THIRD
DIVISION
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Petitioner, - versus- PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (PNP-CIDG),
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 169982 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the dismissal from service of
petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto after being found
guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its
Decision,[2]
dated 27 May 2004, in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its Decision,[3] dated
20 July 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
The present Petition stems
from a Complaint,[4] dated 28
July 2003, filed by respondent Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), through its Director, Eduardo S. Matillano, with the Office of the Ombudsman, which charges
petitioner and the rest of his family as follows:
The undersigned Director of the PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group is hereby filing complaints for Violation
of RA 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in favor of the State any property
found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer) in
relation to Section 8, RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended, Section 8(a) of RA 6713, (Code of Ethical Standard for Public official
and employee) and Section 7 of RA 3019 (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities) and for violation of Article 171 para
4, RPC (Perjury/Falsification of Public Official Documents) against the
following:
1.
USEC
2.
MIGUELA PLEYTO (Wife)- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village,
3.
4.
MARY GRACE
PLETYO- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village,
5.
RUSSEL
PLEYTO-
The said Complaint was based on the
investigation/inquiry on the alleged lavish lifestyle and nefarious activities
of certain personnel of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
conducted by a team, composed of Atty. Virgilio T. Pablico (Atty. Pablico) and Crime
Investigator II Dominador D. Ellazar,
Jr. (Investigator Ellazar, Jr.) of the PNP-CIDG,
together with investigating officers from other government agencies. Petitioner, then serving as a DPWH
Undersecretary, was one of the subjects of the investigating team since he
reportedly amassed unexplained wealth.
Investigating officers, Atty. Pablico and
Investigator Ellazar, Jr., executed a Joint
Affidavit,[6]
essentially stating that: (1) petitioner and the rest of his family accumulated
numerous real properties in Bulacan, other than their
newly renovated residence in Quezon City; (2)
petitioner did not honestly fill out his Statements of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALNs) for
the years 2001 and 2002 for he failed to declare therein all of his and his
wife’s real and personal properties, the true value thereof, and their business
interests; (3) petitioner and his family also took frequent foreign trips from
1993 to 2002; and (4) the properties and foreign trips of petitioner and his
family are grossly disproportionate to petitioner’s income.
The
Investigating Panel from the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau A (PIAB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman, tasked to
evaluate the Complaint against petitioner and his family, issued a Report on 9
September 2003, recommending that the said Complaint be docketed as separate
administrative and criminal cases.
Pursuant thereto, the administrative complaint was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0347-1,
while the criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-05130-1. It is the administrative complaint, OMB-C-A-03-0347-1, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, which presently concerns this Court.[7]
In
its initial evaluation of the “numerous pieces of evidence” which were attached
to the Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Order, dated
In
the meantime, petitioner, his wife, and his children filed their respective
Counter-Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits before the Office of the
Ombudsman, presenting the following defenses: (1) petitioner admits ownership
of the real properties identified in the Complaint but alleges that they were
acquired by way of foreclosure or dacion en
pago in the course of his wife’s lending business
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan; (2) petitioner is not solely dependent on his salary
since his wife has been operating several businesses in Bulacan,
including lending, piggery, and pawnshop, for the last 25 years; (3) his
children are not financially dependent on petitioner and his wife, but are
full-fledged entrepreneurs and professionals; and (4) the computation of their
travel expenses is exaggerated and inaccurate since most of petitioner’s trips
were sponsored by foreign and local organizations, his wife’s trips were
promotional travel packages to Asian destinations, and his children’s trips
were at their own expense.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondent SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, is hereby found
guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and DISHONESTY and is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service.
The
Honorable Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways, Port Area,
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order[11]
dated
Petitioner
then assailed before the Court of Appeals the Decision, dated
1.
Upon filing of the petition, a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be immediately issued directing
the Office of the Ombudsman, its officials and agents, or persons acting for
and on it [sic] behalf, including the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways from implementing the assailed Decision of the
Ombudsman dated 28 June 2004 and its Order dated 12 October 2004.
2.
After hearing on the merits, that judgment be rendered
nullifying the assailed Decision of the Ombudsman dated
Other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.[12]
On
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the PNP-CIDG, requested an
extension of 30 days, or until
However, even before the OSG
could file its Comment, the Office of the Ombudsman filed its own Comment (with
Motions to Intervene; Admit Comment; and Recall Temporary Restraining Order) on
Petitioner promptly filed a
Reply Ad Cautelam (To Ombudsman’s Comment)
with Supplemental Plea. In addition to
opposing the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No.
87086, petitioner also addressed the arguments presented by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its Comment on the propriety of his dismissal from service. He avers that he has adequately controverted by clear and convincing evidence the
unsubstantiated charges against him.
Petitioner thus pleads anew for the immediate and urgent grant of his
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the
order of dismissal of the Office of the Ombudsman.
On
Finding that the execution of the judgment of dismissal
from service of petitioner pending his appeal thereof would possibly work
injustice to petitioner, or tend to render the judgment on his appeal
ineffectual, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[13]
on 1 March 2005 granting the writ of preliminary injunction, thus, ordering the
Office of the Ombudsman and all persons action on its behalf from implementing
its assailed Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12 October 2004,
pending final determination of CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. The appellate court further directed the
parties to submit their memoranda.
