon Ang, represented by Armando Ponce Enrile.)
Subsequent to this Court's Resolution dated September 15, 2003 denying his petition for review on certiorari and Resolution dated January 12, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration, Attorney Francisco B. Cruz, counsel for petitioners, filed "A Practicing Lawyer's Plaint" and other manifestations containing improvident and disrespectful language, highly reflecting his contemptuous regard for this Court. Thus, notwithstanding that there has been an Entry of Judgment in this case dated February 13, 2004, we find it imperative to take appropriate action on the matter, specifically to perform our constitutional mandate of instilling discipline upon an erring member of the Bar.
In his pleading entitled
"A Practicing Lawyer's Plaint," Atty. Cruz alleged that this
Court, in denying his petition for review on certiorari and motion for
reconsideration, has "desecrated legal and jurisprudential
norms." He cautioned its members that "acts not anchored on
the rule of law but on the rule of the powerful and the influential can be worse
than the most heinous crimes." He concluded that this Court "has become unpredictable"
and thus, it is time for him "to consider retiring from the
practice of law."
Atty. Cruz's "Manifestation"
dated June 7, 2004 contains a rather more direct innuendo, stating that
he has a "nascent suspicion that the Minute Resolutions denying his
petition for review and motion for reconsideration did not emanate from this
Court and are of dubious authorship." Apparently, Atty. Cruz doubts the
authenticity of the Minute Resolutions
dated
In the Resolution dated
"Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character."
Unfortunately, Atty. Cruz refused to be enlightened. He persisted
in demanding that the names of the Justices who took part in the deliberation
of his petition be revealed. He even insinuated that the withholding of their
names shows that "something is indeed amiss," "there is a
lot of corruption going around x x x to which even Justices and Judges have not been immune,"
and that he should not be blamed for doubting the authorship of the said
Resolutions involving several violations of procedural rules and considering
that respondent is a powerful and influential person. His "plaint" is
quoted as follows:
"UNDERSIGNED attorney
to this Honorable Court respectfully states that the Resolution
promulgated on
In fact, the resolution to expunge the manifestation from the records has only whet the curiosity of
the undersigned regarding the said authorship and to suspect that
something is indeed amiss.
The undersigned is trying to get an assurance of the legitimacy of the resolutions issued in this case by hoping to see the signatures of the members of this Honorable Court without giving offense to them. The suggested signing of resolutions is merely incidental to the inquiry regarding the authorship of the resolutions denying his petition for review on certiorari.
Obviously, the assurance cannot be given by the very persons who might be responsible for any impropriety.
There is a lot of corruption going around involving Presidents, Legislators, Cabinet members, and to
which even Justices and Judges have
not been immune, and lately, Generals.
Even lawyers are not now trusted as reflected in new rules promulgated
by this Honorable Court. Should this lawyer
thus be blamed for doubting the authorship of the denial of his petition for review on certiorari
involving, as it does, several
violations of the rules of procedure, and considering that a very
powerful and influential person is a party, to whom many will kowtow and pay
obeisance, even without being asked?
x x x
And the undersigned is willing to be censured if there is no basis for his doubt so he may the better understand."
It clearly appears to us that the reason behind the above derogatory remarks is Atty. Cruz's dissatisfaction with this Court's issuance of Minute Resolutions sans the signatures of the Justices who deliberated on the case. He attributes a sinister irregularity in such procedure.
Counsel's imputation of irregularity is, of course, without
basis. Had he taken time to read the Borromeo
vs. Court of Appeals cited in our Resolution dated
"The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis."
In In Re: Wenceslao Laureta[2] this Court stressed that it is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of the case, as was done here. As a practitioner, Atty. Cruz should have been aware that this Court promulgates Minute Resolutions only after the Justices have deliberated on the cases involved.
Now, we go to Atty. Cruz's accountability as a member of the Bar.
At the outset, it is best to take a look at the authority of this Court to discipline members of the Bar. As guardian of the legal profession, it has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys pursuant to its constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which also includes authority to regulate the practice of law itself. Apart from such constitutional mandate, this Court's disciplinary authority is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
Additionally, this Court has an inherent power to punish lawyers for contempt and to control in the furtherance of justice their conduct. Where their conduct is contumacious, it constitutes professional misconduct calling into play this Court's disciplinary authority.[3]
The case at bar involves the interplay of two (2) related powers: this Court's inherent powers to (a) discipline attorneys and (b) punish them for contempt.
While professing reverence for the Court, Atty. Cruz has repeatedly insulted and threatened it in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused the Justices who deliberated on his case of "desecrating legal and jurisprudential norms" and of being "unpredictable." He threatened them that "acts not anchored on the rule of law but on the rule of the powerful and the influential can be worse than the most heinous crimes. He broadly hinted that, "something is indeed amiss" in the issuance of the subject Minute Resolutions and that the non-disclosure of the names of the Justices was due to some irregularities. He justified his suspicions on the premise that "there is a lot of corruption going around involving …. Justices" and that respondent is "a very powerful and influential person to whom many will kowtow and pay obeisance, even without being asked." He insulted this Court by stating that with its unpredictability, he might as well consider "retiring from the practice of law." And lastly, he even challenged the Court to censure him if there is no basis for his suspicions. His statements, without any basis, are grossly disrespectful, casting dishonor and disdain to this Court. As a member of the Bar and officer of the Court, Atty. Cruz should have been the first one to respect it and uphold its dignity.
Viewed vis-à-vis similar statements[4] penalized as contemptuous in the past, this Court holds that Atty. Cruz's statements constitute direct contempt of court and call for the exercise of its disciplinary authority.
In Ante vs. Pascua[5] this Court held that contemptuous statements made in the pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt. This is a reiteration of our ruling in Ang vs. Castro,[6] declaring that if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court reads:
"SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities towards others or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank x x x."
Atty. Cruz is also guilty of professional misconduct. Every lawyer is expected to maintain the proper decorum in his dealings with the courts of justice and is never justified in using scurrilous and threatening language in pleading his client's cause. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers x x x." Rule 11.03 thereof mandates that "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts." Impoliteness is a vice that every member of the Bar must avoid. Intimidations do not suit his role as an officer of the court. While criticism of judicial conduct is not forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in fact encouraged, every lawyer must always act within the limits of propriety and good taste and with deference to the courts before which he pleads.
By his own acts and words, Atty. Cruz has clearly shown that he is unfit to continue as a member of the Philippine bar. Thus, we adopt the penalty imposed in the parallel case of In Re: Ponciano B. Jacinto[7] which is suspension from the Bar. Atty. Cruz should be excluded from the Bar until he proves worthy again to enjoy the privileges of his membership. It is imperative to instill in him a new sense of discipline that should teach him anew that it is his duty to respect the courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds.[8]
ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Francisco B. Cruz is found guilty both of direct contempt of court and gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record and is immediately executory.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
[1] G.R.
No. 82273,
[2] 148 SCRA 382 (1987).
[3] Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
[4] Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 (1974); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); In re Almacen, infra.; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 274 (1935); In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
[5]
No. L-74997,
[6] 136 SCRA 453, 458 (1985).
[7]
No. L-78926,
[8] In re Almacen, No. L-27654,