SECOND DIVISION
|
SPOUSES ROQUE YU, SR. and Petitioners, - versus - BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISES, INC. and THE ESTATE OF BASILIO G. MAGNO, Respondents. |
G.R.
Nos. 138701-02
Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the spouses Roque Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu,
with co-petitioner Leyte Lumber Yard & Hardware, Co., Inc., (Leyte Lumber) assail
and seek to set aside the consolidated Decision[1] dated October 20, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 43714
and 43715, as reiterated in its Resolution[2]
of May 11, 1999, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. CA-G.R. CV No. 43714 is an appeal by the spouses Roque
Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City in its Civil Case No. 5823, while CA-G.R. CV No. 43715 is an
appeal taken by Leyte Lumber Yard from
the decision of the same RTC in its Civil Case No. 5822.
The assailed CA decision
holds petitioner Leyte Lumber liable to the herein respondents in Civil Case
No. 5822 for the amount of P631,235.61 with interest, and, on the same
breath, holds the respondents liable to petitioner spouses Roque Yu, Sr. and
Asuncion Yu in Civil Case No. 5823 in the amount of P625,000.00 with
interest, and P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
The facts:
The spouses
Roque Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu are the controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber,
a business enterprise engaged in the sale of lumber, building and electrical
supplies and other construction materials. During his lifetime, Engr. Basilio
G. Magno (Magno) entered into a verbal agreement with Leyte Lumber through Roque
Yu, Sr., whereby the latter agreed to supply Magno with building materials he
may need in his construction business. The success of Magno's business gave
birth to the Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc.
(BG Magno).
Owing to
this fruitful relationship, the two (Roque Yu, Sr. and Magno) entered into a
joint venture, the Great Pacific Construction Company (GREPAC), with Yu as
President and Magno as Vice President.[3]
Magno, for
what he obtained from Leyte Lumber, paid either in cash or by check. The
relationship between Yu and Magno began in 1975 and continued until Magno's
death on
By the time
the business relationship between Yu and Magno was coming to an end, the
respondents allege that the parties have dealt with each other to the amount of
at least P7,068,000.00.[5]
On P1,270,134.87 for construction
materials claimed to have been obtained on credit by BG Magno, and the other
was Civil Case No. 5823,[7]
raffled to Branch 6, filed by the Yu spouses against BG Magno and the Estate of
Basilio Magno, to collect upon loans and advances (P3,575,000.00) allegedly made by the spouses to BG Magno.
As
defendants in Civil Case No. 5823,
the respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the claims must be
pursued against the estate of the deceased Magno. The motion was denied, and
eventually the estate of Magno was dropped as party-defendant.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 5822, during the pretrial
conference, the petitioners, as plaintiffs in that case, proposed that a
commissioner be appointed. The respondents as defendants in the case interposed
no objections, and so Atty. Romulo Tiu was appointed and tasked with the duty
to examine and make a detailed report on the documents and books of account of
the parties to determine the nature and extent of their respective claims and
liabilities.[8] Atty. Tiu was later replaced by Mr. Uldarico
Quintana, and finally by Mr. Ernesto C. Silvano, who is a lawyer and an accountant[9]
by profession.
The commissioner prepared a
summary of account receivables[10]
and submitted three reports: the first, dated
During trial, the
petitioners presented in Civil Case No.
5822 before Branch 8 three witnesses, namely: petitioner Roque Yu, Sr.,
himself, Atty. Ernesto C. Silvano (the commissioner) and Yao Ping Chan, cashier
of Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., who testified merely on the circumstances
surrounding specific checks that were issued during the course of the
transactions between the parties. For their part, the respondents offered two
witnesses: the widow Perpetua Magno and commissioner Silvano.
As regards Civil Case No. 5823 before Branch 6, the petitioners presented three witnesses:
Roque Yu, Sr., Roque Yu, Jr., and senior bookkeeper Eduardo de Veyra of the Tacloban
Branch of the United Coconut Planters Bank. For their part, the respondents did not
present a single witness, but adopted their evidence presented in Civil Case
No. 5822. They did not, however, make a formal offer of their evidence in both
cases.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff:
1. Dismissing the complaint;
2. Declaring that defendant had made overpayment to the plaintiff in the sum of P620,239.61;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to return to the defendant the amount of P620,239.61 with interest of 12% per annum from the date hereof until fully paid;
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and
6. Ordering plaintiff to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Also, on the same date -
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint;
2. Declaring that defendant had made overpayments to the plaintiffs in the sum of P1,602,625.52;
3. Ordering plaintiffs to return to defendant the sum of P1,602,625.52 with 12% interest per annum from the date hereof until fully paid;
4. The Writ of Attachment is hereby ordered immediately dissolved;
5. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendant the sum of P200,000.00 moral and exemplary damages;
6. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendant P100,000.00 attorney's fees and litigation expenses;
7. Ordering plaintiffs to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
The two
separate decisions of even date were penned by Judge Getulio M. Francisco, the
presiding judge of Branch 6 to which only Civil Case No. 5823 was raffled. In
other words, Judge Francisco of Branch 6 rendered the decision in Civil Case
No. 5822 earlier raffled to and heard by Branch 8 of which he was not the
presiding judge. The parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions
nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an order
for consolidation of the two cases. Instead, they directly interposed their
respective appeals to the CA.
