G.R. No.
174153 – RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.
AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No.
174299 – MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
respondents.
Promulgated:
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am
convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition
before it. The proposals of petitioners
incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the
respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August
25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a petition entitled “IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
THROUGH A PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND
PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM.” The case was
docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their
petition in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed their
signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens,
residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at
least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all
the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people’s initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that “(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right,” the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,[1] are sufficient enabling details for the people’s exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
x x x x
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has
the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for
initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to
“enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”[2]
Petitioners incorporated in their
petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the
1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
On
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an “empty right,” and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the
case to this Court on a petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In support
of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter
alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE
C.
THE PERMANENT
INJUNCTION ISSUED IN
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.[3]
Petitioners
Failed to Allege and
Demonstrate
All the Essential
Facts To
Establish the Right
to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set
out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x[4]
The Court has invariably defined
“grave abuse of discretion,” thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.[5]
There is thus grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.[6] The only question involved is jurisdiction,
either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari
is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.[7] An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible
only by an appeal.[8]
In the present case, it appears from
the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for
initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.[9] In said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for
initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for
the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty
for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the
petition for initiative as “capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely
followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court’s ruling in
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is
considered as finally settled. The
inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and
must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or
judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to
any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or
in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and
settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme
Court….
The principles above stated are, we think,
conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would
inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into
conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable
mischief and confusion. Besides, any
rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme
Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to
the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.[14]
At this point,
it is well to recall the factual context of
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned”;
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300[15] invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The
Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of
signatures of registered voters.
The Court
concluded in
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on
The Court
reiterated its ruling in
The opinion of
the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no
basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution
dated
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
The
Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition
filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court
next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second
issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the
Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ.,
voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second
issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely,
Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.[18]
(Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG’s attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court’s decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.[19]
The pronouncement in the body of the decision
in Santiago permanently enjoining the
COMELEC “from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system” is thus as much a part of the Court’s decision as
its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature
of an in rem judgment barring any and
all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course
to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
conformably with the Court’s ruling in Santiago
did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle
of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to
find the COMELEC to
have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the
ruling of this Court in Santiago
would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.”[20] This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution “assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.”[21]
Petitioners
Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of
Discretion on
the COMELEC
Based on the
Minority
Opinion in
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court’s declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,[22] or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,[23] while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned” constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed “to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977.”[24] In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people’s right to directly propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,[25] have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa “Loi” P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of People’s Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People’s Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate
and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern
the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people
directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening
event, i.e., passage of a law to implement
the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution,
that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the
Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of
stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other
government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its
own ruling.
Contrary to
the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law
cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose
it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be
“incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned” and therefore the
same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court’s composition.[26] Indeed, it is vital that there be stability
in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample
consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined
principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the
expounders of it.[27]
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners’
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
“Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
“(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.”
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
“Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory
Provisions,” which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. “Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “House of Congress,” “Senator[s] or “Member[s] of the House of Representatives” and “House of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all references therein to “Member[s] of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as “Member[s] of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 3. “Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all references therein to “Member[s] of Congress,” “Senator[s]” or “Member[s] of the House of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and of “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in
2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
“Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.”
(2)
The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President,
as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall
initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from
among themselves.] The duly-elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term
of the incumbent President and Vice President.[28]
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU
APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?[29]
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be
readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures
for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers
of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms “amendment” and “revision”
and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of
the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two
concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez,
the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions,
explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, “amendment.” However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – “amendment” or “revision” when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of an existing Constitution: “Revision” may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.[30]
Further, the
framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term “revision” in Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve
the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the
constitutional convention. Stated in
another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be
undertaken through the system of initiative.
Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by
Congress or by a constitutional convention.
It is
significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative
was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided: