FIRST
DIVISION
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NOLITO
D. SOLMAYOR, VICENTE LASTIMA, JUANITO B. SUAREZ, GERVACIO BATAUSA (dec.) represented by Antonio Batausa,
VICTORIANO
Petitioners, - versus - ANTONIO L.
ARROYO, Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 153817 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: March
31, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[2] of
the Office of the President reversing the Order[3] of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (
On 23 November 1978, respondent
Arroyo received a letter from the legal officer of the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (now DAR) informing him that his land with an aggregate area of
9.8038 hectares situated at Matina, Davao City, was the subject of Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) under Presidential Decree No. 27, which took effect on 21 October 1972. Likewise, he was advised that he could apply
for the conversion of the land to residential or other urban purposes in
accordance with applicable laws. In a
letter dated
Based on an Indorsement
issued by the City Zoning and Development Officer on 5 July 1979 certifying
that the property is “partly zonified as Residential
Class ‘A’ and ‘B,’ Commercial and Open Space x x x as per existing Zoning Ordinance of Davao
City,” respondent applied for the conversion of the land to residential
subdivision on 24 July 1979. Attached to
the said application were documents issued by different government agencies
such as the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (precursor of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]), Bureau of Soils and the City of
Acting on said application, DAR local
officials conducted a series of conferences between respondent, through his
representative, and herein petitioners as occupants of the property, purposely
to reach a settlement for the latter’s relocation, award of respective homelots, and the payment of disturbance compensation as a
consequence of the conversion. However,
no final agreement was reached between the parties. This prompted the Agrarian Reform Technologist
of Davao City to propose that the tenants on the land
be accorded the benefits of Presidential Decree No. 27 or that the matter be
referred to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for proper action.
Without first resolving respondent’s
application for conversion, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued in
November 1984 the questioned CLTs in favor of
petitioners. Upon knowledge of said
issuance, respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of said CLTs on 27 August 1985 on the ground that the subject land
was, and still is, residential property and thus, beyond the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27. Furthermore,
respondent denies the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and
petitioners.
On
In an Order dated
Going to the first issue, this Office so holds that
the landholding in question are agricultural as of October 21, 1972 despite the
fact that the same have been declared for tax purposes as residential. The Memorandum dated
The fact that there is a certification from the HLURB
that the property has been rezoned to residential use is of no moment. It must be observed that the notion that real
property which is already classified as residential or commercial, is no longer
agricultural land, is found in Section 3 of R.A. 6657. In other words, the property was still
agricultural at the time of the promulgation of P.D. 27, and the rights of the
tenant farmers shall have vested by then, and future reclassification could not
derogate such vested rights.
Anent the second issue, records show that sharing was
established as per receipts submitted during the investigation by Primitivo J. Borres, overseer of
the subject landholding. Records further
disclosed that the agricultural produce were received by Melencio
A. Gumtang and Bonifacio P.
Bernardino, administrators of Antonio Arroyo’s properties in Matina, Davao City. The contention of the petitioner that there
was no consent extended by him to the respondents is not well-taken. As borne out by the records, overseer Primitivo J. Borres permitted the
tilling of the land by the respondents hence, the landowner-petitioner in the
present case is chargeable with knowledge through his overseer of such
cultivation. Under Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended, tenancy relationship may be established either
verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued
dismissing the instant petition for utter lack of merit. The validity of the issuance of the
Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the tenants is hereby affirmed.[5]
Respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration was subsequently denied in an Order dated
The crux of this case is whether or not grounds exist
to warrant the cancellation of CLTs and EPs issued to
appellees as the identified tenant-beneficiaries on
the land. The determination of this issue
in turn hinges on the question of whether or not the subject land is exempt
under OLT coverage of PD 27.
In the recent case of Eudosia
Daez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133507,
“PD 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT
Program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops;
and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining
therein. If either requisite is absent,
a landowner may apply for exemption. If
either for [sic] those requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT.
x x x
x
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies
if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted;
or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.”
Guided by the foregoing, it is
essential to determine whether or not tenancy relationship exists between Mr.
Arroyo and the appellees. In the absence of the all important element
of tenancy, the subject land falls outside OLT coverage of PD 27 even if
incidentally it is devoted to rice and/or corn.
In the case of Prudential Bank vs. Gapultos,
181 SCRA 160 [1990], the Supreme Court lists the requisites essential for the
establishment of tenancy relationship, thus:
“The essential requisites of
tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of harvests. All these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by Land Reform Program of the government under
existing tenancy laws.”
x x x x
Applying the above-stated
requirements in the case at bar, we find the absence of tenancy relationship
between the parties. Firstly, subject land is not an agricultural land, as the
term is understood. Uncontroverted evidence shows
that the subject land had been classified as residential/commercial even prior
to the effectivity of PD 27. Per Official Zoning Map of the City of Davao adopted under Resolution No. 711, Ordinance No. 281,
s. of 1972 (p. 243, Records), the land was classified as “Commercial Zone and
Residential Zone Class B”. This classification confirmed the residential
character of the subject land as appearing in Mr. Arroyo’s tax declarations
filed way back in 1968 (pp. 187-190, Records). x x x
The residential character of the subject property is
likewise confirmed by the following government agencies or offices:
1.
The Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Davao City, which
issued a Zoning Certification to the effect that the subject land is within the
Residential/Commercial Zone under the Zoning Ordinance of Davao
City adopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and ratified by the HLURB, through Board
Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980 dated July 31, 1980 (p. 208, Records).
2.
The Office of the
Zoning Administrator, City of
3.
The Bureau of
Soils of then Ministry of Agriculture,
4.
The Office of the
City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator,
certifying to the effect that the subject land was classified as Major
Commercial Zone (C-2) and High Density Residential Zone (R-2) in the City
Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982 or better known as Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City (p. 160, Records).
To cap it all, even the
Secondly, the records show that the land in dispute
was never intended for agricultural production. For one, no agricultural
improvements were introduced upon the land since its acquisition by Mr. Arroyo
in 1951. In fact, for more than a decade since 1972, the disputed land was
subject of numerous business proposals (attached to Appeal/Memorandum) from
various land developers for purposes of developing it into a residential and
commercial area. For another, the subject property is situated in a commercial
and residential area. As the records show, it is adjacent to the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) subdivision and other residential or
commercial establishments, and surrounded by GSIS Heights, Villa Josefina
Subdivision, Flores Village, Central Park Subdivision, Poly Subdivision, San
Miguel Village, New Matina Golf Club, Davao Memorial Park, Shrine of the Infant Jesus, Matina Public Market and Venees
hotel.
The fact that appellees may
perhaps have planted rice or corn on the said land, situated in the middle of
what appears to be a fast growing residential and business area in the heart of
a metropolitan area, is of little moment. Such agricultural activity cannot, by
any strained interpretation of law, amount to converting the land in question
into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program of the
government. The Supreme Court in Hilario vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (supra) held that:
“x x x. But even if the claim of the private respondent that
some corn was planted on the lots is true, this does not convert residential
land into agricultural land.
The presumption assumed by the
appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential
purposes, is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial or
non-agricultural unless there is clearly preponderant evidence to show that it
is agricultural.” (underlining supplied)
Clearly, therefore, two (2) requisites – that the land
is agricultural and that the purpose thereof is agricultural production –
necessary to establish the existence of tenancy relationship between Mr. Arroyo
and the appellees are absent. On the other
requirements for the creation of tenancy relationship, suffice it to reiterate
the well-established rule that “[A]ll these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure
tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by Land
Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws” (Prudential Bank
v. Gapultos, supra).