In the CA,
the two cases on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV Nos. 43714 (for Civil Case No.
5823) and 43715[14]
(for Civil Case No. 5822), were consolidated.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Civil Case No. 5822, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by declaring that defendant B.G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc., made an overpayment in the amount of P631,235.61, instead of P620,239.61 as found by the court a quo, and ordering plaintiff to return said amount to defendant, with interest of 12% per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid, and by DELETING the award of exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000.00 in favor of defendant. Thus modified, the judgment below is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
In Civil Case No. 5823, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, defendant B.G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. is ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P625,000.00, with 12% interest per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid, and the further sum of P50,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
With their
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA through its Resolution
of
A. Re: C.A.-G.R. CV No. 43714: (Civil Case No. 5823)
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN REFUSING TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OFFERED TO RTC BRANCH 8, BUT NOT TO BRANCH 6, OF WHICH EVIDENCE RTC BRANCH 6 IMPROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE.
2. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT RTC BRANCH 6 COULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EVIDENCE NOT OFFERED TO IT, NONETHELESS, SUCH EVIDENCE SHOW THAT RESPONDENT B.G. MAGNO IS LIABLE TO PETITIONERS FOR P3,675,000.00.
B. Re: C.A.-G.R. CV No. 43715: (Civil Case No. 5822)
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RTC BRANCH 6 BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5822 WHICH WAS TRIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY RTC BRANCH 8.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RTC BRANCH 6 BECAUSE BASED ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED
TO RTC BRANCH 8,
In sum, the
petitioners question, first, the
propriety of the presiding judge of Branch 6 rendering a decision in a case
filed and heard in Branch 8. They claim that Branch 6 had no jurisdiction to
decide Civil Case No. 5822 pending in Branch 8 in the absence of a motion or
order of consolidation of the two cases; second,
Branch 6 erred in considering the evidence presented in Branch 8; and third, the preponderance of evidence in
both cases warrants a resolution of the cases in their favor.
The
respondents, on the other hand, hold steadfast to the CA’s finding of overpayment
on their part, and that Branch 6 had jurisdiction to render a decision in Civil
Case No. 5822 of Branch 8 since the circumstance that the judge who penned the
decision in both cases did not hear the other case in its entirety is not a
compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions.[16]
On the
issue of Branch 6 taking judicial notice of the evidence presented in Branch 8,
the respondents argue that there was a previous agreement of the parties with respect to the
same.
On the
question of the propriety of Judge Francisco of Branch 6 formulating the
decision in Civil Case No. 5822 which was pending and tried in Branch 8, we
declare that there was nothing irregular in the procedure taken. The records
show that there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or
consolidate the two cases for decision by the presiding judge of Branch 6. As
found by the CA:
…although Civil Case No. 5822 was raffled to and tried in Branch 8…, the court a quo issued joint orders dated February 16, 1993 and September 10, 1993 in Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823…Recognizing the apparent transfer of Civil Case No. 5822 to the court a quo, appellants’ [petitioners’] counsel filed his formal appearance dated October 20, 1993
with Branch 6…There is therefore no basis to appellants’ contention that the court a quo is devoid of authority to decide Civil Case No. 5822.[17]
Indeed,
when the respondents filed a Motion to
Lift, Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on
Petitioners may not now
question the transfer or consolidation of the two cases on appeal, for they
knew of it and did not question the same in the court below. They may not now
make a total turn-around and adopt a contrary stance; more so when the judgment
issued is adverse to their cause.[22]
The next
logical questions are: Is the consolidation of the two cases (Civil Case Nos.
5822 and 5823) a procedural step which
the court a quo could have properly
taken? Is it a remedy available within the context of the surrounding
circumstances?
We answer
both questions in the affirmative. The two cases were filed just a few months
apart;[23]
they involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical
parties and no other; the respondents (as defendants therein) claim, in both
cases, essentially the same defense, which is overpayment; they cover the same
period of transacting continuous business that spans four years; they relate to
simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other; they entailed
the presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a
broad part of the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or
reproduced in the other by either or both parties. And the trial court, being
multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or
both cases on their own.
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347). Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:
“Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”
The obvious purpose of the
above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and
abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of
the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 1342-1343).
Consolidation of actions is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and its action in consolidating will not be
disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the instant case,
respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of
the two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any
substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's
jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.[24]
Likewise,
it became apparent that, after the commissioner filed his reports in court and
the parties their comments thereto, but before trial could commence, the claims
and defenses of the parties in Civil Case No. 5823 are covered by and may be
threshed out by a consideration of the evidence presented in Civil Case No.
