[G.R. No. 157279.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GIOVANNI
Special Third Division
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
G.R. No. 157279 (Philippine National Bank v. Giovanni Palma, et al.)
Before the Court is respondents' Motion for Reconsideration (With Leave of Court and Prayer that the Resolution of the Instant Case be Submitted to the Supreme Court En Banc) dated September 25, 2005.
Respondents ascribe error to the Court for applying the doctrine of stare decisis.[1] They contend that the present case "should be resolved [in] the light of [the] recent Supreme Court En Banc ruling in PPA vs. COA (G[R] No. 160396, September 6, 2005)"[2]
We disagree. The Court was correct in adhering to the principle of stare decisis. The very issue resolved in the Decision[3] had to do with the interpretation and application of Republic Act (RA) 6758. The assailed provision in the law has long been interpreted by this Court in the pronouncements[4] relied upon by the Decision. What the Decision had done was merely to reiterate and fortify a principle long established by the Court. We stress that "allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed by RA 6758, should continue to be enjoyed by employees who (1) were incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of July 1, 1989."[5]
In all the prior cases relied upon by the Decision, the employees were granted the subject benefits because they were incumbents as of July 1, 1989 who were actually receiving those benefits. Thus, in the present case, "the payment of benefits to [respondents] hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before [RA 6758's] enactment."[6] We do not see how the Court committed any error in following this well-established interpretation of the law. This is the situation presented in this case; thus, the Court applied existing jurisprudence.
Respondents argue that the Court should resolve the issue of their entitlement to benefits based on the en banc ruling in PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. COA.[7] Such contention is untenable.
The PPA case cannot be applied to respondents because the employees there are not similarly situated as those in the present case. In that case, "the PPA already granted (its] employees the COLA and the amelioration allowances, even if they were hired after July 1, 1989."[8] In the present case, the PNB employees [respondents] were not actually granted the subject benefits. Thus, although in both cases, the employees were all hired after July 1, 1989, the employees in the former were already being granted the questioned benefits while those in the latter were not.
That respondents were not being given the benefits is beyond question. Respondents allege in their Reply to Petitioner's Comment/Opposition dated March 1, 2006[9] that the benefits were actually granted to them. To prove this allegation, they presented the PNB Manual of Policies on Personnel Management and Manpower Development.[10] Such alleged proof cannot stand. In the Statement of Facts in the Decision, it was clearly slated that "[r]espondents contend that extending to them the allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their allowances and benefits reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the date of respondents' respective appointment or from 30 June 1989."[11] This necessarily showed that respondents were not being given the subject benefits. In fact, respondents sought by mandamus to compel PNB to grant them the fringe benefits and allowances. This could only mean that PNB did not actually grant the benefits to respondents. Also, it could have been very easy for respondents to present proof that they actually received the benefits. Yet they chose to present a PNB Manual from which actual grant and receipt of the benefits cannot be conclusively shown. In any event, these are factual matters that this Court need not delve into any further.
Since respondents were neither (1) incumbents nor (2) receiving the benefits as of July 1, 1989, RA 6758 clearly withheld from them the subject benefits. They cannot invoke the same law which also grants incumbent employees the right to continue to receive the benefits they have already been receiving.[12]
Respondents also insist that this case be reversed because of this Court's declaration that Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 is ineffective -- the basis for granting the benefits in the PPA case.
As discussed earlier, respondents were never actually receiving the subject benefits. Even before DBM CCC No. 10 was issued, the benefits were already denied from them. Thus, whether this issuance was valid or not is irrelevant to them as it did not affect them. Although respondents allege that the subject benefits were withheld from them on the basis of the DBM Circular, it is clear that the benefits were actually withheld from them on the basis of RA 6758. They cite the PNB Manual[13] to bolster their argument that PNB's basis for denying the benefits was the Circular. Even if we accept such contention, it will still not help their cause. If they were not receiving those benefits from July 1, 1989 -- a date that came before the DBM Circular -- then clearly, PNB's basis for withholding the benefits was RA 6758 and not the Circular. Now, the previous discussion on stare decisis gains importance as this is the real basis for the denial of the benefits.
The fact that DBM CCC No. 10 was in "legal limbo" did not affect respondents as RA 6758 -- the basis for withholding respondents' benefits -- remained unequivocal.
We likewise deny respondents' prayer that this case be submitted to the Court en banc, because the banc is not an appellate body to review or modify the decisions of a Division.[14] The Constitution mandates that when the required number to decide a case in the division is not obtained, it shall be decided en banc provided no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[15] Clearly, this case has, in fact, remained consistent with the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court; thus, respondents' prayer to bring this case to the banc is totally devoid of merit.
Regarding respondents' other arguments, we need not deal with them as they are merely a rehash of those already raised and thoroughly passed upon in the Decision.
WHEREFORE, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration (With Leave of Court and Prayer that the Resolution of the Instant Case be Submitted to the Supreme Court En Banc) is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Asst. Clerk of Court
[1] Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; rollo, p. 245.
[2]
[3] PNB v.
[4] Social Security System v. COA, 433 Phil. 946, July 11, 2002; Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 368 Phil. 478 June 25, 1999; Manila International Airport Authority v. COA, 238 SCRA 714, December 5, 1994; Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, 214 SCRA 653, October 16, 1992.
[5] PNB v. Palma, supra note 3 at 320.
[6] Id. at 322.
[7] 469 SCRA 397, September 6, 2005.
[8] Id. at 406. Italics and emphasis supplied.
[9] Rollo, unnumbered.
[10] Annex "5," "5-A" and "5-B" of respondents' Motion for Reconsideration; rollo, pp. 273-285.
[11] PNB v. Palma, supra note 3 at 313.
[12] This is pursuant to the principle of non-diminution of benefits.
[13] Supra note 10.
[14] See Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 (Guidelines and Rules in the Referral to the Court En Banc of Cases Assigned to a Division) which took effect on March 1, 1989.
[15] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3).