As appellees are not de jure tenants of Mr. Arroyo, the ineluctable conclusion is
that the subject land is outside OLT coverage under PD 27. The issuance,
therefore, of CLTs and EPs in favor of the appellees was without legal basis. They must perforce be
cancelled. It should be stressed that the recipients of CLT and EP issued
pursuant to PD 27 do not necessarily acquire vested rights over the landholding
subject thereof. The propriety of canceling a CLT and EP, in case of a finding
that the land is outside the coverage of PD 27, is recognized and is in fact
provided for in DAR Administrative Order No. 02, s. of 1994 entitled Rules
Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Registered/Unregistered
Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) Due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of
Obligations of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs)
and for Other Causes, which provides that:
“Under
Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order No. 228, and Republic Act No. 6657,
tenants, farmers, and regular farmworkers have the
right to own directly the land they till. Ownership shall be evidenced by
either an Emancipation Patent (EP) or Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA)
x x x x
EPs/CLOAs issued to ARBs may be corrected and cancelled for violations of
agrarian laws, rules and regulations. This includes cases of lands which are
found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage, or
part of the landowner’s retained areas. All rights which accrue to the ARB upon
cancellation may be forfeited and the amortization they have paid may be
refunded.”
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed
Aggrieved by the
decision of the Office of the President, petitioners filed a Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the Office of the
President erred in finding that the subject landholding has been classified as
non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
Presidential Decree No. 27 and not primarily devoted to rice or corn crops, and
that the farmer-beneficiaries are not tenants of respondent.
In a decision
dated
The petition is bereft of merit.
x x x x
For Us to determine whether the
subject property is within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27, We are
lifting the pertinent provision of paragraph 5 of P.D. 27 which states in no
uncertain terms that:
x x x x
This (P.D. 27) shall apply to
tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn
under a system of share-crop or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed or
not.”
Thus, from the provision of the
above-cited decree, as amended by R.A. 6657, land coverage thereof only applies
when two (2) conditions concur, a) the agricultural land is planted with rice
and corn; and b) the existence of a tenancy relationship between the landowner
and the tenant-farmer.
As correctly argued by the
respondent herein, and so ruled by the Office of the President, the subject
property is not a private agricultural land as specifically required under the aforequoted provision of P.D. 27, as amended. Uncontroverted
evidence shows that the subject property had already been classified as
residential/commercial even prior to the effectivity
of P.D. 27. Per Official Zoning Map of
the City of Davao adopted under Resolution No. 711,
Ordinance No. 281, s. of 1972 (p. 243, Records), the land was classified as
“Commercial Zone and Residential Zone Class B”.
This classification confirmed the residential character of the subject
land as appearing in Mr. Arroyo’s tax declarations filed way back in 1968 (pp. 187-190,
Records). Furthermore, in support of its
factual findings, the Office of the President rightfully considered several
certifications issued by various government agencies, both local and national,
which confirmed the residential character of the property in question, to wit:
1.
The Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Davao City, which
issued a Zoning Certification to the effect that the subject land is within the
Residential/Commercial Zone under the Zoning Ordinance of Davao
City adopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and ratified by the HLURB, through Board
Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980 dated July 31, 1980 (p. 208, Records).
2.
The Office of the
Zoning Administrator, City of
3.
The Bureau of
Soils of then Ministry of Agriculture,
4.
The Office of the
City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator,
certifying to the effect that the subject land was classified as Major
Commercial Zone (C-2) and High Density Residential Zone (R-2) in the City
Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982 or better known as Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City (p. 160, Records).
5.
DAR Provincial
Task Force on Illegal Conversion Report dated
x x x x
As We have already exhaustively
discussed above, and in the light of Our findings sustaining the stance of the
Office of the President, that the subject property is not classified as an
agricultural land, such fact alone is sufficient justification that the
petitioners are not de-jure tenants. Apropos thereto, the petitioners are not
entitled to the Emancipation Patents issued in their favor. It must perforce be nullified and cancelled.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the decision of the Office of the President dated
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition
before us raising the following assignments of error:
I.
That the Court of
Appeals has palpably erred in ruling that the parcels of land covered by
various Emancipation Patents issued in favor of the Petitioners, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, were non-agricultural;
II.
That the Court of
Appeals has palpably erred in basing its determination of the classification of
the subject land on its “actual land classification” rather than its “actual
use”;
III.
