THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 27 MAY 2002.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-948-MTJ (Loreto P. Cabelic vs. Judge Isagani A. Geronimo, MTCC-Branch 2, Antipolo City.)

In a Sworn Letter-Complaint dated June 16, 2000, Loreto P. Cabelic charges respondent Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Antipolo City with Gross Ignorance of the Law in relation to Criminal Case No. 00-0329 for Slight Physical Injuries entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Neil Martinez”.

Complainant Cabelic avers that he was manhandled by the son of the owner of La Pacita Biscuit, his former employer in Antipolo City, hence he filed a criminal case for slight physical injuries and grave coercion before the Prosecutor’s Office which referred the same to the barangay authorities of Mambugan, Antipolo. No settlement was reached and the barangay chairman returned the case to the Prosecutor’s Office. A criminal case for Slight Physical Injuries penalized under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code was eventually filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Antipolo, Branch 2 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0329. The said case was assigned/raffled to respondent Judge Isagani A. Geronimo . In the Order dated February 29, 2000, respondent judge dismissed the criminal case on the ground of prescription. He was of the opinion that the crime of slight physical injuries is a light offense which prescribes in two months pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, since the criminal case was filed only on February 14, 2000, or more than sixty days from October 9, 1999, the date of the alleged incident, the case had prescribed. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent judge’s order but the same was denied. Respondent judge stated that the filing of the criminal action with the Office of the Public Prosecutor did not stop the running of the period of prescription. Said order of denial was no longer questioned before a higher court.

In this administrative case, herein complainant now charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. He is of the view that the filing of the criminal case for slight physical injuries with the Prosecutor’s Office on November 3, 1999 tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

In his Comment, respondent judge explained that the criminal case for slight physical injuries falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and therefore the interruption of the prescriptive period under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply.

The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative case. He opined that the filing of the case with the Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as such filing is not filing directly in court. The proceeding that would have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTCC of Antipolo City, Rizal on February 14, 2000 citing the case of Luz Zaldivia vs. Judge Andres Reyes.[1] He further stated that even assuming that respondent judge erred in his interpretation of the law, the matter is judicial in nature for which an administrative complaint against him would not lie.

We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator only insofar as the dismissal of the instant case is concerned. We take exception to the conclusion of the Court Administrator that “the filing of the case with the prosecutor’s office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as such filing is not filing directly in court” and that the “judicial proceeding that would have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTCC of Antipolo City, Rizal, which was done on 14 February 2000, after the crime had already prescribed.”

It should be noted that the criminal case filed with the Prosecutor’s Office was one for slight physical injuries which carries with it the penalty of arresto menor under the Revised Penal Code.[2] The penalty of arresto menor, which has a duration of one day to thirty days,[3] is a light penalty.[4] Being a light offense, the crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.[5] On this point, respondent judge was correct.

The question now is whether the filing of the criminal action with the Public Prosecutor’s Office suspended or tolled the running of the period of prescription.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall be “interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.” Notably, the said article does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. However, this Court, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals[6] declared that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the statute of limitations citing the cases of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals[7] and People vs. Cuaresma.[8]

In the Reodica case, it was further declared that Section 9[9] of the Rule on Summary Procedure which provides that in cases covered thereby, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC” cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said court. This Court ruled therein that in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code which is a substantive law, the latter prevails.

The Zaldivia case cited by the Court Administrator is not controlling. What was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance where the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code but Act No. 3326[10] as amended. Hence, the Court, in said case, held that the period of prescription was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Thus, on this score, it is clear that the respondent judge erred in declaring that the crime of slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of the complaint before the prosecutor’s office did not toll or suspend the running of the prescriptive period.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge made an erroneous interpretation of the law, the matter is judicial in nature. Well-entrenched is the rule that a party’s remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing court, and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint.[11]

Moreover, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular. The administrative case cannot be used as a remedy to challenge the assailed order or decision rendered by respondent judge nor can it be used as a substitute for other judicial remedies.[12] Administrative liability for ignorance of the law does not necessarily arise from the mere fact that a judge issued an order that may be adjudged to be erroneous.[13] He may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision. The rule is settled that it is only when a judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are called for.[14] The error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of proof to the contrary, an erroneous order or decision is presumed to have been issued in good faith.[15]

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court Administrator, this administrative case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Gutierrez, J., on leave)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

[1] 211 SCRA 277 (1992).

[2] Article 266, thereof.

[3] Article 27, Revised Penal Code.

[4] Article 25, ibid.

[5] Article 90, ibid.

[6] 292 SCRA 87 (1998).

[7] 122 SCRA 538 (1983).

[8] 172 SCRA 415 (1989).

[9] Now Section 11 of the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure which reads:

SEC. 11. How commenced. – The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

[10] “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.” Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.

[11] Nescito Hilario and Ma. Meriem Ursua vs. Hon. Julian C. Ocampo, Executive Judge of MTC Naga City and Presiding Judge of MTC Naga City, Branch 1, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1305, December 3, 2001; Dionisio vs. Escano, 302 SCRA 411 (1999).

[12] Fr. Michael Sinnot, Erlinda Pedrano Pingkian, Rosita Pedrano-Lopez, Alfredo Pedrano, Antonio Pedrano, Carino Pedrano, Corazon Mendoza, Virginia Baling-Pestañas vs. Judge Recaredo P. Barte, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1453, December 14, 2001; Santos vs. Orlino, 296 SCRA 101 (1998).

[13] Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).

[14] Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Rogelio R. Joboco, RTC Br. 16, Naval, Biliran, 294 SCRA 119 (1998).

[15] Ramir Mina vs. Judge Rodolfo Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1264, February 4, 2002; Canson vs. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268 (1999).