FIRST
DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150649,
HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN AND CONSUELO CABANAYAN VERSUS MARLYN A.
BENITO AND GERONIMA C. RAVARA
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated
G.R. No. 150649 – (HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN and CONSUELO CABANAYAN
versus MARLYN A. BENITO and GERONIMA C. RAVARA)
Petitioners, the heirs of Simeon D. Cabanayan and
Consuelo Cabanayan, bring to us this petition for
review on certiorari[1] questioning
the August 10, 2001 decision[2] and
November 7, 2001 resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64074.
Sometime in 1996, Simeon D. Cabanayan executed an
authority to sell a portion of a 264,176 square-meter parcel of land he owned
in Bolaen, Sual, Pangasinan. The power of attorney
was in favor of respondents Marlyn A. Benito and Geronima C. Ravara[4] who were authorized to look for a buyer at a
price of P25 per square-meter and a commission of 5% of the total price, plus
any excess or "overprice" as their service fee.[5]
A portion (or 180,000 square-meters) was sold to spouses McArthur and Erlinda Ang for P35 per square
meter or a total of P6.3 million.[6]
Pursuant to the authority to sell, respondents demanded their commission
amounting to P225,000 and the overprice of P1.8 million as service fee but Cabanayan paid them only P500,000 leaving a balance of
P1,525,000.[7]
To pursue their claim, respondents filed a complaint for a sum of money and
damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69
against the spouses Simeon and Consuelo Cabanayan.[8] In a decision dated
The court a quo held that since it was respondents, along with a certain
Juanita de Leon, who found the buyers (the spouses Ang),
they were entitled to the commission and service fee agreed upon in the
authority to sell.[9] Consequently,
it ruled that the spouses Cabanayan were jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents P1,525,000 plus interest, moral damages in
the amount of P40,000 and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.[10]
Aggrieved, the spouses Cabanayan appealed to the CA.
Pending their appeal, Simeon Cabanayan passed away
and his heirs substituted him.[11]
The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award of moral damages and attorney's
fees for being unwarranted.[12]
Hence this petition.
The core issue petitioners raise is factual. Inevitably, their petition must
fail.
Petitioners insist that respondents had no involvement in the sale of the land.
They maintain that it was solely Juanita de Leon who found the buyers. However,
the RTC and CA determined otherwise. It was shown that respondents, along with
de Leon, were responsible for effecting and finalizing the sale.[13]
Time and time again, we have stated that only questions of law may be raised by
the parties in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[14] Findings of fact of the CA affirming those
of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court
when supported by the evidence on record.[15]
It is not our function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of
the parties.[16] While we recognize
several exceptions to this rule,[17]
none of these exceptions finds application here.
According to both the CA and RTC, it was undeniably through the efforts of
respondents that the lot was sold. Thus, they were entitled to the balance of
their commission and the "overprice" or service fee. No compelling
reason whatsoever was shown by petitioners for this Court to review and reverse
the trial court's findings and conclusions, as affirmed by the CA.
Petitioners assert that there was no basis to hold Consuelo Cabanayan
“jointly and severally liable” with her husband Simeon because only the latter
executed the authority to sell.[18] This issue, however, was not raised in their
appeal.[19] Evidence not having been
adduced in the courts below why she should not be held solidarily
liable, we decline to rule on this issue.
They also argue that as heirs, they should not be held liable under Rule 3,
Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. We disagree. Aside from the fact that this issue
is also being proffered for the first time on appeal, nowhere in the cited rule
does it say that heirs of the deceased defendant will not be liable. In fact,
Rule 3, Sec. 20 provides that despite the death of the defendant, the case will
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff can then be prosecuted against the estate of the deceased person.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
First Division
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of
the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo,
pp. 29-40.
[3] The resolution was penned by
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; id., pp. 41-42.
[4]
[5] id.
[6]
[7]
[8] Docketed as Civil Case No. 17712;
id., p. 29.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] This was established by the
testimony of de Leon herself; id., pp. 33-35.
[14] Jose v. People, G.R. No.
148371, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 294, 302; Pleyto
v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432
SCRA 329, 336; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Wong, 412 Phil. 207,
216 (2001).
[15] Jose v. People, supra; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 554, 558 (2001); Garrido v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 872,
881 (2001); Santos v. Spouses Reyes, 420 Phil. 313, 317 (2001); Yu
Bun Guan v. Ong, 419 Phil. 845, 854 (2001); Fernandez
v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322, 337 (2001); Nagkakaisang
Kapisanan Kapitbahayan sa Commonwealth Avenue v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil.
146, 153-154 (2001).
[16] Jose v. People,
supra.
[17] The exceptions are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission,
390 Phil. 1228, 1242 (2000); CIR v. Embroidery and Garments Industries
(Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals,
349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).
[18] Rollo,
p. 120.
[19] They alleged that the trial
court erred:
I
IN RELYING ON THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF [RESPONDENTS’]
WITNESS JUANITA DE
II
IN NOT GIVING FULL WEIGHT TO THE OCULAR INSPECTION REPORT WHICH ESTABLISHED
BEYOND PERADVENTURE THAT [RESPONDENTS] WERE NOT EVEN AWARE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND EVENTUAL
III
IN FINDING EXHIBIT 2 MATERIAL TO THE CASE AND A
FAVORABLE VERDICT TO [RESPONDENTS].
IV
IN GIVING COMMISSIONS AND SERVICE FEES TO [RESPONDENTS] WHO HAVE NOT RENDERED
ANY SERVICE [TO PETITIONERS] AND WHO ARE NOT IN FACT LICENSED REAL ESTATE
BROKERS AND ARE NOT THEREFORE ENTITLED TO LEGAL COMMISSIONS AND OVERPRICE FROM
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS. (Id., pp. 31-32.)