SECOND DIVISION
|
LADY LYDIA CORNISTA-DOMINGO, SYLVIA SALANGA,
LIWAYWAY SILAPAN, CYNTHIA ALICANTE, ALBERTO ANCHETA, ANA MARIA SANCHEZ, ELENA
TUMBAGA, PEDRO JOSUÉ, TERESITA VOCAL, ROSIE ANCHETA, LILIA PINUELA-JULIAN, IMELDA
ERESE, NORMA YABUT, LOURDES PINEDA, CORAZON CARANDANG, ERLINDA GUTIERREZ,
MARIO MILAN, FLAVIANO MEJIA, JR., ESTELA AYSON, ENRIQUE GARAYGAY, ROSE
DAILEG, JOSE CALDO, RITA BATAC, MARIA CORAZON GALAN, MA. ELISA GAYO, DEBBIE
RODRIGUEZ, CAROLINA CABEBE, EDGARDO BOLIVAR, FE ILAGAN, TERESITA MONDEJAR,
ELVIRA ANGELES, PEDRO EMPIG, LUZ MARQUEZ, TERESITA DORIA, ABELARDO BONTOC,
MADELON REYES-YEE and FILOMENO CINCO, JR., Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EDUARDO J. CARPIO, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS BANK and/or SUNDAY LAVIN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION
and/or FELIZARDO SARAPAT, AMELITA DURIAN, RICARDO RICAFRENTE, LEON MAGALONA,
FERMIN CASTILLO, NORMINIO MOJICA and OLYMPIO DE GUZMAN, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 156761
Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: October 17, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari,[1]
petitioners seek the review and reversal of the consolidated Decision[2]
dated December 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51218, CA-G.R. SP No. 51219 and CA-G.R. SP No. 51220 declaring as null and void the September 14,
1993 decision and the November 22, 1993 resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstating the decision dated March 31, 1993
of Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio. Likewise, assailed is the CA Resolution of
The
ultimate facts material to the resolution of the case are as follows:
On
In
consequence, the Bank adopted a retrenchment and reorganization program which
was challenged before this Court by the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees
Union (
While
G.R. No. 67125 was pending, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 612, dated
Although
a number of the Bank employees accepted their separation pay and other benefits
and executed quitclaims and releases therefor in favor of the Bank, others
chose to question their termination. Thus, on
On
On
To
facilitate the implementation of R.A. No. 7169, a Rehabilitation Committee was
created by the Monetary Board. The committee thus created was given the power
to select and to organize an initial manning force headed by a management team
to be staffed by a trained workforce. Hiring preference was given the veterans
and their dependents, other
qualifications being equal.[6]
At
this juncture, several employees of the Bank initiated a series of cases claiming
that the enactment of R.A. No. 7169 nullified Monetary Board Resolution No. 612
placing respondent Bank under liquidation and, in effect, also nullified the
liquidator’s termination of the Bank’s employees.
On
In
the meantime, on
On
Wherefore, premises
considered, the claim of the
The charge for unfair
labor practice filed by the
SO ORDERED.
In
time, the
On
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered, finding the claim for reinstatement of the
appellant to be legal and proper.
Accordingly, Appellee bank therefore is hereby ordered to immediately
reinstate all members of the appellant union inclusive of those who have
executed their quitclaims and release and all the rest of the PVBEU members,
who will signify their intention to be reinstated from the date of this Decision. In the meanwhile, however, that the bank has
not fully reopened and activated all its operational departments, offices and
branches, the employees’ reinstatement shall be conditioned to actual personnel
requirement of the department branch office to be reopened, for which reason,
preference shall be given to employees formerly occupying the position being
reinstated or reactivated or at the prerogative and discretion of management,
to any position in the office provided the latter is of equivalent rank and at
least has the same rate of pay.
For this purpose,
appellee is hereby ordered to temporarily cease and desist from further hiring
new employees which might affect the full compliance to this Decision. The claim for backwages and other CBA
benefits are hereby denied for lack merit.
