FIRST DIVISION
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Jowett k. golangco, petitioner, - versus - Atty. jone b.
fung,
Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, - versus - HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and Atty.
jone b. fung,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 147640 G.R. No.
147762 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: October 12, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners Jowett K. Golangco
(Golangco) and the Office of the Ombudsman, in this consolidated Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assail the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57418 dated 24 August 2000 and its
Resolution[2]
dated 28 March 2001 setting aside the Resolution dated 13 March 1995 and the
Order dated 25 September 1996 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-ADM-0-93-0149. The assailed Decision also directed the Office of the
Ombudsman to cause the withdrawal of the Information it filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38 entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Atty. Jone B. Fung,” docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-149444. The said
Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman found Atty. Jone B. Fung
(respondent) guilty of oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty
and grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from
government service.
Respondent is an employee of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and was, at that time,
assigned as Officer-In-Charge of the Operations and Surveillance Division,
Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch, Licensing and Regulation Office, under the
auspices of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On P20,000.00
as initial payment of the total recruitment fee of P55,000.00 before his
application as factory worker in
The DOLE Secretary referred the
letter-complaint to the POEA Administrator who instructed the POEA Licensing
and Regulation Office, headed by respondent, to conduct an on-the-spot
investigation of the activities of G&M (Phil.) Inc. and to verify in particular
the placement fee being charged as alleged in the letter-complaint. Respondent was likewise directed to conduct a
discreet surveillance of the recruitment agency.
On
On
The PNP-CIS operatives proceeded to
the premises of G&M (Phil.) Inc. located at P55,000.00
payable as follows: P7,000.00
downpayment, P20,000.00 to be paid after submission of the requirements,
and P28,000.00 payable at the airport prior to departure for
As a result of their surveillance,
the operatives recommended that an entrapment operation be conducted on the
employees of the agency.
On P7,000.00 to Encenada as initial payment of the placement fee of P55,000.00. When Encenada received the money, she was
arrested by the team.
During the arrest of Encenada,
petitioner Golangco was not around. When he arrived, he, too, was arrested by the
POEA-CIS team and was brought to the POEA Headquarters for investigation.
Petitioner Golangco left the POEA
premises at around
Subsequently, petitioner Golangco and
Encenada were charged with violation of Articles 29, 32 and 34(a) of the Labor
Code. Thereafter,
Administrative cases were also hurled
against G&M (Phil.) Inc. for violations of the Labor Code. However, the cases were dismissed based on
the finding that there was no evidence adduced showing that the agency was
involved in the illegal acts of Encenada.
Aggrieved by his arrest, petitioner
Golangco filed a criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
case was docketed as OMB-0-93-0407. An
administrative complaint for oppression, abuse of authority, gross
inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct arising from the same
incident was likewise filed against respondent which was docketed as
OMB-ADM-0-93-0149.
In a Resolution dated
Unfazed by the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, petitioner Golangco filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court entitled, “Jowett K. Golangco v. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.” docketed as G.R. No. 112857.
In a Resolution dated
In the meantime, the administrative
complaint against respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0149, proceeded
independently of the criminal complaint.
In a Resolution dated
Convinced that the administrative
complaint against respondent was bereft of evidence, GIO Onos, in a Resolution
dated
Petitioner Golangco filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
When Aniano A. Desierto assumed the
Office of the Ombudsman, he referred the Order dated
Special Prosecution Officer I Lemuel
M. De Guzman (De Guzman), to whom the case was assigned, issued a Memorandum
dated 22 January 1996 finding probable cause against petitioner Golangco for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, De Guzman recommended to Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto that the Resolutions dated
On
With the Ombudsman’s approval of the
Information prepared by De Guzman, said information was subsequently filed
before the RTC, Branch 38,
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of GIO Dao’s Resolution dated
Disgruntled with the actions of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-93-0149, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court impugning the
validity of the foregoing Resolution and Order adjudging him guilty of
oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct. The petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 112857, was later referred to the Court of Appeals based on the
doctrine laid down in Fabian v. Hon.
Desierto[3] which
vested in the Court of Appeals the appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
Ombudsman pertaining to administrative disciplinary cases.
In a Decision dated
Petitioner Golangco and the Office of
the Ombudsman separately filed motions for reconsideration of the
decision. These motions were denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Hence, these petitions.
In G.R. No. 147640, petitioner
Golangco raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A MATTER
OF LAW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER
PETITIONER’S WARRANTLESS ARREST.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND RESPECT TO THE OPINION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND IN
CONSIDERING IT AS AN EX-OFFICIO
COUNSEL FOR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND EXCEEDED
ITS AUTHORITY IN, LIKEWISE, RULING ON THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THE CASE IN
DISREGARD OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S RESOLUTION ISSUED IN G.R. NO. 128742 DATED
In G.R. No. 147762, the Office of the
Ombudsman submits the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO HAS
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE OMB-0-93-0407, MUCH LESS DIRECT THE LATTER TO WITHDRAW SAID CASE
ALREADY FILED WITH REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION PERTAINS ONLY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE
OMB-ADM-0-93-0149 WHICH IS DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT OF SAID CRIMINAL CASE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT EFFECTED A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST ON A DULY-LICENSED
RECRUITER FOR ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF RECRUITMENT LICENSE OR AUTHORITY, AS DEFINED
AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 29 AND 39 (B) OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, EVEN
THOUGH SAID RECRUITER WAS NOT ACTUALLY COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT SAID
OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF THE ARREST.
