[A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-100-CA-J. May 3, 2006]
JOSE C. DIAZ v. FORMER SEVENTH DIVISION JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
En Banc
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated MAY 3, 2006
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-100-CA-J (Jose C. Diaz v. Former Seventh Division Justices of the Court of
Appeals, et al.)
Considering the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator,
to wit:
1. AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT
filed by Jose C. Diaz, charging Associate Justices PORTIA ALIŅO-HORMACHUELOS,
REBECCA DE GUIA-SALVADOR and AURORA SANTIAGO- LAGMAN, as members of the Former
Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals, with "Bias and Evident
Partiality for Defendants-Appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 79136" entitled
Jose C. Diaz, plaintiff-appellant, versus Sps. Juan
& Elizabeth Diaz, defendants-appellants".
In the aforesaid complaint filed on 11 November 2005, complainant
accuses the respondents listed above with "rendering an unjust and
unlawful decision against him" in the case mentioned in the preceding
paragraph and for denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration filed by him in said case.
The complainant avers that the decision rendered by respondent Justices
"was simply a rewrite of the brief of defendants-appellants in digested
form". Complainant further avers
that the said decision does not conform with the law and the evidence presented
in said case. He then narrates the facts
as he believes the Court should have found. He argues that because he was a co-owner of a
certain property which was sold and with the proceeds being used to buy another
property, he should have been held as a co-owner of the newly acquired property
as provided by our civil laws.
The complainant further avers that he co-owned, together with his brother
Juan (defendant-appellant in the case mentioned above) and his sister Marita, a parcel of real estate situated in
Some thirty years later, Juan sold the Ortigas
property together with the house he had built on it, for thirty one million
pesos (P31,000,000.00). The complainant
filed with the
The Mandaluyong Regional Trial Court
ruled in favor of complainant although it did not rule that he was a co-owner
of the Greenhills property. The RTC held that Juan owed Jose the remainder
of his share in the purchase price of the Mandaluyong
property which Jose alleged Juan had withheld form him. The RTC ordered Juan to pay Jose the sum of P7,000.00
representing the portion of his share in the selling price of the Mandaluyong property which Juan had allegedly withheld, with
interest. The RTC also granted moral and
exemplary damages as well attorney's fees and costs.
Complainant decries the respondents' failure to adopt the findings of
fact of the RTC. He argues that this
action of the respondents constitute the bias and partiality that he claims
characterized their judgment. For this reason,
complainant prays that aside from the administrative sanctions which Supreme
Court find appropriate, respondents should be made to reimburse him for actual
damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00).
2. COMMENT filed
by the three respondents. Respondents
pray that the Complaint be dismissed outright for lack of merit.
Respondents claim that the complainant basically questions their appreciation
of the evidence as well as their application of the law and jurisprudence. They argue that because complainant failed to
elevate the questioned judgment to the Supreme Court by way of a Petition for Review,
said findings have become final and have been accepted as such by the
complainant.
Respondent Justices are correct in their averment that jurisprudence
supports their present claim for in Tan Tiac Chiong vs. Cosico, 365 SCRA 589,
the Supreme Court held that "(I)f a party is prejudiced by the orders of a
judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and
not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative
complaint".
It has been consistently held that an administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge or Justice alleged to be aberrant
or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available such as a motion
for reconsideration, or an appeal. Obviously,
if subsequently developments proved the Judge's challenged order to be correct,
there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all (Flores vs. Adefuin dela Cruz, 440 SCRA 106).
Disciplinary proceedings against Judges
(and Justices) are not complementary or suppletory of
nor a substitute for these judicial remedies. Resort and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the Judge
concerned. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellant tribunals
have spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil
or administrative liability may be opened or closed." (Officers vs. Pamintuan,
443 SCRA 87, citing Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA
392).
Respondent Justices argue that clearly complainant's remedy was to
elevate the questioned judgment to the Supreme Court for review. That he did not prove that he had not [sic]
exhausted the judicial remedies of which he could have availed.
