THIRD
DIVISION
|
PARAÑAQUE, and/or AMABLE C. AGUILUZ IX, President, MRS. CELESTE BANSALE, School Director, MS. SOCORRO, MR. PATRICK AZANZA, GRACE BERANIA and MAJAL JACOB, Petitioners, - versus - ROLANDO A. AUSTRIA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 164078 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November
23, 2007 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated
The Facts
After a thorough evaluation of the
performance of Mr. Rolando
In view of this, he will be entitled
to a transportation allowance of One Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P1,560.00).
In the event that Mr. Austria gives up the Dean position or fails to meet the standards of the (sic) based on the evaluation of his immediate superior, he shall be considered for a faculty position and the appointee agrees that he shall lose the transportation allowance he enjoys as Dean and be entitled to his faculty rate.
Sometime in August 2000, respondent
was charged with violating AMA’s Employees’ Conduct and Discipline provided in
its Orientation Handbook (Handbook),[7]
as follows:
1) leaking of test questions;
2) failure to monitor general requirements vital to the operations of the
company; and
3) gross inefficiency.
In a Memorandum[8]
dated
Dear Mr.
Please be informed that after a careful deliberation on the case filed against you and upon serious consideration of the evidences (sic) presented, the Management has found you guilty of violating the following policies:
A. Loss of trust and confidence by management due to gross inefficiency.
(5.21 Very Serious/Grave Offense)
B. Failure to monitor general requirements vital to the operations of the company.
(5.10 Medium Offense)
C. Leaking of test questions.
(4.17 Very Serious/Grave Offense)
This resulted to the loss of trust and confidence in your credibility as a company officer holding a highly sensitive position. In view of this, your services as Dean of AMA Parañaque is hereby terminated effective immediately.
You are hereby instructed to report to the branch HR Personnel for further instructions. Please bear in mind that as a company policy you are required to accomplish your clearance and turn over all documents and responsibilities to the appropriate officers.
You are barred from
entering the company premises unless with clearance from the HRD.[10]
On
The Labor
Arbiter's Ruling
In his Decision[12]
dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
P30,000 x 10/30 days = P10,000.00 and his proportionate transportation allowance.
P1,560.00 x 10/30 days = P520.00 and the salary/benefits
withheld prior to
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed the
said Decision to the NLRC.[13]
The NLRC's
Ruling
On
serving the
three (3)-month probationary period required under the Handbook.[15]
Thus, while the NLRC sustained the Labor
Arbiter's finding that petitioners failed to establish the grounds for
respondent's dismissal, it held that the Labor Arbiter erred in declaring that
respondent's appointment was only from April 24 to
PREMISES
CONSIDERED the Decision of P100,378.80).
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[17]
assailing respondent's regular status, which the NLRC in a Resolution,[18]
denied for having been filed out of time and for lack of merit. Respondent also
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[19]
which the NLRC, in another Resolution,[20]
denied for lack of merit.
Thus, petitioners went to the CA via
Petition for Certiorari[21]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The CA's
Ruling
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as above stated, with regard to the computation of backwages.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[23]
of the said Decision, which the CA denied, in its Resolution[24]
dated
Hence, this Petition based on the sole
ground that the CA committed serious error of law in affirming and then further
modifying the erroneous decision of the NLRC declaring that herein respondent
was illegally dismissed by AMA.[25]
Petitioners argue that respondent, as
college dean, was an academic personnel of AMA under Section 4(m) (4)(c) of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools[26]
(Manual) and, as such, his
probationary employment is governed by Section 92[27]
thereof and not by the Labor Code or AMA's Handbook; that under the
circumstances, respondent has not yet attained the status of a regular
employee; that respondent's employment was for a fixed term as found by the
Labor Arbiter but the same was terminated earlier due to just causes; that the
respondent, whether he may be considered as a probationary or a regular
employee, was dismissed for just causes; and that the award of backwages in
favor of the respondent, up to the finality of the decision, is oppressive to
the petitioners, considering the absence of an order of reinstatement and the
respondent's fixed period of employment.[28]
On the other hand, respondent counters
that both the NLRC and the CA found that respondent was a regular employee and
that he was illegally dismissed; that the instant Petition raises questions of
fact - such as whether or not respondent is a regular employee and whether or
not circumstances existed warranting his
dismissal - which can no
longer be inquired into by
this Court;[29]
that petitioners assailed the regular status of the respondent for the first
time only before the CA; that they never raised as issue respondent's regular status before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC because they merely concentrated on their stand that respondent was
lawfully dismissed; that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving
the existence of a valid ground in dismissing respondent as found by the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA; and that the CA's award of backwages from the
date of actual dismissal up to the date
of the finality of the decision in favor of the respondent is consonant with
Article 279[30]
of the Labor Code, and hence, valid.[31]
From this exchange of arguments, we
glean two ultimate questions that require resolution, viz.:
1. What is the nature of respondent's
employment?
2. Was he lawfully
dismissed?
The first question, i.e., whether respondent is a regular,
probationary, or fixed term employee is essentially factual in nature.[32]
However, the Court opts to resolve this question due to the far-reaching effects
it could bring to the sector of the academe.