Petitioners Golangco and the Office
of the Ombudsman posit that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the
Resolution of the Ombudsman and in ruling that respondent is not guilty of
oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct for
ordering the arrest and detention of petitioner Golangco. In support of this claim, petitioners insist
that respondent failed to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirement
when he effected petitioner Golangco’s arrest without any valid warrant of
arrest. Likewise, respondent cannot
validly arrest petitioner Golangco without warrant as the latter did not commit
any crime when he was arrested. Since
the arrest was not lawful, ergo,
respondent deserves the penalty of dismissal from service.
Respondent is charged with an
administrative case for oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty
and grave misconduct arising from the arrest incident of petitioner Golangco.
Oppression has been defined as “an
act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.”[4]
Gross inefficiency is closely related
to gross neglect, for both involve specific acts of omission resulting in
damage to another.[5]
Gross neglect of duty or gross
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[6] It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own property.[7] In cases involving public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[8]
The Court defined misconduct as an
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.[9] As differentiated from simple misconduct, in
grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.[10]
No such acts or omissions as defined
has been committed by respondent.
The attendant circumstances leading
to the arrest of Encenada and petitioner Golangco was a result of the
surveillance and entrapment operations efficiently planned and carried out by
POEA-CIS team headed by respondent. It
will be recalled that the arrest incident started with the letter complaint
against G&M (Phil.) Inc. of then Senator Ernesto Maceda to then Labor
Secretary Confessor which the latter referred to the POEA. In turn, the POEA Administrator ordered a
surveillance and investigation of G&M (Phil.) Inc. to be conducted by a
joint POEA-CIS team headed by respondent.
The surveillance and investigation operations established the following
facts: that Encenada permanently occupied a table of her own at G&M (Phil.)
Inc.; and that she conducted recruitment activities thereat by interviewing,
screening and collecting payments and documents from the prospective applicants
of G&M (Phil.) Inc.; and that Encenada was closely associating with the
other employees of the agency and was discussing with the wife of petitioner
Golangco matters relating to the employment status of applicants. These attendant circumstances and the fact
that Encenada was not an employee included in the list of personnel submitted
by the agency to the POEA to conduct recruitment activities, gave respondent
and the POEA-CIS operatives more than reasonable ground to sustain the belief
that petitioner Golangco authorized and allowed the illegal activities of
Encenada inside the agency thereby violating Article 29 of the Labor Code which
provides:
Article 29. Non-transferability of
licence or authority-
No license or authority shall be used directly or
indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at
any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such
license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person
or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any
agent or representative including the establishment of additional offices
anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.
That respondent honestly believed
that petitioner Golangco was violating Article 29 of the Labor Code when the
arrest was made can be gleaned from respondent’s opinion on the applicability
of the said provision embodied in his Memorandum dated 10 May 1995 sent to his
superior, the Officer-In-Charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office, POEA, viz:
This Office could not close its eyes (from) the
prevalent malpractices committed by the licensed agencies of simply engaging unregistered
employees in their recruitment business for purposes of collecting money from
unwary job seekers and then later, deny them as its employees in order to
escape from liability. This is exactly what was envisioned under Article 29 of
the Labor Code. Otherwise, said provision is just a useless provision.[11]
Verily, from the foregoing
disquisition, the conduct of respondent in arresting petitioner Golangco was
far from being oppressive, malicious, grossly negligent, inefficient or
abusive. On the contrary, respondent was
just doing his legal duty as a government official tasked with enforcing the
law. On this score, Sanders v. Veridiano II [12]
is quite relevant:
[E]ven under the law of public officers, the acts of
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not
been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed
by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they
were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
Perforce, the Court of Appeals did
not err when it held that respondent is not liable for the administrative
charge hurled against him.
Likewise, petitioners Golangco and
the Office of the Ombudsman assail the actuation of the Court of Appeals in
taking cognizance of the criminal case against respondent and directing the
Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw Criminal Case No. 96-149144. This, according to petitioners, is in
violation of established jurisprudence stating that the Court of Appeals has no
authority to review the finding of probable cause by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Court agrees with the
petitioners.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only.[13] It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or
non-administrative cases.
In Kuizon v. Desierto,[14]
this Court clarified:
The appellate court correctly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing
that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional,
we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action. It cannot be taken
into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted
to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
In the case under consideration, the
Court of Appeals, instead of confining itself to the administrative case
appealed before it, reviewed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-93-0407 finding probable cause against respondent. The Court of Appeals further ordered the
Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw the criminal information filed by the same
with the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149144. Such act by the Court of Appeals cannot be
countenanced. It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.[15] Since the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its
ruling on the same is void.
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered as follows:
(1)
The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
(2)
The
same Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals directing the withdrawal
of Criminal Case No. 96-149144 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
38,
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 147762, pp. 29A-42; penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, concurring.
[2]
[3] 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[4] Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847, 893 (1996).
[5] Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission, 328 Phil. 843, 858 (1996).
[6] Brucal v. Desierto, G.R. No. 152188,
[7]
[8]
[9] Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166,
[10]
[11] Rollo of G.R. No. 147640, p. 429.
[12] G.R. No. L-46930,
[13] Kuizon
v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 140619-24,
[14]
[15] Arcelona
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900,