Republic of the
Supreme Court
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 149723 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN,
CJ., Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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VICTOR KEITH |
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FITZGERALD, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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October
27, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the August 31, 2001 Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted the Motion
for Bail[2]
of accused-appellant, herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).
The
facts are of record.
An
Information filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 75,
That
sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused
VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs
(“vitamins”) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant “AAA,”[4]
a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering
said “AAA” with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge
of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.[5]
After
trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph 5 of
Republic Act No. 7610, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached therewith; and to indemnify
the private complainant “AAA” the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Lingap Center of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Olongapo City shall hold in trust
the said awards and dispose the same solely for the rehabilitation and
education of “AAA”, to the exclusion of her mother and her other relatives.
The accused under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full of his preventive imprisonment if
he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.
Upon completion of the service of
his sentence, the accused shall be deported immediately and forever barred from
entry to the
In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for
Rape, the accused is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Fitzgerald
applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated
x
x x x
In
fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the
hearing on the bail petition, the Court is of the considered view that the
circumstances of the accused indicate probability of flight and that there is
undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on bail
pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the
foregoing considerations, the Petition for Bail pending appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in
a Decision[8]
dated
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the
accused-appellant is imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and
One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of
Reclusion Perpetua, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New
Trial[10]
and a Supplemental to Accused’s Motion for New Trial[11]
on the ground that new and material evidence not previously available had
surfaced. The CA granted the Motion for
New Trial in a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, the appellant’s Motion for New
Trial dated
The
People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13]
from the
[T]his Court hereby RESOLVES
to:
x x x x
2. DENY accused-appellant’s Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Sec.
7. – Capital Offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal procecution.”
In the case at bar, the maximum
imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610 otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua.
As it is, the evidence of guilt is strong,
hence, We hold that his motion for bail cannot be granted at this point.
With regard to his alleged physical
condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant is not precluded from
seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the necessary
representations with the proper authorities are made.
SO ORDERED.[16]
(Emphasis ours)
The
People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari[17]
docketed as G.R. No. 146008 questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13,
2000 CA Resolutions. The petition was
dismissed in a Resolution[18]
dated
Meanwhile,
on
On
x x
x x
Be that as it may, while We
maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We have taken
a second look at appellant’s plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that appellant is already
of old age[23]
and is not in the best of health. Thus,
it is this Court’s view that appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised
not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in the higher
interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial granted in this
case. Accordingly,
appellant is hereby DIRECTED to post a bail bond in the amount of P100,000.00
for his temporary liberty provided he
will appear in any court and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof
if and when required to do so. The
appellant is likewise refrained from leaving the country now or in the future
until this case is terminated. Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is ORDERED to include appellant in its hold departure list xxx.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[24]
(Emphasis ours)
Thereafter, the RTC ordered
Fitzgerald’s temporary release on
P100,000.00.[25]
Hence,
the People filed this Petition to have the
In
his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial
negated the previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;[28]
and justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an
extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.[29]
The petition is meritorious.
We resolve first the preliminary
question of whether the CA, after issuing its
According
to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution, referring the
case to the RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on May 2, 2001
when this Court denied its petition for review
in G.R. No. 146008, then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001
Resolution granting respondent bail, it had been stripped of jurisdiction over
the case.[30]
Petitioner is
mistaken.
When
this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court
convicting the accused[31]
and the judgment of the CA affirming it,[32]
and remands the case to the trial court for reception of newly-discovered
evidence and promulgation of a new judgment,[33]
at times with instruction to the trial court to promptly report the outcome.[34] The Court itself does not conduct the new
trial for it is no trier of facts.[35]
However,
when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ,
notwithstanding Sec. 1,[36]
Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity
in appellate criminal procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions
of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.[37] Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec.
14, Rule 124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered
evidence under Sec. 12,[38]
or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence
under Sec. 15.[39] In either case, it does not relinquish to the
trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to
resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.
Now
then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of
the original records of the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the
new evidence material to appellant’s defense within 60 days from receipt of the
original records; and third, that the
RTC submit to it the said evidence together with the transcript of the case
within 10 days after reception of evidence.[40] From the foregoing dispostion, it is evident
that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case, even as it delegated
to the RTC the function of receiving the respondent’s newly-discovered
evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority
to act on respondent’s bail application.
Moreso that the the original records of the case had yet to be
transmitted to the RTC when respondent filed his bail application and the CA
acted on it.
With that procedural matter out of
the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA erred when it
allowed respondent to bail.
The right to bail emenates from of
the right to be presumed innocent. It is
accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys,[41]
be allowed provisional liberty upon
filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions.[42]
Implementing Sec. 13,[43]
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections
4[44]
and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive
and procedural rules on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused
person in custody for an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment,[45] but a
matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an
accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his
guilt is strong.[46] As for an accused already convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The
appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be
recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par.
(a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the
maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a
lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
These circumstances are not altered
when the CA granted a new trial.[47] As already discussed, the CA retained
appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of
the original records thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set
aside only its own September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7,
1996 RTC Decision. In fact, in its
As
we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellant’s conviction of the
offense charged as well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved
during the appreciation of the new trial after considering the new evidence
which appellant insist would prove his innocence.[48]
The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision,
therefore, remained operative. And under
said Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six
years.
Moreover, both the RTC and CA were
unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of the guilt of
respondent.[49]
These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a new trial. Under Section 6 (b),
Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered
evidence but maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a finding that evidence
is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon another
motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against
the accused has remained strong.[50] In the present case, no new evidence had
since been introduced, nor hearing conducted as would diminish the earlier
findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of strong evidenc against
respondent.
In
sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not
a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to
be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the
denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the
circumstances enumerated therein [51] such as
those indicating probability
of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in
its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, “xxx not on
the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx,” but “xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is
already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx,” and notwithstanding
its finding that “xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong
xxx.”[52] The Resolution disregarded substantive and
procedural requirements on bail.
It is bad enough that the CA granted
bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it
is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter’s illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for
bail.[53] It may be that the trend now is for courts to
permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.[54] There may also be an existing proposition for
the “selective decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.[55] But, in this particular case, the CA made no
specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that
his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or
put his life in danger. It merely
declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on
record as to the latter’s state of health is an unverified medical certificate
stating that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent’s condition required him to “xxx
be confined in a more sterile area xxx.”[56] That medical recommendation was even rebuffed
by the CA itself when, in its
Moreover, there is a finding of
record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. In its
Dr.
Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a
state of sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The
possibility of the commission of a similar offense for which the accused was
convicted is great if the accused will be exposed to “stress” and if an
opportunity to commit it lurks.[59]
The
foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned
Resolution. Such finding, therefore,
remains controlling. It warranted the
outright denial of respondent’s bail application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted
respondent’s Motion for Bail.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED and the
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I
O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring and Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, dissenting.
[2] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[4]
Per People v. Cabalquinto,
G.R. No. 167693,
[5] Records I, pp. 1-2.
[6]
[7]
[8] Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Artemio G. Tuquero and Elvi John S. Asuncion, concurring.
[9] Records II, p. 806.
[10] Rollo, p. 85.
[11]
[12]