[OCA-IPI No. 05-93-CA-J.
TOMAS Y. TAN vs. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH (9th) DIVISION
En Banc
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
Court dated
JAN. 31, 2006
OCA-IPI No. 05-93-CA-J (Tomas Y. Tan vs. Chairman and Members of the Court of Appeals, Ninth (9th) Division)
This treats of the instant Verified Complaint dated
PHESCHEM is the private respondent in the case entitled, "Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, Inc., v. Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), Pheschem Industrial Corporation and Philippine Coast Guard," docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88446. The case is a Petition for Review filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by petitioner Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association (PPSTA), wherein certain orders of the Office of the President and is not a party to the case below.
Complainant avers that he filed a Comment before the Court of Appeals seeking the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that PPSTA committed forum-shopping as it had a pending second motion for reconsideration before the Office of the President when it filed the petition before the appellate court, and that it was not a party to the case below.
Complainant maintains that the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals ignored his arguments when with Justice Pine as ponente, it ruled in favor of
PPSTA on
The Court resolves to dismiss the complaint.
The Court holds that the filing of the instant administrative complaint is premature. There is a pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. It precisely seeks the rectification of any error which the appellate court justices may have committed. Under the circumstances, the dropping of the administrative complaint is inexorable. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available.[1]
More fundamentally, the act complained of pertains to the justices' exercise of their judicial functions and, as such, is not subject to the Court's disciplinary power unless committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith, which exception complainant has neither shown nor proven.[2]
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court