That the Court of
Appeals has palpably erred and gravely abused its discretion in not properly
and correctly appreciating the acts of Respondent Arroyo – seeking conversion
of the subject landholdings to residential subdivision and in making a
Voluntary Offer to Sell the subject parcels of land to the government pursuant
to the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 – as
admissions of the fact that subject landholdings were indeed agricultural;
IV.
That the Court of
Appeals has palpably and gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the claim
of petitioners that they were tenants of the lands covered by the said
Emancipation Patents.
Preliminarily, respondent,
in his Comment, and again reiterated in his Memorandum, argues that the instant
petition is defective and must be dismissed for failure to comply with Section
5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires the plaintiff or principal party
to make a certification under oath in the initiatory pleading against forum
shopping. Respondent maintains that
since the signatures of only four of the twelve petitioners appear on the certification
against forum shopping attached to the petition, the petition is defective as
petitioners have failed to comply with the requirements of the aforementioned
Rule and thus warrants the dismissal of the case.
While we may
agree with respondent’s contention that the absence of the signatures of the
eight other petitioners in the certification against forum shopping causes the
petition to be defective and is therefore a valid cause for the dismissal of
the instant petition, this conclusion, however, will not deter this Court from
proceeding with the judicial determination of the important legal issues
herein. The Court has stressed that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.[8] The strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded.[9] It does not thereby prohibit substantial
compliance with provisions under justifiable circumstances.[10] All petitioners as occupants of respondent’s
land filed the instant petition as a collective group, raising the same
arguments to defend their rights. There
is sufficient basis, therefore, for the four petitioners to speak for and in
behalf of their co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim in
another court or tribunal involving the same issues.[11] Thus, the execution of the certificate
against forum shopping by only four petitioners in behalf of the co-petitioners
constitute substantial compliance.[12]
Furthermore, we
must bear in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper
administration of law and justice. The
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense,
for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.[13] A
deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for
the existence of courts.[14] Moreover, we cannot shy away from our constitutionally
mandated duty to questions of law set forth in this petition which hinges on
the determination of the rights of herein litigants in the light of a very
important piece of social legislation, Presidential Decree No. 27, which aims
for the equitable distribution and ownership of land, without disregarding the
property rights of landowners. Thus, for
pragmatic reasons and consideration of justice and equity, the Court must put
to rest the issues presented before us.
Respondent further contends, and the
same is admitted by petitioners, that the settlement of the issues assailed in
this petition centers on the review of certain facts which, as a general rule,
may not be raised in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This Court, in numerous instances
have had occasion to explain that it is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court respects the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR,
giving them a certain measure of finality.[15] However, we have ruled that factual findings
of a quasi-judicial institution which are not supported by substantial and
credible evidence do not bind this Court, e.g.
the findings and conclusions have no basis in the records or are contrary to
the evidence on record or the factual determinations of an appellate body are
contrary to those of the initial fact-finding agency.[16] Moreover, we have outlined several instances
when this Court may resolve factual issues, such as: 1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its
findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[17]
Records demonstrate that the findings
of fact of the DAR, the quasi-judicial agency which first resolved the instant
case, differ from that of the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals,
the appellate bodies which reviewed such findings. Therefore, based on the exceptions enumerated
above, it is clear that due to the disparity between the findings of fact of
the DAR on one hand and the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals on
the other, the Court may review the facts of this case based on the evidence
presented by both parties.
Having discussed
the preliminary matters, we now endeavor to resolve the crux of this case. As pointed out by the Office of the
President, the pivotal issue which must be settled in this petition is whether
or not the subject landholding is covered by the Operation Land Transfer under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Simply put,
we must determine whether or not respondent’s property is agricultural land
devoted primarily to rice and/or corn and whether or not there is a tenancy
relationship between petitioners and respondent.
We agree with the
petitioners that the date of reckoning as to whether or not the subject
property is classified as agricultural is before or at the time of passage of
Presidential Decree No. 27 on
To support their
stance, petitioners maintain that the landholding has been more than
substantially established as agricultural by virtue of a Memorandum dated 17
May 1993 containing the Investigation Report of the DAR personnel who conducted
the ocular inspection and investigation showing that the actual use of the land
is agricultural being primarily devoted to rice and corn crops.