Respondent Justices pray that the complaint be dismissed outright for
sheer lack of merit and that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC dated
EVALUATION: Evidently,
the complainant has failed to show sufficient reason for the Court to give due
course to this case. As stated above, he
questions the findings of fact found in the questioned judgment rendered by the
three Associate Justices. His action,
after the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration should have been to elevate
the case to the Supreme Court for review. However, for reasons only known to him, he failed
to elevate the case. The decision having
attained finality, the findings of fact as well as the application of the law
therein are no longer open to question. The
filing of the present administrative complaint has, therefore, no legal or
factual underpinnings and deserves to be dismissed outright.
It does not mean that in every case where the trial court views the
evidence in one way and the appellate court in another, one of them has erred. It is precisely the reason that in the hierarchy
of courts the court superior to another is the venue for the review of the
lower court's decisions.
In the present case, the trial court found from the evidence before
it that Juan did not deliver to Jose the totality of his share in the sale of Mandaluyong property which they admittedly jointly owned. The court found that Juan gave Jose only
P2,000.00 which he admitted when his total share should have been P9,000.00. This was the amount which Juan gave to their
sister Marita, whose share in the property was the
same as that of the complainant. For
this reason, the trial court held that the defendants (spouses Juan and
Elizabeth) had failed to prove that he had delivered the share of Jose in full.
He failed to substantiate his claim that
aside from the P2,000.00 check he had given to Jose, he had given another P1,000.00
as "balato" to their mother nor the alleged
monthly payment of P100.00 upon the instructions of their mother during the
entire period of their stay with Juan in the house he had constructed on the Greenhills property. In the decretal
portion of his decision, the trial judge merely directed Juan to pay Jose the
sum of P7,000.00 which was withheld from him when the Mandaluyong
property was sold, with interest from
The appealed judgment reversed the lower court and dismissed the complaint.
The respondent Justices held that the
co-ownership of the Mandaluyong property was
terminated when it was sold in 1958, the fact that Juan subsequently purchased
the Greenhills property did not create another
co-ownership over the latter. The
questioned decision points to the fact that there is no evidence, whether
documentary or testimonial to show that the Mandaluyong
property was purposely sold in order to buy the Greenhills
property. The title issued for the Greenhills property does not show that the complainant is
one of the co-owners. While in the title
to the Mandaluyong property the proportionate share
of the co-owners was stated clearly, the respondents found it improbable that
the complainant would agree to the title being issued without his name as
co-owner if he really was one.
It is rather surprising that the complainant only filed this case against
the present respondents. Why did he not
file the same case against the trial judge who decided the case not in
accordance with his expectations.
The decision of the three respondent Justices mentions the fact
that during the nearly thirty years the spouses Juan and Elizabeth Diaz held
the property, built their house, occupied the same under the claim of ownership
that recognized no other co-owner, complainant Jose was conspicuously silent. It was only when the property was sold for P31
Million (P54Million according to complainant) that complainant awoke from his
slumber to claim a portion of the consideration.
RECOMMENDATION: It is
respectfully recommended that the present administrative complaint be DISMISSED
for lack of merit. It is further
recommended that the complainant Jose C. Diaz be directed to SHOW CAUSE why he should
not be cited in contempt of court for filing such a frivolous and unmeritorious
complaint which has deprived the respondent Justices of valuable time which
they could have used for more important and pressing duties in the court.
and finding the evaluation and
recommendation therein to be in accord with law and the facts of the case, the
Court approves and adopts the same.
If a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy
lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the
Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint.[1] Complainant should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court.
Furthermore, a judge's failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily render him administratively liable. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action.[2]
ACCORDINGLY, the
administrative complaint against Justices Portia Aliņo-Hormachuelos,
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Aurora Santiago-Lagman is DISMISSED.
Complainant Jose C. Diaz is DIRECTED
to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
cited in contempt of court for filing such a frivolous and unmeritorious
complaint, within ten (10) days from notice.
Puno, J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) FELIPA B. ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court