Petitioner and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their
respective Memoranda, while the OSG manifested that it was adopting its Comment
and the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman on the Petition as its
Memorandum.
On
To repeat, the
administrative liabilities of the petitioner proven by substantial evidence is
his failure to file a truthful and accurate SALN and possession of assets
manifestly out of proportion of (sic) his legitimate income. Either one is legal basis for dismissal or
removal from office. As a final
recourse, the petitioner asks for the chance to correct his SALN before he should
be held administratively liable. The
Ombudsman ripostes that this would be a mockery of the law, saying that the
SALN is not a misdeclare-first-and
correct-if-caught instrument, but a full and solemn recording under oath of
al (sic) the items required to be reported. Ipse dixit.
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the petition
DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary
injunction is LIFTED.[14]
The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution,[15] dated 4
October 2005, found that the arguments raised in petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already been discussed and passed upon in its Decision,
dated 20 July 2005, and there was no cogent reason to warrant reconsideration,
much less, a reversal of the appellate court’s original findings. Hence, petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision, dated
a) The Court of
Appeals committed grave error in law in allowing the active intervention of the
Ombudsman in the review proceedings and invoking its arguments raised on appeal
in the resolution of the case.[16]
b) The Court of
Appeals gravely erred in adopting in toto the
appealed judgment of the Ombudsman, the finding being inconsistent with the
evidence on record and the burden of proof required by law being higher than
mere substantial evidence as the penalty involves dismissal from service.[17]
c) The Court of
Appeals committed grave error in law in declaring that petitioner’s resort to
the Compliance and Review Procedure under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6713 is completely
unavailing.[18]
Pursuant
to a Resolution issued by this Court on
NOW, THEREFORE, you (the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways), your officers, agents, representatives, and/or persons acting upon your orders or, in your place or stead, are hereby ENJOINED, ORDERED, COMMANDED and DIRECTED to desist from implementing the assailed decision and order dated June 28, 2004 and October 12, 2004, respectively, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I entitled “Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group vs. Salvador A. Pleyto” dismissing herein petitioner from the service, as affirmed in the decision and resolution dated July 20, 2005 and October 4, 2005, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 entitled “Salvador A. Pleyto vs. Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.”[19]
Having established the facts leading to the Petition at bar, this Court shall now proceed to review petitioner’s assigned errors one at a time.
Petitioner
raises before this Court his continued objection to the intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. It should be recalled that the Office of the
Ombudsman, although not named as a respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, filed
its Comment and Memorandum therein, which were admitted by the Court of
Appeals.
The Office of the Ombudsman moved
to intervene in the Court of Appeals proceedings in representation of the
State’s interests. As a competent
disciplining body, it asserts its rights to defend its own findings of fact and
law relative to the imposition of its decisions and ensure that its judgments
in administrative disciplinary cases be upheld by the appellate court,
consistent with the doctrine laid down by this Court in Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy[20]
and Philippine National Bank v. Garcia.[21] As the agency which rendered the assailed
Decision, it is best equipped with the knowledge of the facts, laws and
circumstances that led to the finding of guilt against petitioner.
Petitioner opposed from the very
beginning the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the appellate
court proceedings. He pointed out to the
Court of Appeals that only the PNP-CIDG was named as a respondent in his
Petition for Review, and the Office of the Ombudsman was not impleaded because Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
expressly mandates that the court or agency which rendered the assailed
decision should not be impleaded in the
petition. He argued that the
non-inclusion of the court or tribunal as respondent in cases elevated on
appeal is founded on the doctrine that the court is not a combatant in the
appeal proceedings. He called attention
to previous rulings of this Court admonishing judges to maintain a posture of
detachment in cases where their decisions are elevated on appeal or
review.
Petitioner,
in the instant Petition, presents the same arguments in support of his first
assignment of error. It is noted that
the OSG, representing the PNP-CIDG, in its Comment and Memorandum before this
Court, did not address the issue on the intervention of the Office of the
Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, focusing solely on the issue on the
propriety of the dismissal from service of petitioner.
After
a review of both positions on the matter of the intervention of the Office of
the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, this Court rules
in favor of petitioner. The Court of
Appeals indeed committed an error in admitting the Comment and Memorandum of
the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto[22] already settled that appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman should be
brought first to the Court of Appeals via a verified Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, together with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from
judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. In specifying the contents of such a Petition
for Review, both Rule 43 of the Rules of Court[23]
and Administrative Circular No. 1-95[24]
require the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the lower courts or agencies as petitioners or
respondents. The only parties in
an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee
as respondent. The court, or in this case, the administrative agency which
rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in said appeal.[25]
This is not
a case wherein the petitioner improperly impleaded
the Office of the Ombudsman in his Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No.