The claim for unfair
labor practice is also hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On
Therefrom,
the Bank and the
The
Bank, in its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 113423,[9]
sought to nullify the NLRC decision of
On
A
substantial majority of the members of the
On
WHEREFORE, finding the
terms and conditions set forth in the Compromise Agreement to be not contrary
to law, morals and public policy, the same is hereby approved and considered as
in complete and full satisfaction of the Decision in the above-entitled case
dated September 14, 1993.
The parties are hereby
enjoined to comply strictly and faithfully with the terms and conditions of the
Compromise Agreement.
SO ORDERED.
A
number of the employees, in separate appeals to the NLRC, contested the foregoing
Order of the Labor Arbiter. They argued that the compromise agreement is
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
On
In
a Resolution dated
On
WHEREFORE, in the
interest of substantial justice and fair play, the order appealed from is
hereby partially vacated and Set Aside in that:
a) For those union members who received
and acknowledged receipt of the first payment as agreed upon in the Compromise
Agreement dated January 26, 1996 and who executed the corresponding Quitclaim,
Waiver and Release will be bound by the said Compromise Agreement which was
made the basis of the Order dated February 16, 1996 appealed from and they shall
continue to receive the money due them on the second and third payments due on
December 15, 1996 and December 15, 1997, respectively.
b) For those union members who signified
their opposition and those who are similarly situated who did not receive and acknowledge
receipt of the money, let the case be remanded to the Arbitration Branch of
origin for further proceedings. The
Labor Arbiter so designated to hear is hereby ordered to proceed with dispatch
so as not to prejudice the parties as the disposition hereof has been duly
delayed.
SO ORDERED.
Separate
petitions were then filed with the Court by the Bank, the
On
On
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed
NLRC decision dated
Accordingly, the other two (2)
petitions, CA-G.R. SP No. 51219 and CA-G.R. SP No. 51220 are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Partly
says the CA in its decision:
1.
The Supreme Court said in G.R. No. 67125 (189 SCRA 14) that the PVB
employees were not “illegally dismissed but lawfully separated.” This is a
pronouncement, as categorical as can be, that the employment relationship
between the Bank and the separated employees had definitely ceased to exist as
of that time;
xxx xxx xxxx
4. It is a well-settled doctrine that
reinstatement is proper only in cases of illegal dismissal. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court that
the PVB employees were “not illegally dismissed” forecloses any right of
reinstatement under any circumstance.
While the PVB employees concerned
should be given priority in hiring, they cannot demand it as a matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, Domingo, et al. ratified the Compromise Agreement and even
voluntarily received the first payment under that agreement, executing the
corresponding Quitclaim, Waiver and Release in the process. Having done that, they are deemed bound by
the Compromise Agreement under the previously discussed principle of res judicata and/or estoppel.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners are now before the Court via the present recourse essentially
arguing that the CA committed reversible error in foreclosing their right to be
reinstated to their former employment with the Bank upon its rehabilitation and
in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement entered into by the Bank
and the
Petitioners
argue that the passage of R.A. No. 7169,[14]
which reopened and rehabilitated the Bank, gave them the right to be reinstated
and entitled them to the payment of back wages and other benefits. They call the
Court’s attention to Congress Resolution No. 1104 expressing the sentiments of
some congressmen to give preference to veterans and their dependents in the employment
with the Bank. This resolution,
according to petitioners, strengthens their claim for reinstatement.
We
are not persuaded.
As we see it, upon implementation of Monetary Board Resolution No. 612 and prior
to the passage of R.A. No. 7169, the Bank ceased to exist. Its subsequent rehabilitation was not an
ordinary rehabilitation. R.A. No. 7169
had to be passed as a legislative fiat to breathe life into the Bank. While it is true that the Bank used its old
name, a new law had to be enacted to restructure its outstanding liabilities.
As it is, the Bank’s present state of finances, the enormous cost of backwages
and other benefits that have to be paid its employees seeking to be reinstated
would surely put an end to the economic viability of the Bank.
The enactment of R.A. No. 7169 did not nullify Monetary
Board Resolution No. 612 which earlier placed the Bank under liquidation and
caused the termination of employment of the petitioners. The Bank’s subsequent
rehabilitation did not, by any test of reason, “revive” what was already a dead
relationship between the petitioners and the Bank. Neither did such
rehabilitation affect the Court’s pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans
Bank[15]
that the actions of the Monetary Board and its duly appointed liquidator were
valid and that the former employees’ claim for back wages must be rejected as they
were lawfully separated. Reinstatement is a relief accorded only to an employee
who was illegally dismissed.[16]
To
reiterate, the forcible closure of the Bank by operation of law permanently severed
the employer-employee relationship between it and its employees when it ceased
operations from
Whilst
House Resolution No. 1104 expressed sentiments of some congressmen that
“preferential right to employment be given to veterans and their dependents”
under Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 7169, without more, such sentiments did not operate
as a compulsion to the newly opened Bank to accept an employee earlier
separated from work as a result of its closure.
If at all, such sentiments only provide that all things being equal,
preference shall be given to veterans and their dependents in the hiring of new
employees. While the employees concerned should be given priority in hiring,
they cannot demand it as a matter of right.
Verily,
the clear wordings of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7169 gave the rehabilitation
committee created thereunder a free hand in the selection and appointment of
the Bank’s new employees. We quote
Section 7 of the law:
Sec. 7. Rehabilitation Committee. – To facilitate the
implementation of the provisions this Act, there is hereby created a
rehabilitation committee which shall have a term of three (3) months from the
date of the approval of this Act composed of the following: the Executive
Secretary, as Chairman, and the Administrator of the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office, the President of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, a
representative from the executive board of the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines and a representative from the Board of Trustees of the Veterans of
World War II or their respective representatives, as members.
Specifically, the
committee shall:
(a) Prepare, finalize and submit a viable
rehabilitation plan to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank;
(b) Select and organize an initial manning
force headed by a management team to be composed of competent, experienced and
professional managers who must possess all qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided under Central Bank rules and regulations. The management team shall be staffed by a
trained workforce: Provided, That
preference shall be given to the veterans and their dependents, other
qualifications being equal;
The
mandate given the Bank’s rehabilitation committee to “select and organize an
initial manning force” shows that the lawmakers recognize the fact that the new
bank is entirely without any working force. Congress, therefore, gave the Bank
full authority and discretion to recruit and form a new staff. Had Congress intended that separated
employees be rehired and given priority in the hiring of new employees, it
would have clearly stated this in R.A. No. 7169. The fact that it did not only shows its clear
legislative intent to give the new bank a free hand in the selection and hiring
of its new staff.
We
have to acknowledge the sad reality that giving in to petitioners’ demand of
wholesale reinstatement with back wages, bonuses, holiday pay, vacation and
sick leave benefits would be a fatal blow to the very intention of R.A. No. 7169
to rehabilitate the Bank. The payment of
such substantial amounts would definitely further dissipate the remaining
assets of the Bank and cripple its finances even as, at this point, the Bank is
barely making a profit under the weight of its present liabilities, and ultimately make impossible its desired
rehabilitation. This clearly contravenes
the intent and spirit of R.A. No. 7169.
Petitioners
fault the CA in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement. They claim that said agreement is not binding
on employees who did not ratify it and even to those who were allegedly tricked
and/or deceived by the
The
argument is utterly baseless. A labor union’s function is to represent its
members. It can file an action or enter
into compromise agreements on behalf of its members. Here, majority of the Bank’s employees
authorized the
Further,
respondent
The
general rule that the Labor Arbiter must be present during the signing of the
compromise agreement is not immune to certain exceptions. Here, the submission
of the Compromise Agreement on joint motion of the parties for approval by the
Labor Arbiter cured whatever defect the signing of the agreement in the absence
of the Labor Arbiter would have caused. So it is that in Santiago v. De Guzman,[17] the Court ruled:
A compromise agreement
entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before
whom the case is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the
parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand
the terms and conditions of “the settlement and that it was entered into freely
and voluntarily by them.
It is incumbent upon the
Labor Arbiter not only to persuade the parties to settle amicably, but equally
to ensure the compromise agreement is a fair one and that the same was forged
freely, voluntarily with full understanding of the terms and conditions
embodies therein as well as the consequences thereof.”
It is likewise noteworthy that as of
As regards the third
petition for certiorari filed by Lady Lydia Cornista Domingo, et. al. (CA-G.R.
SP No. 51220), the position taken by the petitioners is that NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion by: a) ordering petitioners who received the first
payment under the Compromise Agreement to be bound by it, and b) resolving to
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings insofar as those
who did not receive payment are concerned.
Petitioners Domingo et.
al. allege that “(a)s found out by the respondent NLRC, the Compromise
Agreement was not entered into in the presence of the labor Arbiter and it
(NLRC) faulted the latter in not calling the parties especially the complainants,
to a conference and satisfy himself that they (complainants) understand the
terms and conditions of the settlement; and that the agreement was entered into
freely and voluntarily” (Rollo of SP No. 51218-20, p. 886) as called for under
Section 2, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
Further, petitioners
contend that “(h)ad the respondents NLRC and Labor Arbiter Carpio followed the
rules, they would have found out that those who received the first payment were
only tricked and deceived in(to) receiving the payment;” that “had the
respondents Labor Arbiter and NLRC been more circumspect in their solemn
duties, they should have required the respondent union officers to present a
special power of attorney as required under Article 1878(3) of the Civil
Code.” (Ibid., pp. 886-887).
We are not convinced.
Evidently, Domingo, et.
al. ratified the Compromise Agreement and even voluntarily received the first
payment under that agreement, executing the corresponding Quitclaim, Waiver and
Release in the process. Having done
that, they are deemed bound by the Compromise Agreement under the previously
discussed principle of res judicata and/or
estoppel.
We find that the
subsequent decision of petitioners Domingo, et. al. to repudiate the Compromise
Agreement was merely an afterthought, whatever would be the reason for their
subsequent change of mind. Since they
had entered into a binding contract on their own volition and received benefits
therefrom, they are therefore estopped from questioning the validity of said
contract later on. Parenthetically, it
is interesting to note that while the petitioners try to impugn the Compromise
Agreement that they themselves entered into, they have not made any offer or effort
to return the money they received as first payment under said agreement.
The other allegation of
the petitioners that “those who received the first payment were only tricked
and deceived in(to) receiving the payment” deserves scant consideration. Said petitioners are not only ordinary laborers
but mature, educated and intelligent people with college degrees, and
considering the size of their group, it is unbelievable that they could have
been easily duped into doing something against their will and self-interest. Absent a showing that they were indeed
victims of trickery and deception, outside of their own self-serving
affidavits, the petitioners’ allegation does not hold water.
Here,
the petitioners and other employees legally separated were in fact given
termination or separation pay despite the staggering loss sustained by the Bank. They were given a very good bargain in the
compromise agreement. They, therefore,
have no reason to complain. Without the subject
compromise agreement, they would not have received any separation pay in light
of our ruling in State Investment House,
Inc. v. CA,[19]
and North Davao Mining Corporation v. NLRC,[20]
where we held that in cases of serious
losses or financial reverses, the Labor Code does not impose any obligation
upon the employer to pay separation benefits, for obvious reasons.
Records
reveal that when the Bank offered termination or separation pay to its
remaining employees by way of a compromise agreement, a great majority of them accepted the amount as justifiable
settlement of their claims.[21]
Like these quitclaims and releases, there are voluntary agreements which
represent reasonable settlements and are considered binding on the parties.[22]
Petitioners, therefore, cannot renege on the compromise agreement they entered
into after accepting benefits earlier simply because they may have felt that
they committed a mistake in accepting their termination/separation pay. As no proof was presented to show that the
compromise agreement in dispute was entered into through fraud,
misrepresentation or coercion, the same must be recognized as valid and binding
upon all the 529 employees of the Bank. In
fine, the petitioners and the other employees are estopped from questioning the
validity of the Compromise Agreement.
In
law, a compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res judicata between the parties and
should not be disturbed except for vices of consent, forgery, fraud,
misrepresentation and coercion,[23]
none of which exists in this case. The Compromise Agreement between the
All
told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in
rendering its challenged decision of
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is
DENIED.