PABLO R.
ANTONIO, JR.,
Petitioner, -
versus - ENGR. EMILIO M. MORALES as Sole Proprietor of E. M.
MORALES & ASSOCIATES, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
165552
Present: PUNO, c.j., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: January 23, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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For
our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals
dated
Records
show that on December 18, 1995, E. M. Morales & Associates filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati City a complaint for a sum of money
(based upon an oral contract) against Pablo R. Antonio, Jr., petitioner, and
Design Consultancy, Inc., docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-1796.
Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: (1) plaintiff’s failure
to attach to the complaint a certificate of non-forum shopping; and (2) plaintiff’s
lack of legal capacity to sue, plaintiff being a sole proprietorship.
On
The
RTC issued an Order admitting the amended complaint and denying petitioner’s motion
to dismiss. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied, prompting him to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59309, which
remained pending for more than six years.
Feeling
that the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 59309 would be indefinite, respondent filed
with the RTC a motion to dismiss his complaint.
On
On
On
On
Meanwhile,
on
Forthwith,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription
considering that under Article 1145 of the Civil Code, actions based on oral
contracts prescribe in six years.
Petitioner maintains that from August 14, 1995, when he received
respondent’s last letter of demand, to September 23, 2002, when respondent
filed Civil Case No. Q-02-47835, more than seven years had elapsed; and that
the first case, Civil Case No. 95-1796, did not interrupt the running of the
period.
However,
the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner seasonably
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 80001.
On
Hence,
the present petition raising the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint by reason of prescription.
The
petition lacks merit.
Articles
1139, 1145 and 1155 of the Civil Code provide:
ART.
1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
x
x x
ART. 1145. The following actions must be
commenced within six years:
(1)
Upon an oral-contract
(2) Upon a quasi-contract.
x x x
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor.
In
the early case of US v. Serapio,[3]
this Court held that under the Civil Code, the prescription of an action refers
to the time within which an action must be brought after the right of action
has accrued. The prescriptive statutes serve to protect those who are diligent
and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. The rationale behind the prescription
of actions is to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great
distances of time, thus surprising the parties or their representatives when
the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or
death or removal of the witnesses.[4] Prescription applies even to the most
meritorious claims.
Prescription
as understood and used in this jurisdiction does not simply mean a mere lapse
of time. Rather, there must be a
categorical showing that due to plaintiff’s negligence, inaction, lack of
interest, or intent to abandon a lawful claim or cause of action, no action
whatsoever was taken, thus allowing the statute of limitations to bar any
subsequent suit.
Petitioner’s
invocation of prescription is misplaced.
We recall that on
We
further observe that respondent acted swiftly after the dismissal of his case
without prejudice by the Makati RTC. He
immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a manifestation that Civil Case No.
95-1796 was dismissed by the lower court. But the Court of Appeals acted on his
manifestation only after one year. This
delay, beyond respondent’s control, in turn further caused delay in the filing
of his new complaint with the Quezon City RTC. Clearly, there was no inaction or lack of
interest on his part.
The statute of limitations was
devised to operate primarily against those who slept on their rights and not
against those desirous to act but could not do so for causes beyond their
control.[5] Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in
holding that the RTC, Branch 215, Quezon City did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondent’s complaint
and ruled that respondent’s filing of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-47835 is not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80001. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 36-43. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
[2] Ibid., pp. 45-46.
[3] 23 Phil. 584 (1912).
[4] Sinaon
v. Soroñgon, G.R. No. 59879,
[5] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43179,