Republic of the
FIRST DIVISION
Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November
22, 2006
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent’s propensity to resort to undeserved language and
disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in
case similar misconduct is again committed.
Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito
E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
A verified
complaint[1] dated
Complainant
alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while
respondent is the counsel for complainants.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision[2]
affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),[3] pertinent
portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help
suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the
pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight
modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable
individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at all connected
with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC,
First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay
should be only one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not
clear enough, or is there another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on
the part of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the
complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents
failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable
Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring
facts.
x x x How much is the
separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service – and all of it to
the affected workers – not to some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have
taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the
First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the
Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the
evidence before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of
their ponente.
If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty
on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the
evidence. Unfair labor practice stares
them in the face.
If labor arbiter
x x x The union in its
“Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management” and its Annexes has shown
very clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead of the
facts. He fixed his sights on the tent
in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate
beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by
something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be
trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol
has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the established rule
was, in cases of money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment.
Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a
better name we should call this new rule the “Special Dinopol
Rule”. But only retirable commissioners are authorized
to apply this rule and only when the money claims involved are substantial.
When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner
Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that
the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service incentive leave pay.
This
finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record
proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible
to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He
needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol
by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of]
the decision that he signed and caused his co-commissioners in the First
Division to sign) has shown great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of
discretion and ignorance of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not
be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case any more. Commissioner
Go and Chairman Señeres, by negligence, are just as
guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the
inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Señeres
should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2) other commissioners from
another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in the instant case.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer
with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only
intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases between
complainant and the workers in the different fora where
they are pending; that the Rules
of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily
at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and
litigants appearing in cases before it;
that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to
lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC
Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial
Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor
lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get
paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger
when they get cheated in their cases by reason of corruption and collusion by
the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives and the lives of their
constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers who get
paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved.[5]
Attached
to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union
president Marilyn Batan wherein
it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several instances, such that while
the labor case is pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the
laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon
City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction
between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates
Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that
although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar,
respondents Paras’s and Cruz’s office
instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's
company did not pay income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation
due to fire and respondents consented to this act of the employer which
violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and
that when the case started, there were more or less 100 complainants, but due
to the acts of the employer and the respondents, the number of complainants
were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and
19-03.[6]
In
Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,[7]
respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time
did they file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or brook
interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs
sought before the CEO has nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and
illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and unrelated to
the labor cases of complainant; the CEO
was requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located outside the
employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other
paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the
employer's property and present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer
found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and
MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is completely
irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or
justify the construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate
the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life, property and
legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against
respondent Alar; they merely instructed
their client on how to go about filing the case, after having been served a
copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived
as an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their
brother lawyers; the complaint failed to
mention that the only reason the number of complainants were reduced is because
of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of them; their
engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no time were they
consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never
privy to the financial records of the latter; at no time did they give
advice regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is
unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.
The
case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner
Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of using improper and abusive language and recommended
that respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three months with a
stern warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed.
On the
other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable
misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and
therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint
against them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors
issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees
with the findings of the IBP, it does
not agree that respondent Alar deserves only a
reprimand.
The
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral
and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality,
impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent
used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that
does not admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,[8] the Court
ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the
right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. However, even the
most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the
In Uy v. Depasucat,[9] the Court held that
a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
It must be
remembered that the language
vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[10] A lawyer's language should be
forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[11] Submitting
pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes
against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.
Respondent's
assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or
justices and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently,
the Code of Judicial Conduct does not
apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,[12] the
Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the
law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice
and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics.[13]
Respondent’s argument that
labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is
unavailing. It does not deter the
Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or
fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.[14]
The Court
held in Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer,[15] thus:
2.
What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or
irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney – in a motion for
reconsideration – to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned
upon as “neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in the motion” are “sufficient,” and such words “superfluous.” It is in this context that we must say that just
because Atty. Armonio “thought best to focus the
attention” of this Court “to the issue in the case” does not give him unbridled
license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come
up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court’s
attention to the issues involved. The language
vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of
unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of
“harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.” Stability of judicial
institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents
aver, “was the result of overenthusiasm.” It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that
enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue,
if channeled in the right direction.
However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due
regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government.[16]
Respondent
has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actions erode the
public’s perception of the legal profession.
However,
the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors is not proportionate to respondent’s violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine
in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent
the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to
disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit
any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do
so.
At any rate, it must be noted that
the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really partakes of a
different cause of action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made by the city
engineer. Respondent’s remedy should be
to question that decision, not bring it to this Commission which has no
jurisdiction over it. We can not
substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should determine the
propriety or sagacity of the city engineer’s action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited
from availing themselves of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of
decency. In supporting the action
against respondent’s conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorney’s duty as an officer of
the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal
attack. This requires of him not only to refrain
from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but also to
discourage other people from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so
subjected. By the very nature of his position a
judge lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded
criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or
more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbents of the judicial
positions. (Agpalo,
p. 143 citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572
(1946); Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1
(1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152
(1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed
by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more apropos
would be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to
consider disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different
matter altogether. Since the respondent
lawyers have already stated that they were not engaged as counsels to take care
of their client’s tax problems, then they cannot be held accountable
for the same. If any wrongdoing has been
committed by complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who
were responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.
Finally, while it may be true that Batan’s group has been greatly diminished from about 100
claimants to less than half the number is not by itself an actionable
misconduct. Lawyers are duty
bound to foster amicable settlement of cases;
litigation and adversarial proceedings while a necessary part of the
practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no
reason to prevent the same. There is
nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that the compromise agreement and
waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers liable
for the same. Besides, a “compromise is
as often the better part of justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer
who encourages compromise is no less the client’s champion in settlement out of
court than he is the client’s champion in the battle in court.” (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalo’s
Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore
respondent Alar[‘]s beef with the execution of
these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?