[G.R. No. 152291.
PHILIPPINE MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC.* versus THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO D. ARTITA AND FELIX E. DOMINGO
Third Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the
Third Division of this Court dated
G.R. No. 152291 (Philippine
Mutual Security Agency, Inc.* versus The Court of Appeals, National Labor
Relations Commission, Rogelio D. Artita and Felix E.
Domingo)
This special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the March
30, 2001 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51399, and its February 12, 2002 Resolution[2]
denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Vacate
Entry of Judgment.
Petitioner Philippine Mutual Security Agency, Inc. provides
security services. Under its contract with
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), petitioner assigned private respondents
Rogelio D. Artita and Felix E. Domingo and some
others, to secure APT's properties in Diit,
Petitioner alleged that despite receiving a series of memoranda
to attend the APT re-orientation conferences and seminars at petitioner's head
office in
Private respondents Artita and Domingo,
in response, alleged that they had, earlier than the scheduled seminars, filed
on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the herein consolidated complaints. Award for compassion the Respondent [sic] is
hereby ordered to pay Felix Domingo P2,000.00 and Rogelio Artita
P2,000.00.
Other claims including those of respondents' are denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Private respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, as discussed above, the decision appealed from is REVERSED,
VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered REMANDING the case for further
reception of evidence with the strict directive for the handling Arbiter to
conduct the necessary proceedings for the early resolution hereof.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On reconsideration, the NLRC resolved the case,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
On the merits, We dismiss the complaints for illegal dismissal of complainants Edgar Caliwan and Bernardo Jullado. We however find complainants Rogelio Artita and Felix Domingo to have been illegally dismissed. Respondent PHILMUSA (Philippine Mutual Security Agency) is hereby ORDERED to pay the following:
|
1. EDGAR CALIWAN a) 13th Month Pay b) Refund of Cash Bond |
……………………………. |
P 6,300.00 |
|
2. BERNARDO JULLADO a) 13th Month Pay b) Refund of Cash Bond |
……………………………. |
4,550.00 |
|
3. FELIX DOMINGO a) Backwages b) Separation Pay c) 13th Month Pay |
…………………155,070.00 …………………..19,600.00 ……………………7,466.66 |
182,136.66 |
|
4. ROGELIO ARTITA a) Backwages b) Separation Pay c) 13th Month Pay |
…………………174,453.80 …………………..25,200.00 ……………………8,925.00 Total Add: Attorney's Fees (10%) Grand Total |
208.578.80 401,565.46 40,156.55 P441,722.01 ========= |
All other claims are dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The NLRC observed that private respondents' termination for
alleged insubordination was a retaliation for their filing of money claims. The issuance of the series of memoranda came
much later and became the excuse for private respondents' termination. The NLRC concluded that private respondents'
termination was illegal for being retaliatory and discriminatory.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is
now before this Court for review on certiorari.
In accordance with St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,[7]
we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. On
Again, before this Court petitioner raises that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion:
(a) ... in denying petitioner's Motion to Vacate Entry of Judgment and
in ruling that petitioner received [i]ts Decision
through counsel despite the undisputed evidence to the contrary.
(b) … in affirming the Resolution of the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (Fourth Division) which reversed the factual findings of
its Regional Arbitration Branch and ruled against the petitioner, without any
transcript or record of the latter's proceedings to properly and fairly guide
them in its review of the case.
(c) ... in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of failure
of petitioner "to post a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from."[8]
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that its Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Vacate Entry of Judgment was seasonably filed
on
x x x x
3. That post-office
messengers are often in a hurry that they don't bother anymore to go up the
building but would sometimes ask me to receive mailed letters for the different
building occupants;
4. Yesterday, I was confronted by the lawyers of the Senining, Belcina, Atup Law Offices with a xerox
copy of the records of the Cebu Post Office about a
letter from the Court of Appeals,
x x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)[11]
To support its contention, petitioner cites Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc.
v. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association,[12] where
the decision of the NLRC was served upon the security guard of the building
where the office of petitioner's counsel was located. We held that "[w]here the copy of the
decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk or one in charge of the attorney's
office, such service is invalid and the decision does not therefore become executory. The
security guard of the building where the attorney is holding office is neither
the office clerk nor a person in charge thereof as contemplated in the rules."[13]
Private respondents counter that the records show that Mahusay had been receiving mail matters for petitioner's
counsel. Such practice was therefore
tolerated by petitioner. Thus, there was
a valid service of the appellate court's decision to petitioner's counsel and
it became final and executory after the lapse of the
period within which petitioner may appeal.
We are not wholly convinced by petitioner's argument. While Mahusay's
affidavit states that "it is not my duty to receive these mail matters,"
the tolerated practice appears an implied agency between him and petitioner's
counsel. In Equitable PCI Bank v. Ku,[14]we
held that:
An agency may be express but it may also be implied from the acts of
the principal, from his silence, or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate
the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. Likewise, acceptance by the
agent may also be express, although it may also be implied from his acts which
carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances.[15]
In this case, Mahusay averred that
"post-office messengers are often in a hurry that they don't bother
anymore to go up the building but would sometimes ask me to receive mailed
letters for the different building occupants," indicating that he had
received on several occasions mail matters for petitioner's counsel. There is no showing that petitioner's counsel
had objected to this practice or took steps to put a stop to it. In fact, Mahusay
even declared that "from now on I will be keeping a log book for such
letters especially those intended for the law office since I realize only now
how important those letters can be," implying that instead of putting a stop
to this practice, petitioner's counsel still allowed him to receive mail matters
as long as he maintains a logbook to keep track of them.
In our view, Mahusay's receipt of the
Court of Appeals' decision dated
In light of the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other
errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals.
As a final note, records show that on
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUClTA
ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
