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ELIODORO ALELIGAY, substituted
by CEFERINO ALELIGAY, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 165943
Present: |
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- versus - TEODORICO LASERNA, PRISCILLA VILLAGRACIA
and ANGUSTIA |
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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VILLAGRACIA, Respondents. |
November 20, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the Decision[1]
and the Resolution[2]
dated
Subject of the present controversy is a
124,554 sq. m. parcel of land located in the Barrios of Daplas and Matagnop,
Dao, Capiz, identified as Lot No. 1235 of Cadastral Survey of Dao, originally
owned by Anselmo Aleligay. Upon Anselmo’s
death in 1927, the lot passed on to his heirs, namely: Eleno, Maura, Juan, Consolacion, Rosario and
herein petitioner Eliodoro (now deceased), all surnamed Aleligay.[4] At present, the lot is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-995 issued by the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Capiz in the name of respondents Priscilla and Angustia Villagracia
(the Villagracias).
In his Complaint, Eliodoro claimed
that after inheriting Lot No. 1235, he mortgaged it in 1946 to respondent
Teodorico Laserna although he retained its possession. He also averred he tried several times to redeem
the property from Laserna but was persuaded by the latter not to hurry. He alleged that it was only in 1976 when he
discovered a deed of sale in Laserna’s favor. Allegedly it was signed by him, but he
insisted that his purported signature was a forgery committed by Laserna. Hence, Laserna’s sale of the lot to the Villagracias,
according to complainant, was illegal and void.
In his Answer, Laserna alleged that in
1946, he and Diosdado Martirez bought the property from Eliodoro and his
siblings.[5] Martirez later on sold his portion to
Laserna.[6] In 1969, Laserna sold the entire property to
the Villagracias. Contrary to Eliodoro’s
claim, Laserna insisted he had been in possession of the property since 1946.
For their part, the Villagracias averred
that Laserna had been the owner of Lot No. 1235 since 1946 and had in fact leased
the lot to one Gregorio Gecarane, Jr. They
also claimed to have bought[7]
the lot in good faith from Laserna on August 12, 1969 and had later on secured
an order for the registration of said lot from the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Capiz; hence, OCT No. 0-995 was issued in their favor.
During the pre-trial, the parties, in
the stipulation of facts,[8]
admitted the authenticity and due execution of the
On
WHEREFORE, a decision is rendered
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of a (sic) cause of action, and;
1. Declaring
defendants Priscil[l]a Villagracia and Angustia Villagracia owners of Lot No.
1235 of the Cadastral Survey of Dao, Capiz, with right of possession, and
ordering plaintiff and all persons under him, their agents and representatives
to vacate the land;
2. Ordering
plaintiff to pay defendants the sum of P7,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
to pay defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and,
3. To
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
While
the case was pending appeal, Eliodoro died and he was substituted by his son, Ceferino
Aleligay. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming the trial court’s ruling. It also held that a valid Deed of Absolute
Sale existed among respondents Laserna and the Villagracias. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the
SO ORDERED.[11]
In the
instant petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN RESPONDENT [TEODORICO LASERNA]
AND [ELIODORO ALELIGAY] WAS A MERE MORTGAGE AND NOT
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS PRISCILLA AND ANGUSTIA VILLAGRACIA WERE
BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH.[12]
Simply
stated, the issues raised are: (1) Is the Deed of Sale dated
Eliodoro
contends that the questioned deed of sale should be declared as an equitable
mortgage, because he had continued possession of Lot No. 1235 since 1946, which
proves his ownership of Lot No. 1235. He
further contends that if it was really intended by the parties to convey
ownership over Lot No. 1235, then Laserna should have
occupied the lot after the alleged transaction. Eliodoro insists
that his possession had remained uninterrupted, public, adverse and in the
concept of an owner.[13]
On the other hand, respondents Laserna
and Villagracias were one in the assertion that they, in succession, owned and
had possessed Lot No. 1235. Laserna, on
his part, testified that he bought the lot from Eliodoro and his siblings, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated
Laserna
also testified that he occupied the lot immediately after the sale and that he has
consistently declared it in his name for taxation purposes.[14]
He likewise presented a Joint Affidavit[15]
executed by Eliodoro and one Presentacion Sion Vda. de
Estialbo, both adjoining owners, attesting that Laserna owned Lot No. 1235.