5822 as well, which consisted mainly of the reports of the commissioner. Based
on the commissioner’s reports in the case pending in Branch 8 (Civil Case No.
5822), the petitioners’ claims, including those in Branch 6, appear to have
been paid; indeed, this is in essence the defense of the respondents as set
forth in their Answers to the two
complaints. Yet, despite all these, neither of the lawyers for the parties
sought a consolidation of the two cases, which would otherwise have been
mandatory.
When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation, when appropriate, also contributes to the declogging of court dockets…
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement
was put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to submit to the
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the resolution of common questions of law or facts.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both
parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved
therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety
of the venue in the
Consolidation
of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which
saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major
abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context
of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and
state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of
justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Another
compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation is the
avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
courts in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.[26]
In fine, we
declare the consolidation of the two cases to have been made with regularity.
To quote what the Court has said in an earlier case:
The ordered consolidation of cases, to our
mind, crystallizes into reality the thinking of our predecessors that:
". . . The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."[27]
Having given their assent to
the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823, petitioners’ other
assignment of errors must fail. The evidence in each case effectively became
the evidence for both, and there ceased to exist any need for the deciding
judge to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in each case.
On the
issue relative to the pecuniary liabilities of the parties in respect of their
corresponding claims and defenses, suffice it to state that this Court is not a
trier of facts. The findings of fact of the CA, supported as they are by the
evidence on record, bind this Court.
Prefatorily, we restate the time-honored principle that in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[28]
We disagree,
however, with the CA in holding the petitioners liable to the respondents in the
amount of P142,817.27 representing the unpaid account of GREPAC for
filling materials delivered to it by BG Magno. As it is, GREPAC possesses a
distinct corporate personality separate from Leyte Lumber whom BG Magno sought
to be liable therefor. GREPAC’s own liabilities may not be made chargeable against
petitioner Leyte Lumber as the CA ruled after piercing the corporate veil of
GREPAC. To our mind, the situation does not call for a piercing of GREPAC’s
corporate veil since there is no clear and convincing evidence showing fraud
and illegality in the formation and
operation of GREPAC. Quite the
contrary, what has been proved suggests that GREPAC was a product of the close
business and personal ties that bound Roque Yu, Sr., and Magno during better
times. It was a bona fide joint
venture between the two.
We cannot
help but discern how the respondents were put to expense by the petitioners’
mishandling of the cases in the trial courts. First of all is the petitioners’
filing of two (2) separate actions of simple collection cases which were
ultimately found to revolve essentially around the same factual milieu. And, as
soon as it became apparent that the two cases were inexorably linked, it became
the duty of the petitioners to seek a consolidation of the cases a quo. Yet they did not; instead, they
took advantage of every perceived technicality, all the way to this Court, in
order to defeat the respondents’ case. They vigorously opposed the adoption by
the respondents of the latter’s evidence in the other branch of the court,
thereby advancing misleading arguments for consolidation that had already
occurred with their visible consent. They attribute error to the trial court’s
“taking judicial notice” of the respondents’ evidence in the other court, when
it no longer was a proper argument in view of the resultant consolidation. We
do not approve of the practice of counsel employing subtlety, advancing
gratuitous arguments that tend only
to muddle the
issues, and seizing
upon every opportunity to win the case
for his client,
when in the first place the confusion
in the proceedings
was precipitated by his failure to act accordingly,
as counsel for the
plaintiffs, in seeking
the proper consolidation of the two cases. The
result is a simple collection case that has remained pending for twenty-seven
years now.
Likewise,
what the petitioners did in filing the two cases in different branches of the
court may be held to be tantamount to forum shopping which not only put the
respondents to additional unnecessary expense, but wasted the precious time of
the courts as well.
Forum-shopping is a deplorable practice of litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. What is pivotal to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora upon the same issues.[29]
Finally, we admonish RTC Branches 6 and 8 for the manner in which the case before each sala was handled and conducted. We note the lack of an order of consolidation in the records of the cases. As to Judge Francisco’s two separate decisions, we do not perceive any advantage or benefit derived from promulgating two separate decisions on the same day in the two cases that have already been consolidated into one. Although we recognize no ill intent or attribute no deliberate irregularity to the same, such demeanor can only breed suspicion and promote distrust for our judicial institutions. A judge should avoid every situation where the propriety of his conduct would be placed in question. His official acts must at all times be above reproach,[30] and they must be consistent with the proceedings taken in his court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed CA decision by setting aside and deleting
the award of the respondents’ counterclaim in the amount of P142,817.27
in Civil Case No. 5822; reiterating the P50,000.00
award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondents in
Civil Case No. 5822; and deleting the award of attorneys’
fees to the petitioners in Civil Case No. 5823. In all other respects, the
assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.