THIRD DIVISION
|
HILARION M. HENARES, JR.,
VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO
HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No.
158290 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
|
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents. |
Promulgated: October
23, 2006 |
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RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners
challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
Citing
statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of
1996,[1]
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,[2]
a study of the Asian Development Bank,[3]
the Manila Observatory[4]
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources[5] (DENR)
on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and
their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a
compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and
related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate
matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets,
varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity,
infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the
effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to
other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of
nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur
dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds,
it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause
retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another
emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the
atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With
prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people
with weak hearts.[6]
Petitioners add that although much of
the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of
oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected
doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing
high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to
remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the
study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002[7],
stating that in four of the country’s major cities, Metro Manila,
·
Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is
valued at about US$140 million.
·
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic
bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.
·
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom
days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in
Petitioners
likewise cite the University of the Philippines’ studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing
that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest
among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5
percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to
40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children
in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural
counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned
detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural
gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of
propane and butane,[10]
is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it
produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90
percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and
releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the
only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed
for global warming.[11]
Asserting their right to clean air,
petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to
order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,[12]
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa
v. Factoran, Jr.,[13]
and Section 4[14]
of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”
Meantime,
following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners’ motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB
and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the
correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he
or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[15]
Further citing existing jurisprudence,
the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General
also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners
of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749
does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless
this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as
alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that
it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB
nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under
Section 26[16]
of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the
specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel
compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section
21[17]
of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change
or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should
declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist
that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to
implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by
Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2[18]
and Section 21.[19]
Petitioners state that under these laws
and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of
CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as
alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline
and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in
the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other
than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should
be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase
the issues before us as follows:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO
BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE
TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO
USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS[20]
Briefly
put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition
before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to
petitioners, Section 16,[21]
Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the
people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is
enunciated in Oposa.[22] The implementation of this policy is
articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the
bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the
government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then,
the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission
by the government. This, they say, is
embodied in Section 4[23]
of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is
the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to
regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs,
and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The
Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel
the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor
General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the
emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as
far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize
CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition
should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel
the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently,
this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if
what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia
in the Oposa case,[24]
describes as “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-generational
justice.”
Now, as to petitioners’ standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have
standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right
of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a
party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in
the exercise of the Court’s discretion, be set aside
in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality
under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially
so if these cases demand that they be settled
promptly.
Undeniably,
the right to clean air not
only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air
they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences
of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment
due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations,
the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our
next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the
writ could issue against respondents.
Under
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the
following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case
any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station;
and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,[25]
we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its main objective. It does not
lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course
of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required.
It never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it
must however, be clear. The writ will
not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this
petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges
on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational
terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act
specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned,
the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It
provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles.
- a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles
set pursuant to and as provided in this Act.
To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall
review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need
arises. It shall consider the maximum
limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air
quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph
(b) states:
b)
The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control
and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the
Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is
no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set
the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it
devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that
motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for
motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa[26]
we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it is
clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said
right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of
the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs
to use CNG as an alternative fuel.
Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the
use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive
order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive
Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on
Regrettably, however, the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs
to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.[27]
The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot
be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides, comity
with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and
leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems
raised in this petition.
In the same
manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility”
and “inter-generational justice” in Oposa,[28]
where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the
rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and
the future generation to clean air. In Oposa
we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly
found in the Constitution even if the right is “assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
[of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come. . .”[29]
It is the firm
belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we
have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on
air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens,
and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the
use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse
by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, p.
4.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Section 16.
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
[13] G.R. No. 101083,
[14] SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the
above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought
to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The
right to breathe clean air;
b) The
right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of
sustainable development;
c) The
right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making
process;
d) The
right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development
policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse
impact on the environment and public health;
e) The
right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any
activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The
right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or
her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The
right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all
activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The
right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting
from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or
activity.
[15] Rollo, p.
64.
[16] SEC. 26. Fuels
and Additives.- Pursuant to the Air Quality Framework to be established
under Section 7 of this Act, the Department of Energy (DOE), co-chaired by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in consultation with
the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS) of the DTI, the DOST, the representatives
of the fuel and automotive industries, academe and the consumers shall set the
specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products, to improve fuel
composition for increased efficiency and reduced emissions: . . .
[17] SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
.
. .
[18] SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles. - . . .
. . .
Finally, the State recognizes that a clean and healthy
environment is for the good of all and should therefore be the concern of all.
[19] SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as
provided in this Act….
[20] Rollo, pp. 93-94.
[21] Supra
note 12.
[22] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.
[23] Supra note 14.
[24] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.
[25] G.R. No. 100588,
[26] Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 805, 808.
[27] Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454,
[28] Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., supra note
13 at 803.
[29]