Laserna also
presented as witness, a certain Gregorio Gecarane, Jr., a government employee
and resident of Matagnop, Dao, Capiz, who testified that he once leased the lot
from Laserna. This
fact was evidenced by a notarized lease contract.[16] Gregorio also testified that before he leased
it from January 1969 to February 1971, Laserna had occupied it.
Most
significant, the Dactyloscopic Report FP Case No.
84-66[17]
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) confirmed the genuineness and
authenticity of Eliodoro’s signature and the fingerprints of other heirs, Maura
and Rosario, on the questioned Deed of Sale.
The records also revealed that the
Villagracias testified that they filed a case against Eliodoro for forcible
entry docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 95[18]
and 97.[19] They then possessed the lot after the sheriff
turned over possession to them. However,
Eliodoro re-entered the lot forcing them to file another case against him. For the record, another witness for
respondents, namely Quirubin Franco, the officer-in-charge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Dao-Ivisan, Capiz, identified the decision of the
Court in Civil Cases Nos. 95 and 97.
That decision ordered Eliodoro to vacate Lot No.
1235 or the portion illegally possessed by him.
Now, on the claim of petitioner that what he entered into was
an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale. Under Article 1602, in relation to Article
1604[20]
of the Civil Code, the instances when a contract – regardless of its
nomenclature – may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage are as follows:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
x x x x
The presence of any of these
circumstances is sufficient for a contract to be deemed an equitable mortgage. Both the trial and appellate courts, however,
found none of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil
Code. Neither do we find any cogent
reason to reverse their findings. Actori
incumbit onus probandi. (Upon the
plaintiff in a civil case lies the burden of proof.) Plaintiff must therefore establish his case
by preponderance of evidence; failing to do so results in his defeat.[21]
On this point, we are in agreement that records on hand show that the
questioned deed of sale is really one of sale and not an equitable mortgage. Eliodoro’s assertion
of continued possession over Lot No. 1235 was not substantiated by any indubitable
evidence nor was it attested to by any other witness. Except for his
self-serving claims, Eliodoro could not refute the
overwhelming evidence of respondents that the disputed contract is one of sale.
First, being a notarized document, the questioned deed of
sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred by law upon duly executed
instruments; it is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.[22] Second, not one of the Aleligays,
except for petitioner, appeared in court to deny under oath their respective
signatures and fingerprints appearing on the questioned deed of sale. On the contrary, respondents presented in
evidence the Dactyloscopic Report FP Case No. 84-66 conducted by the NBI
confirming the genuineness and authenticity of Eliodoro’s signature and the fingerprints
of other signatory heirs, namely Maura and Rosario, in the questioned Deed of
Sale. Third, respondents presented a
joint affidavit executed on
Finally, we need not tarry on the alleged issue on good faith.
Good faith is always presumed, unless
convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced.[25] Eliodoro failed to submit such contrary
proof. Thus, the presumption of good
faith in favor of the Villagracias stands.
Whether there was good or bad faith on their part as buyers, in our view,
is a non-issue, raised mainly by petitioner to beef up his scanty contention.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 82-89. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes,
Jr., with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos
and Josefina Guevara-Salonga concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, p. 110.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, pp. 84-85.
[9] Supra note 7.
[10] Rollo, p. 64.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Records, pp. 121-123.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo, pp. 145-148.
[20] Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
[21] San Pedro v. Lee, G.R. No. 156522,
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 63 and 88.
[24] See Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119794,
[25] Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 117609, December 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 565, 575.