87086. In fact, the petitioner adhered
to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 1-95, by
naming as respondent only the PNP-CIDG, the original complainant against
him. It is the Office of the Ombudsman
who actively sought to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
It is a
well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre
for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such
proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual
positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active
participation. When a judge actively
participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial
and has become adversarial instead.[26]
The court
or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when
hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought
on appeal before a higher court. The
judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind
that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in
accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should
already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify
further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial
officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his
detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal
since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the
original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment),
but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors, defend
his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
The
reliance of the Office of the Ombudsman on this Court’s pronouncements in Dacoycoy and Garcia cases are
misplaced.
The issue in the landmark case Dacoycoy, was the right of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to file an appeal with this Court from the decision of the
Court of Appeals exonerating the civil service officer Dacoycoy
from the administrative charges against him.
According to Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, appeals, where
allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within
15 days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within 15 days. Previous decisions of this Court ruled that
the “party adversely affected” in Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, refers
solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively disciplined
and, hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty. It is within the foregoing
context that this Court ruled in Dacoycoy in
the following manner:
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals to the Supreme Court?
Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service
system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it
may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this
ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases
where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” or “when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.” In other words, we
overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes
v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro
v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.[27]
The similar issue arose in Garcia. In said case, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee Garcia the penalty of
forced resignation for gross neglect of duty.
On appeal, the CSC exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges
against him. In
accordance with its ruling in Dacoycoy, this
Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to
appeal to the Court of Appeals the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which
complained of Garcia’s acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be finally
exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its
fold. PNB should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its
view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it
can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the
country.
Having established the
foregoing, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Dacoycoy and Garcia
to support its intervention in the appellate court proceedings for the following reasons:
First, petitioner was not exonerated from the administrative
charges against him, and was in fact dismissed for grave misconduct and
dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its decision in the administrative
case, OMB-C-A-03-0347-I. Thus, it was
petitioner who appealed to the Court of Appeals being, unquestionably, the
party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.
Second, the issue herein is the right of the Office of the
Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to
appeal. Its decision has not even been
reversed yet so no question has arisen as to the standing of the Office of the
Ombudsman to appeal from the reversal of its judgment. The Office of the Ombudsman
only wishes to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 to make sure that its decision
dismissing petitioner from service is upheld by the appellate court.
And third, Dacoycoy
and Garcia should be read together with Mathay, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals[28] and National
Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[29] in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of
the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of
decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a
private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority.
Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize “either party” to appeal in the
instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP
member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the
government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but
the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can
appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the
case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous
situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the
case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy,
the Court declared:
To be sure, when the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As
a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge
who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review.”
In instituting G.R. No.
126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to “hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of
its offices and agencies,” not to litigate.[30]
Should the Office of the
Ombudsman insist on its right to intervene based on Dacoycoy and Garcia,
then its exercise of such right should likewise be qualified according to Mathay and Mamauag. As the disciplining authority or tribunal
which heard the case and imposed the penalty, it must remain partial and detached. It must be mindful of its role as an
adjudicator, not an advocate. It should
just have allowed the government agency prosecuting the administrative charges
against petitioner, namely, the PNP-CIDG, appropriately represented by the OSG,
to participate in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086.
Not
being an appropriate party to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, any
participation of the Office of the Ombudsman therein, more particularly,
through its Comment, Memorandum, and other pleadings, should not have been
considered by the Court of Appeals. Not
even the adoption by the OSG of the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman as
its Memorandum can cure the defect of such Comment which was filed by a
non-party to the case. To rule otherwise
would be to condone the wrongful intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in
the appellate court proceedings and to allow a circumvention of a fundamental
rule of procedure, for it would still afford the Office of the Ombudsman the
opportunity to effectively present its position and arguments in the case
despite its absence of interest or personality therein, a dangerous precedent
indeed.
Intervention
of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be allowed on liberality. Obedience to the requirements of procedural
rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom,
and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping on
the policy of liberal construction.[31] Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.[32]
This Court now proceeds to
petitioner’s second assignment of error in which he alleges that the judgment
against him was grossly inconsistent with the evidence on record and the burden
of proof required by law. Undoubtedly,
petitioner is requesting that this Court consider and weigh again the evidence
presented before the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as the Court of Appeals,
and make its own findings of fact.
While it is an established rule in
administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of
fact of said administrative agencies, the same is not absolute and there are
recognized exceptions thereto. Courts
may not be bound by the findings of fact of an administrative agency when there
is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial;[33] when
there is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such
that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction;[34]
or when the precise issue in the case on appeal is whether there is
substantial evidence supporting the findings of the administrative agency.[35] The last exception exists in this case and
compels this Court to review the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
There are two principal findings
against petitioner as a result of the proceedings below: (1) petitioner failed
to satisfactorily prove that his acquisition of properties, as well as his
foreign travels, were within his lawful income; and (2) petitioner willfully
concealed and misdeclared his assets in his 2001 and
2002 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). It was on the basis thereof that petitioner
was found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty by both the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.
The Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its investigating officers identified the following properties in the name of petitioner and his wife:
a)
One residential house and lot in
b)
Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
·
Three residential lots measuring 998, 998 and
359 sq. m.;
·
One residential house built on a lot measuring
356 sq. m.;