In contrast,
respondent offers for consideration several documents to bolster its position
that subject land is residential, namely: 1) copies of the Declaration of Real
Property (tax declaration) filed by respondent as early as 1968 indicating
therein that the subject property is residential;[18] 2)
a Certification dated 3 July 1979 by the Bureau of Soils stating that the land
is suitable for urban use and for housing projects;[19] 3)
a copy of the Preliminary Approval and Locational
Clearance granted by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission dated 12
January 1982 indicating therein that the land is primarily coco land and
residential and suitable for the proposed residential subdivision;[20] 4)
a Certification from the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Davao City dated 10
December 1981 to the effect that the property per Zonification
Ordinance of Davao City is within a Residential Zone
Class “B”;[21] 5) a
Zoning Certification issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) dated 4 March 1991 certifying that the land is within the
Residential/Commercial Zones under zoning
ordinance of Davao City adopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and
ratified by the HLURB, through Board Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980, dated 31 July
1980;[22] 6)
a Certification from the Office of the City Planning and Development
Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator, dated 26 March 1991 to the
effect that the subject land was classified as Major Commercial Zone (C-2) and
High Density Residential Zone (R-2) in the City Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982,
or better known as Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao
City;[23] 7)
a Certification from the Office of the City Planning and Development
Coordinator of Davao City dated 16 February 1996 that
per Official Zoning Map of the City of Davao adopted
under Resolution No. 711, Ordinance No. 281, Series of 1972, the subject
property is within two zones classification namely: Commercial Zone and
Residential Zone Class B;[24] and 8) the Report of the DAR Provincial Task
Force on Illegal Conversion dated 2 June 2000, ruling out any act of illegal
conversion as the subject land is classified as commercial and residential
zones.
Although this
Court will not disregard the evidence presented by petitioners that the land is
devoted to rice and corn crops in 1993, when the ocular inspection by the DAR
personnel was conducted, it must be noted that around the time of the passage
of Presidential Decree No. 27 up to 1978, when the subject property was placed
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the available evidence issued and
certified by the different government agencies, closer in time to the mentioned
time frame will show that respondent’s property has, indeed, been classified as
within the residential and commercial zones of Davao
City. It cannot escape the notice of
this Court that more than a decade before the issuance of the said ocular
investigation report stating that the land is devoted to agricultural
production, government agencies equipped with the technical expertise to
determine the proper classification of the subject land have already determined
that the land is part of the residential and commercial zones of Davao City making it suitable for other urban use. Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude,
based on the certification of various executive agencies issued when this
controversy arose, that at the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No.
27, respondent’s property was not agricultural.
Well settled is
the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are
in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts.[25]
Accordingly, since specialized government agencies tasked to determine the
classification of parcels of land, such as the Bureau of Soils and the HLURB,
among other agencies, have already certified that the subject land is
residential/commercial, the Court must accord such conclusions great respect,
if not finality, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Based on the
foregoing, we thus conclude that at the time of the passage of Presidential
Decree No. 27, the subject land consisting of 9.8038 hectares was not
agricultural.
As to the issue
of whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondents, we sustain the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the
Office of the President that petitioners are not de jure tenants of respondent.
The case of Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform[26]
outlines the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship which must all
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between parties, to wit:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.[27] This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.[28] The subject land not being agricultural, the
requirements for the creation of a tenancy relationship is thus lacking. Moreover, the Court has had the occasion to
state that the key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a
landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed
property.[29] Accordingly, having earlier concluded that
the subject landholding is not agricultural, we must conclude that petitioners
are not de jure
tenants of respondent and are, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA-G.R. SP No. 63180, dated
[2] OP Case No. 96-L-6682, dated
[3] Dated
[4] See DAR Order dated
[5]
[6] CA Rollo, pp. 33-36.
[7] Rollo, pp. 37-45.
[8] HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 139360, 23 September 2003, 411 SCRA 504, 508, citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 532, 540 (2003); Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302, 311 (2003); Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 208, 298 (2003).
[9] Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302, 311 (2003).
[10]