[G.R. No. 141790.
JOHNNIE C. SO versus THE COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTORINO ESERJOSE, ALLEGED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF GLORIA GLORIA
Third Division
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the
Third Division of this Court dated
G.R. No. 141790 (Johnnie C.
So versus The Court of Appeals and Victorino Eserjose, Alleged Attorney-In-Fact of Gloria Gloria)
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1]
and the Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51105, which set aside the Orders[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82, in Criminal Case
No. Q-98-75989.
The facts are undisputed.
On
That sometime in the month of October 1997, in
|
CHECK NO. |
DATE OF CHECK |
AMOUNT |
|
35 0214461 |
|
P 300,000.00 |
|
35 0214455 |
|
1,400,000.00 |
|
35 0214454 |
|
600,000.00 |
payable to the order of CASH valued in the
total amount of P2,300,000.00, Philippine Currency, simultaneously with
exchange of cash from the offended party; that upon presentation of the said
checks to the bank for payment, the same were dishonored and payment thereof refused
for the reasons 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and said accused notwithstanding due notice to
him by the said offended party of such dishonor of the said checks, failed and
refused to deposit the necessary amount to cover the amount of the checks
within three (3) days from receipt of the said notice, to the damage and
prejudice of the said GLORIA GLORIA, represented herein by her attorney-in-fact
VICTORINO E. ESERJOSE in the aforesaid amount of P2,300,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground that the charge
does not constitute an offense. The RTC,
in its Order dated
On petition for certiorari, however, the Court of Appeals ordered
the trial court to reinstate the criminal case against petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted
and respondent court's Orders of
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration. His motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following
grounds:
I. THERE WAS NO VALID
INFORMATION FILED IF "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FAILED TO
SHOW, PRESENT OR FURNISH THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR A COPY OF A SPECIAL POWER
OF ATTORNEY TO PROSECUTE". THE
OPERATIVE FACT OF AUTHORITY IS THE AUTHORITY ITSELF OR THE SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY AND NOT AN AFFIDAVIT OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.
II. COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE
ISSUE, THE HON. RTC JUDGE OF BR. 82, QUEZON CITY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
WHEN HE DISMISSED THE CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RE-FILING AN INFORMATION AFTER
THE INVESTIGATING FISCAL WILL HAVE PASSED UPON THE AUTHENTICITY OF AN ALLEGED
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY THAT WAS PRODUCED MORE THAN FOUR (4) MONTHS AFTER
FILING OF THE INFORMATION WHEN ITS ABSENCE HAS BEEN BROUGHT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PROSECUTORS AND THE COURT FOUR (4) MONTHS EARLIER.
III. A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DOES NOT TOLL THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO FILE
UNDER SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[6]
Petitioner contends that Victorino Eserjose has no authority to institute the complaint for estafa on behalf of the offended party. Petitioner stresses that the offended party
herself must file the complaint in order to establish the element of damage. Lastly, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari for having been
filed out of time, as the second motion for reconsideration does not toll the
running of the prescriptive period.
For his part, respondent Eserjose,
through his principal, Gloria Gloria, countered that
a Special Power of Attorney authorized him to file the estafa
case against petitioner. He argues that
probable cause is not negated by the simple fact that the document itself was
not in his possession during the preliminary investigation. Lastly, he points out that petitioner failed
to promptly assail before the RTC the alleged irregularity of the second motion
for reconsideration.
After carefully weighing the parties' submissions, we resolve to
deny the petition.
Anent the first and second issues, we must stress that it is
not necessary that the offended party file the complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is
that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio,
any person may file the complaint for preliminary investigation.[7] Undoubtedly, estafa
is not an offense that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio. Thus,
with or without a special power of attorney, Eserjose,
or any person for that matter, may properly file the complaint for estafa allegedly committed by herein petitioner against
Gloria.
With respect to the third
issue, the rule is that a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final order is a prohibited pleading.[8]
As such, a second motion for
reconsideration does not suspend the period for filing a petition for
certiorari.[9]
In this particular case, Eserjose had
filed in the RTC two motions for reconsideration of the
Records show that Eserjose received the
notice of the RTC's denial of the first motion for
reconsideration on
Nonetheless, we sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals on
the issue of who has authority to institute a complaint for estafa.
As already discussed, we agree with the
appellate court that Eserjose had authority to file
the complaint on behalf of Gloria. The
trial court gravely erred in quashing the Information and dismissing the
criminal case on the sole ground that the complaint for estafa
was not filed by the offended party herself, but by her attorney-in-fact. It
is, therefore, only proper that in the interest of substantial justice, the
grave error of the trial court be corrected now, and that the criminal case for
estafa against petitioner be reinstated.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51105, which set aside the Orders dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-35. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, witb Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
[2]
[3] Dated
[4] Rollo, p. 25.
[5]
[6]
[7] Salazar v. People, G.R. No. 149472,
[8] RULES
of COURT, Rule 37, Sec. 5. Second motion
for new trial. - x x x
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
[9] University of Immaculate Conception v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 143557, June 25, 2004, 432 SCRA 601, 608.