[G.R. No. 143189. June 7, 2006]

LEODEGARIO E. BANZAL* versus UNILEVER PHILIPPINES (PRC), INC. AND HON. SENECIO O. ORTILE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 30, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA

Third Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated JUNE 7, 2006

G.R. No. 143189 (Leodegario E. Banzal* versus Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. and Hon. Senecio O. Ortile, Presiding Judge, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court, Manila)

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Orders[1] dated December 27, 1999 and March 10, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 97-81467.  The trial court deemed petitioner to have waived his right to present rebuttal evidence and considered the case submitted for decision.

This case stemmed from a complaint for collection of a sum of money filed with the RTC by herein respondent Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. (Unilever) against petitioner Leodegario Banzal.  According to Unilever, Banzal retired from the service but failed to pay his debt in the amount of P250,000, with 18 percent interest per annum.  Banzal, on the other hand, claimed that the debt was already paid since the amount was deducted from his retirement benefits.  He further alleged that under company policy, no retirement benefits are given to employees unless all obligations are settled.

During the trial, Unilever and Banzal presented their evidence.  Then, Banzal moved for the presentation of rebuttal evidence with issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the Manager or any responsible officer of Unilever's Accounting Department to produce pertinent records[2] relative to Banzal's cash advances in the amount of P250,000.  The RTC granted the motion and scheduled a hearing on March 1, 1999.  However, Banzal's counsel failed to attend, citing heavy traffic as reason for such failure.  The trial court thereafter issued an order which considered Banzal to have waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence.

Banzal moved for reconsideration of said order.  On March 12, 1999, the trial court granted the motion and allowed Banzal to present his rebuttal evidence.[3]  Despite due notice, Banzal again failed to appear on date of hearing.  Hence, in an order[4] dated September 6, 1999, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision, and Banzal to have waived his right to present rebuttal evidence, and ordered him to submit his memorandum.

On September 28, 1999, Banzal sought reconsideration, again, citing heavy traffic as the reason for his failure to appear on hearing date.  But the trial court denied his motion in an order[5] dated December 27, 1999.

On January 21, 2000, Banzal again moved for reconsideration of the December 27, 1999 order but to no avail.  In an order dated March 10, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and directed Banzal to submit his memorandum.

Hence this petition, wherein petitioner raises the lone issue:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND/OR GRAVELY ABUSE[D] HIS DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHEN HE DENIED ... PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ... WHICH DENIAL EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED ... PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[6]

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the trial court did not allow him to present rebuttal evidence.  He argues that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration of the September 6, 1999 order on the basis of petitioner's failure to appear on hearing date of said motion.  He further avers that he will be able to substantiate his claims if he is allowed to present the rebuttal evidence under respondent's control.

Private respondent for its part maintains that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, considering that petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to present rebuttal evidence upon failure to attend the hearing despite due notice.  It contends that heavy traffic is not a valid excuse for absence at a hearing or trial.  It adds that petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on January 21, 2000 was actually a second motion for reconsideration of the September 6, 1999 order which was affirmed in the December 27, 1999 order.  Such second motion is prohibited under the Rules of Court and was appropriately denied, according to private respondent.

At the outset, we note that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on January 21, 2000 was in reality a second motion for reconsideration of the September 6, 1999 order.  But such motion cannot be denied outright for being forbidden by law.[7]  Contrary to private respondent's contention, the rule that "no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order"[8] does not apply in this case.  The September 6, 1999 order of the trial court is neither a judgment nor a final order, but merely interlocutory, for it did not rule on or dismiss the case.[9]

Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion in this case.  Petitioner has only himself to blame when he repeatedly failed to present his rebuttal evidence.  "Heavy traffic" without more compelling reasons is not enough to excuse his non-appearance.  The trial court has granted him ample opportunity to present rebuttal evidence, but he still failed to do so.  Thus, the trial court correctly considered the case submitted for decision even without the rebuttal evidence of petitioner.[10]

Besides, the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, which determines the proper forum for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.  Considering that a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.[11]  While this doctrine admits certain exceptions, the circumstances of this case do not permit the application of such exceptions.[12]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The Orders dated December 27, 1999 and March 10, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 97-81467 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court


* Also referred as Banzol in some parts of the records.

[1] Rollo, pp. 47 and 57.  Penned by Judge Senecio O. Ortile.

[2] Id. at 21.  This includes (1) the complete records of non-trade receivables; (2) general journal; (3) general ledger; (4) cash disbursement book and balance sheet, for the years December 1994, 1995 and 1996.

[3] Id. at 33.  Records do not show that respondent corporation presented rebuttal evidence.

[4] Id. at 35.

[5] Id. at 47.

[6] Id. at 14.

[7] Philgreen Trading Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120408, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 719, 726.

[8] RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 37, Sec. 5, 2ND par.

[9] Honoridez v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 153762, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 646, 653.

[10] Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 138296, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 509,518-519.

[11] Honoridez v. Mahinay, supra note 9, at 653-654, citing Del Rosario v. Montaņa, G.R. No. 134433, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 109, 116.

[12] Del Rosario v. Montaņa, id. at 115.