As an exception to the general rule, we
held in Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc.: [33]
A disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission opens the door to a review thereof by this Court. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.
The instant case falls squarely within
the aforesaid exception. The Labor Arbiter held that, while petitioners did not
prove the existence of just causes in order to warrant respondent's dismissal,
the latter's employment as dean ceased to exist upon expiration of respondent's
term of employment on
Prior to his dismissal, respondent held
the position of college dean. The letter of appointment states that he was officially
confirmed as Dean of AMA College, Parañaque,
effective from
We agree.
We held that Article 280 of the Labor
Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period.
Even if the duties of the employee consist of activities necessary or desirable
in the usual business of the employer, the parties are free to
agree on a fixed period
of time for
the performance of such activities. There is nothing
essentially
contradictory
between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s
duties.[34]
Thus, this Court's ruling in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[35] is instructive:
The question immediately provoked. . . is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The definition seems non sequitur. From the premise — that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" — the conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or identical to employment with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when." Seasonal employment, and employment for a particular project are merely instances of employment in which a period, where not expressly set down, is necessarily implied.
x x x x x x x x x
Some familiar examples may be cited of
employment contracts which may
be neither for seasonal
work nor for
specific projects, but to which
a fixed term
is an essential
and natural appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one,
to which, whatever
the nature of
the engagement, the concept
of regular employment with all that it
implies does not
appear ever to
have been applied,
Article 280 of the Labor
Code notwithstanding; also appointments to the positions of dean,
assistant dean, college
secretary, principal, and other
administrative offices in educational
institutions, which are by practice
or tradition rotated
among the faculty members, and where
fixed terms are
a necessity without which no
reasonable rotation would be possible . . . .
x x x
The instant case involves respondent's
position as dean, and comes within the purview of the
First.
The letter of appointment was clear. Respondent was confirmed as Dean of AMA
College, Parañaque, effective from
Second.
The fact that respondent did not sign the letter of appointment is of no
moment. We held in
Accordingly, and since the entire
purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present
Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already
observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out
all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive
evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent security of tenure. It should
have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed
upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or
improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the
employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.
Unless, thus, limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to
purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences.[37]
The fact that respondent voluntarily accepted
the employment, assumed the position, and performed the functions of dean is
clear indication that he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the terms and
conditions of the appointment, including the fixed period of his deanship.
Other than the handwritten notes made in the letter of appointment, no evidence
was ever presented to show that respondent’s consent was vitiated, or that
respondent objected to the said appointment or to any of its conditions.
Furthermore, in his status as dean, there can be no valid inference that he was
shackled by any form of moral dominance exercised by AMA and the rest of the
petitioners.
Alternatively, petitioners also claim
that respondent did not attain regular status, relying on Section 92 of the Manual in connection with Section 4(m) 4(c)
thereof which provides for a three (3)-year probationary period for Academic
Personnel. Petitioners submit that the position of dean is included in the
provision “school officials responsible for academic matters, and may include
other school officials.” As such, petitioners aver that the three (3)-month
probationary period for officers set forth in the Handbook is not applicable to
the case of respondent.
The Handbook merely provides for two
classes of employees for purposes of permanency, i.e., Faculty and Non-Academic. However, the same does not
specifically classify the position of dean as part of the Faculty or of the Non-Academic
personnel. At this juncture, we find solace in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools Annotated,[38]
which provides that the college dean is the senior officer responsible for the
operation of an academic program, the enforcement of rules and regulations, and
the supervision of faculty and student services. We already had occasion to
state that the position of dean is primarily academic[39]
and, as such, he is considered a managerial employee.[40]
Yet, a perusal of the Handbook yields
the interpretation that the provision on the permanency of Faculty members
applies to teachers only. But the Handbook or school manual must yield to the
decree of the Manual, the latter
having the character of law.[41]
The specified probationary periods in Section 92 of the Manual are the maximum periods; under certain conditions, regular
status may be achieved by the employee in less time.[42]
However, under the given circumstances and the fact that the position of dean
in this case is for a fixed term, the issue whether the respondent attained a
regular status is not in point. By the same token, the application of the
provision in the Manual as to the
required probationary period is misplaced. It can be well said that a tenured status
of employment co-exists and is co-terminous only with the definite term fixed
in the contract of employment.
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, the resolution of the second question requires full cognizance of
respondent’s fixed term of employment and all the effects thereof. It is axiomatic that a contract of employment
for a definite period terminates on its own force at the end of such period.[43] The lack of notice of termination is of no
consequence because when the contract specifies the length of its duration, it
comes to an end upon the expiration of such period.[44]
Thus, the unanimous finding of the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA that respondent adequately refuted all the
charges against him assumes relevance only insofar as respondent’s dismissal
from the service was effected by petitioners before expiration of the fixed
period of employment. True, petitioners erred in dismissing the respondent,
acting on the mistaken belief that respondent was liable for the charges
leveled against him. But respondent also
cannot claim entitlement to any benefit flowing from such employment after
Finally, while this Court adheres to
the principle of social justice and protection to labor, the constitutional
policy to provide such protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to
oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause
of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when the law is
clearly on its side.[45]
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition is GRANTED and the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 78455 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION