FIRST DIVISION
EDUARDO LEYSON,
G.R. No. 150756
EDUARDO BANTULO alias
“BOY,” DOMINADOR
BANTULO alias “DOMING,” Present:
EDUARDO PADAYAG alias
“EDRING,” EDDIE PADAYAG
alias “OYONG,” and RODOLFO
PADAYAG
alias “JUAN,” PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
-
versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
PEDRO
LAWA, JENNIFER MOSO,
LINO
MENDI, MAMER BAGON,
JOEL
BAGON, LEA TACULOD,
LILIA
BAGON, GLORIA ANDA,
ALICIA
GILON, EDDIE BAGON,
PEDRO
BAGON, ROMEO JARMIN,
and THE COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated:
(Third Division),
Respondents.
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756 affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case
No. 12205, except as to the penalty imposed on petitioners Eduardo Leyson, Sr.,
Eduardo Bantulo, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Eddie Padayag and Rodolfo
Padayag.
The Antecedents
On
That
on or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of September 7, 1996 at Nopol, Conel,
General Santos City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Eduardo Leyson, as ranch owner, and the accused
Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo alias Doming, Bernardo Bantulo alias Boy, Eduardo
Padayag alias Edring, Eddie Padayag alias Oyong and Rodolfo Padayag alias Juan,
who are the cowboys or farm-hands of accused Eduardo Leyson, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with malice aforethought, with intent
to destroy and cause damage and in order to drive away the different
complainants from the area of the ranch of Eduardo Leyson which they have been
cultivating for years, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
set fire on the thirteen (13) houses one after the other of the complainants
causing damage representing the value of the houses and their personal
belongings which were reduced to ashes with their corresponding value as
follows:
1. Pedro Lawa - P67,795.00
2.
Jennifer Moso -
7,000.00
3.
Lino Mendi -
37,500.00
4.
Mamer Bagon -
85,950.00
5.
Joel Bagon -
8,500.00
6.
Teresita Bagon -
19,000.00
7.
Lea Taculod - 31,160.00
8.
Lilia Bagon -
25,000.00
9.
Gloria P. Anda -
7,000.00
10. Alicia B. Gilon - 98,735.00
11. Eddie Bagon - 27,140.00
12. Pedro Bagon - 28,710.00
13.
Romeo Jarmin -
25,000.00
with the total value of P468,490.00, more or
less, and to their damage and prejudice in such amount.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[2]
Petitioners, assisted by counsel,
were arraigned on
The Case for the Prosecution
Sometime in October 1993, Eduardo Leyson
allowed some members of the B’laan Tribe to till portions of his 29-hectare
landholding in Nopol, Conel,
Romeo Jarmin built his house on the
ranch sometime in December 1993. The roof was made of cogon, the walls of split
bamboo, and the side of a coconut tree was used for flooring. The portion of
the ranch where he planted corn and palay was about 3 hectares.[3]
Mamer Bagon, his brother-in-law, lived about 50 meters away from him, also in a
house made of wood.[4] Mamer
Bagon planted palay, coconut trees and other agricultural plants and gave 50%
of his produce to Leyson.[5]
Joel, Teresita, Lilia, Eddie, Pedro, all surnamed Bagon, also built their
respective huts in the ranch. Pedro Lawa, who also built a house on the
landholding, also delivered to Leyson his share of the produce from his
agricultural crops as agreed upon.
However, on
At about
At about
a. Pablo Lawa, for his house
& the items inside P67,000.00
b. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00
c. Lino Mendi, for his house,
corn
plants, and lost personal
properties 37,500.00
d. Mamer Bagon, for his house,
8 chickens, shoes, pants,
2 sacks rice, 2 sacks corn 85,000.00
e. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00
f. Teresita Bagon, for her house 19,000.00
g. Lea Taculod, for her house,
1/2
sack rice, a plow, and
a
guitar 31,000.00
h. Delia Bagon, for her house
&
personal belongings 30,000.00
i. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00
j. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,
corn
planted in l/2 hectares
of
land, 35 punos of banana
plants,
10 head chickens, and
carpentry tools 98,000.00
k. Eddie Bagon, for his house &
other
belongings 27,000.00
l.
Pedro Bagon, for
his house and
Other
lost properties 28,700.00
m. Romeo Jarmin, for his house 25,000.00[13]
The farmers reported the matter to
Sumog-Oy who then invited members of the media, police and barangay personnel
to the ranch on
The Case for the Accused
Petitioners denied having burned the
huts of the complainants and interposed the defense of alibi.
Leyson testified that his co-accused
Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Jun Padayag and Eddie
Padayag, were employees in his eight-hectare farm located at
He narrated that during the period of
Dominador Bantulo testified that he
and Bernardo Bantulo were brothers, employed by Leyson as laborers in the
farm. Rodolfo and Eduardo Padayag were
also Leyson’s laborers. All of them
resided in Leyson’s house in
The other accused likewise denied the
charge. They insisted that they were in
the farm of Eduardo Leyson harvesting and loading corn from
Renilo Punay, a laborer of Pioneer
Seeds Production, corroborated the testimony of the accused. He narrated that he was the roving guard of
the company and stayed with the men as they harvested and loaded corn for
Pioneer Seeds Production from
On
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the
accused DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO BANTULO alias BOY, EDUARDO
PADAYAG alias EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG, RODOLFO PADAYAG alias JUAN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ARSON, and there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, each of them is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two years four months and one day as minimum, to eight
years, as maximum. All of them,
including Eduardo Leyson, are severally liable for the actual damages of
private complainants.
Accused EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. is hereby ACQUITTED. However, he is hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally with the other accused the following amounts to the private
complainants:
1. Pablo Lawa, for his house
& the items inside P62,000.00
2. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00
3. Lino Mendi, for his house,
corn
plants, and lost personal
properties
32,500.00
4. Mamer Bagon, for his house,
8 chickens, shoes, pants,
2 sacks rice, 2 sacks corn 80,000.00
5. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00
6. Teresita Bagon, for her house 14,000.00
7. Lea Taculod, for her house,
1/2
sack rice, a plow, and
a
guitar
26,000.00
8. Delia Bagon, for her house
&
personal belongings 25,000.00
9. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00
10.
Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,
corn
planted in l/2 hectares
of
land, 35 punos of banana
plants,
10 chickens, and
carpentry tools 93,000.00
11. Eddie Bagon,
for his house &
other
belongings 22,000.00
12. Pedro Bagon,
for his house and
other
lost properties 23,700.00
13.
Romeo Jarmin, for his house 20,000.00
The accused found guilty should suffer all the
accessory penalties provided for by law.
Also, they are ordered to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The accused appealed the decision to
the CA, alleging that
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
EDUARDO BANTULO ALIAS BOY, DOMINADOR BANTULO ALIAS DOMING, EDUARDO PADAYAG
ALIAS EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG ALIAS OYONG, AND RODOLFO PADAYAG ALIAS JUAN DESPITE
REASONABLE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE
HOUSES.[32]
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the sentence
of the appellants. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that
accused DOMINADOR BANTULO, EDUARDO BANTULO, EDUARDO PADAYAG, EDDIE PADAYAG and RODOLFO
PADAYAG are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[33]
According to the appellate court, the
testimony of Batata and Jarmin, corroborated by Lino Mendi, were credible and
entitled to full probative weight. It
took into account Leyson’s admission that he would pay for the damages
sustained by the private complainants.
The appellate court rejected as barren of factual basis the appellants’
defenses of denial and alibi.
Leyson and his men filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the appellate court denied; hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari, where petitioners submit the following
contentions:
BOTH COURTS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. THIS FINDING IS
PURE SPECULATION, SURMISE AND CONJECTURE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN THIS CASE.
x x x
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO
BANTULO alias “BOY” DOMINADOR BANTULO alias “DOMING,” EDUARDO PADAYAG alias
“EDRING,” EDDIE PADAYAG alias “OYONG” and “RODOLFO PADAYAG alias “JUAN,”
DESPITE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE HOUSES
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. THIS FINDING
IS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
x x x
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING EDUARDO LEYSON,
SR. CIVILLY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE CONVICTED ACCUSED, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY APPLIED THE LAW ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN
ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE.[34]
The issues to be resolved in the
present case are: (1) whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner, except petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320
of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether petitioner Leyson is civilly
liable for alleged damages to the private complainants.
Petitioners aver that respondents
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for arson. The testimonies of respondent Romeo Jarmin
and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with the affidavits given to the police
investigators. While Jarmin pointed to and identified petitioner Eduardo Leyson
during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit,[35]
Jarmin failed to mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men
were “cowboys.” Petitioners further point out that Jarmin had admitted that he
returned to the farm only on September 2, 1996; hence, it was impossible for
him to have seen the burning of the houses on September 11, 1996.
Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified
that even before the burning of the houses on September 7, 1996 he already knew
petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the perpetrators in the
affidavit which he gave to the police investigators.[36] In fact, Batata, in his affidavit, never
identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin
could not have seen the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the
culprits, considering that the surface of the canal where they claim to have
hidden was covered by three feet cogon grass, and Jarmin and Batata were only 5
feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared that he saw petitioners burn
the houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and declared
that he saw only one of them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he did not see the
face of the arsonist. And contrary to the ruling of the CA, Lino Mendi did not
see the burning of the houses.
Petitioners conclude that conformably
with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus, the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have no probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General asserts that the ruling of the CA is buttressed by the
testimonial and documentary evidence on record.
The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata
and their respective affidavits pertain to minor and peripheral matters, and
did not necessarily discredit them. The OSG asserts that Leyson, having been
acquitted merely on reasonable doubt, is nevertheless civilly liable to private
respondents. It points out that he even
obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by private respondents.
We agree with the rulings of the RTC
and the CA that petitioners conspired to burn the houses of private respondents
on September 7, 1996.
Well-entrenched rule is that the
findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA on appeal, are accorded with
high respect, if not conclusive effect by this Court. The assessment by the
trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses and its calibration of the probative weight thereof are even
conclusive on this Court, absent clear evidence that facts and circumstances of
substance which if considered would alter or reverse the outcome of the case
were ignored, misinterpreted or misconstrued.[37]
The testimony of a witness must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is
not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of
said parts. In ascertaining the facts
established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts
imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or
explained as qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
strictly applied in this jurisdiction.[38]
The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule
of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application.[39]
The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as
to others:
Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the
trial court did not give credit to Edwin and Lina’s testimonies that they
positively identified Edgardo, it should, pursuant to the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,”
likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly
acquit him. In People vs. Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a
mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court
may or may not draw. In People vs. Pacada, we stated that the
testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to
others. And in People vs. Osias, we ruled that:
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of
a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other
facts. And it has been aptly said that
even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was
present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the
accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x x.”
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening
commentary:
“It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in
itself worthless —first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely
contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and
in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in
point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any
event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous
form of words. It is also in practice
pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper
force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere
instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in
themselves.”[40]
The
general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of
a witness in contrast with what he stated in an affidavit do not necessarily
discredit him. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are made ex
parte and often incomplete or incorrect for lack or absence of sufficient
inquiries by the investigating officer.[41] It is of judicial knowledge that sworn
statements are almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally
inferior to the testimony of a witness in open court.[42]
Inconsistencies
or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or
peripheral matters and not to the significant facts vital to the guilt or
innocence of the accused from the crime charged or the elements of such crime
are not grounds for the acquittal of the accused.
It
is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin[43]
in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner Leyson for the burning of the
houses. In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson conspired with
his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents because they
refused to vacate the ranch.[44] Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his
co-petitioners, was present when the houses were burned on September 7, 1996,
as he was even armed with a long firearm.
Petitioner Leyson even assured Sumog-oy later that he would pay for the
damages sustained by private respondents. The testimony of Sumog-Oy on the
matter reads:
Q And you
talked to Mister Leyson?
A Yes,
sir, and in fact I asked him what things he will do considering that his cattle
were feasting on the crops of the B’laans and he told me that all these things
will be listed and he will pay for them.[45]
Sumog-oy reiterated his testimony on cross
examination:
Q Because
you of course asked Mister Leyson if he could assist those people?
A No sir,
I just asked him what is he planning to do that his cattle were feasting on the
crops of the B’laans.
Q And so
you asked particularly on the crops that as you said were feasted by his
cattle?
A Yes sir
including the houses and he said to list all the things that were damaged and
then including the crops amount and he also mentioned about the houses and in
fact he told me that they should not charge the cost of the woods because the
woods used for the construction of the houses were just cut from his ranch, he
said.
Q And
that was the response of Mister Leyson when you asked him if he could assist
these people?
A I did
not particularly ask him to assist, it was his own suggestion.
Q So he
suggested that he would assist these people?
A Because
I told him, “what are you going to do now that the houses of these people were
destroyed and your cattle were feasting on the crops” and he told me that “just
tell them to list the things that were destroyed including the amount and I
will pay them.”
Q Pay them
as his assistance to these people?
A He just
plainly said, “I will pay.”
Q In
other words, his offer to pay was in response to your questioning him what he
would do to the destroyed houses and on the damaged crops, correct?
A That is
the logical interpretation sir.
Q That is
the correct interpretation?
A Probably
the logical interpretation.[46]
On
redirect examination, Jarmin declared that, in his affidavit he wanted to
charge not only petitioner Leyson’s employees but also the “cowboys” as well:
Q Mister
Witness, do you understand the words or how do you understand the words “to
file a complaint against the cowboys of Mr. Eduardo Leyson”, as far as against
whom you are filing?
A All of
them, Mister Leyson and his cowboys.[47]
Apparently,
Jarmin did not know whether petitioners were farmhands or cowboys of petitioner
Leyson. But whether petitioners were the
farmhands or cowboys of petitioner Leyson is of little significance. The fact of the matter is that petitioner
Leyson employed his co-petitioners, who were given long firearms when they
drove away the private respondents from the farm on September 1 to 2, 1996; and
on September 7, 1996, they fired shots and burned private respondents’
houses.
Petitioner
Leyson ordered his men to intimidate the private respondents with bodily harm
if they did not leave the ranch. Indeed,
as testified by Jarmin, petitioner Leyson was with his co-petitioners on
September 7, 1996 when private respondents’ houses were burned:
Q Where
are your houses now?
A Our houses were burned on September 7,
1996.
Q How
many houses were burned on September 7, 1996?
A 13
houses were burned down.