SECOND
DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6973,
ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA AND ROMMEL F. MARONILLA V. ATTY. EFREN N.
JORDA AND ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA’O
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your
information, is a resolution of this Court dated
A.C. No. 6973 – (ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA and ROMMEL F. MARONILLA v. ATTY.
EFREN N. JORDA and ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA’O)
This treats of the following pending incidents:
a) Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated 14 August 2006,
asking for five (5) days from 14 August 2006 or until 21 August 2006 to
comment on respondent Jorda's motion for
reconsideration, filed by counsel for complainants;
b) Comment dated 21 August 2006 on respondent Jorda's
motion for reconsideration, filed by complainants;
c) Manifestation dated 7 August 2006, filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) requesting copy of respondent Jorda's
motion for reconsideration to enable the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment thereon; and
d) Urgent Manifestation dated 27 December 2006, with prayer for reconsideration
of Resolution dated 30 October 2006 granting respondent Jorda's
Motion for Reconsideration, filed by complainants.
A preliminary matter warrants some clarification. The Resolution dated
Likewise, it also appears that the IBP also duly filed a Manifestation In Lieu
Of Comment, requesting a copy of respondent Jorda's
motion for reconsideration. At this point, the Court no longer finds the
need for the Comments of the IBP on respondents' motion for reconsideration and
accordingly dispenses with the same.
Still, to effectuate a prompt and final disposition of this case, the Court
shall duly consider the Comment filed by complainant, especially as it relates
to the Motion for Reconsideration relative to the Court's Resolution of
It may be recalled that the Court, in its 20 October 2006 Resolution,
ultimately concluded that respondent Jorda could not
be held accountable for “gross ignorance of the law” when he filed an appeal
from the subject decision of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal, owing to the
authority of the President of the University of the Philippines under Article
50 of the University Code “to modify or disapprove any action or resolution of
any college or school, faculty or administrative body, if in his judgment the
larger interests of the University System so requires.”[2] In concluding that respondent could not be
held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the Court observed that the appeal
undertaken, even if not expressly sanctioned, was neither expressly barred and
indeed permissible within the discretion of the U.P. President to recognize
under Art. 50 of the University Code.[3]
Both in their Comment and their present Motion for Reconsideration,
complainants argue that the Rules and Regulations re Fraternities, Sororities
and other Student Organizations (RRFSO), adopted by the U.P. Board of Regents
on 24 October 1995, does not afford the right of appeal to the University or
the University Prosecutors from a SDT resolution ordaining the dismissal of a
complaint filed against a university student. They contend that the RRFSO is a
"special law" which applies in particular to fraternities and
sororities, whereas the University Code is a general law applicable to the
university community at large. It is proposed that as a special law of later
enactment, the RRFSO effected “a partial repeal” of the University Code insofar
as the former is inconsistent with the latter.[4]
The arguments of complainant are not tenable. They may, had there been
provision in the RRFSO that explicitly bars an appeal to the U.P. President
from a decision of the SDT dismissing a disciplinary case against a student.
But there is none. There is a rule that expressly prohibits "motions for
reconsideration of SDT rulings and/or resolutions."[5] That is irrelevant
to the matter at hand. As for Rule V of the RRFSO, which governs appeals from
SDT decisions, true it does not expressly authorize appeals to the U.P.
President from SDT decisions acquitting or dismissing the case against a student-defendant
but it does not categorically prohibit such appeal either.
Yet ultimately, the fact that complainants have to rely on a roundabout
argument that hinges on a novel proposition, the implied repeal of Article 50
of the University Code, all but highlights the conclusion that respondent could
not have been guilty of “gross ignorance of the law” when he wrote the
letter-appeal to the U.P. President. The standard of “gross ignorance of the
law” has been held to extend to errors so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of bad faith, or for acts not only contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption.[6]
The first predicate to a finding of gross ignorance of the law is of course an
act that stands contrary to existing law or jurisprudence. As we held in the
Even assuming arguendo that the Court, in the
context of this disciplinary case, had cast prudence aside and gone as far as
to declare that Article 50 was superseded by the RRFSO, or that Article 50 is
somehow legally infirm, still such pronouncement would be one of first instance
that could not have guided prior acts such as those complained of respondent Jorda.
Complainants also argue, rather belatedly, that the IBP Resolution under which
respondent Jorda was reprimanded could no longer be
the subject of a motion for reconsideration or appeal, as the case was already
“terminated.” This argument is based on the fact that respondent filed a motion
for the reconsideration thereof instead of appealing the same before this Court,
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complainant claims
that under said Rule, if the sanction imposed by the IBP is less than
suspension or disbarment, such as the reprimand imposed in this case, the case
will be deemed terminated unless a petition challenging the same were filed
with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
We ruled in Halimao v. Villanueva[7] that "nothing in [the] text [of Section
12] or in its history suggests that such motion [for reconsideration] is
prohibited [and i]t may therefore be filed within 15
days from notice x x x."[8] Following Halimao
and the cases that affirmed its doctrine, no error may be attributed to
respondent Jorda in filing the motion for
reconsideration, certainly no error which would render the IBP Resolution
beyond the pale of the Court's review. And once the Court has rendered its
ultimate decision based on the IBP decision, a party aggrieved certainly has
the right to seek reconsideration of that decision before the Court.
It should be stressed that no decision of the IBP may become final and executory simply with the lapse of the 15-day period under
Section 12, even if there is no petition filed with this Court assailing the
decision. Such decision takes effect only upon its affirmation or modification
by the Court, or as ordained by the Court. This is so because the inherent
power to discipline members of the Bar belongs to the Court, not the IBP. It is
in fact a matter of routine that even decisions of the IBP Board of Governors,
imposing sanctions less than suspension or disbarment are automatically
elevated to the Court for review. There is no need for a petition filed with
the Court within 15 days from notice in order that the Court may acquire
jurisdiction over the matter.
Concededly, complainants are careful enough to refrain from asserting that the
IBP Resolution had already become “final and executory”
consequent to respondent Jorda's failure to file a
petition challenging the same before the Court. Hewing to the language of
Section 12, Rule 139-B, they contended instead that the case was “terminated.”
Still, it must be made clear that even as Section 12, Rule 139-B may operate to
terminate the case at the level of the IBP, no such operative effect bears on
the Court as it reviews the IBP Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DENY complainants’ Urgent Manifestation with
Prayer for the Court to Reconsider its Resolution
Dated 30 October 2006 Granting Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, p. 252.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rule IV, Section 7(G), RRFSO.
[6] See, e.g., Ora v. Almajar, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1599,
[7] 323 Phil. 1 (1996).
[8]