Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, G.R. NO. 142509
JR.,
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J.
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
J. PIERAZ, Promulgated:
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania
Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated January 18, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig
City, convicting him of the crime of libel.
Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution[2] dated
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are
as follows:
On
DON
HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
Metro
ATTY.
JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel
for Benjamin A. Monroy
Subject: Anent your letter dated
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile
threatening letter dated
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to
continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer
the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a
matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all
persons behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned
to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove “who is who”
once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding
these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE
ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in-
Fact of the present
Court
Administrator of the entire
Intestate
Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not
personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz,
nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated
Reacting
to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr.,
particularly: “Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao,” Atty. Pieraz filed a
complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents
came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they
all chided him telling him: “Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.”
Aside
from the monetary expenses he incurred as a
result of the filing of the instant case, Atty
Pieraz’ frail health was likewise affected and
aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
The
defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr.
was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the
organization “Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan” or NASATAMA,
and of a member, Teresita Quingco,
that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of
private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially
during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall
whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent
another letter, this time dated
After
trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania
Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in
Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10)
Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages,
and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. [5]
The trial court ruled that: calling a
lawyer “inutil”, stupid and capable of using
only carabao English, is intended not only for the
consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous
letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name
of respondent and an affront to his
standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was
representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person
represented by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a defect
or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message sought
to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the
defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been
couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the intention of petitioner was
only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but instead
petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic
intention.
The RTC also found that since the
letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party,
there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established
since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance
that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner
boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member
of petitioner’s association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to
recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation
was to impair respondent’s reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in
fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since
the publication of the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad
faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the
RTC’s decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated
The CA found that the words used in
the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the
good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected
petitioner’s claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would
exculpate him from liability since he failed to come up with a valid
explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer
to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called “duty”
in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the
letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.
The CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated
Hence the instant petition for review
on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:
A.
CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF
LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL,
DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM HER
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL
RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?[6]
The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his own Comment
praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As
required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is
whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that:
the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco[7]
that “if the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act
which has another objective, the crime is not libel;” when he made his reply to
respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand
for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that
Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the
Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language,
either verbal or written of a lawyer
under obligation to defend a client’s cause is but a privileged communication;
the instant case is a qualified privileged communication which is lost only by
proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice;
the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that
petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or
ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the
defamatory imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his
complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter which was to defend
the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to eject
Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the
words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is
justification for the use of those words, to wit: “lousy but inutile
threatening letter…using carabao English” was due to
the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not
serve its purpose as respondent’s client
has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words “Yours in Satan
name” is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication
letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being
communicated and which is just the
reverse of saying “Yours in Christ”.
We deny the petition.
Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be
libelous, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be
given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.[8]
The last two elements have been duly
established by the prosecution. There is publication
in this case. In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other
than the person against whom it has been written.[9] Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself
states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had
dictated the letter to his secretary. It
is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a
third person.[10] Furthermore, the letter, when found in the
mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was
identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the
issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and
malicious.
In determining whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense.[11]
For the purpose of
determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down
the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,[12] to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109
In
applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard
any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account. The whole question being the
effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having
been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too
late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words
used in the publication.[13]
Gauging from the
above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated
Any of the imputations
covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in
Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice
on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that
petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law).[15] A reading of petitioner’s subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand
letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and justifiable motive for
writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists
that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his
moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the
Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized
tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in
the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement
for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption
of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged
communication.
In
order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified
privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had
a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom
it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice.[16]
While it would appear
that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of
the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the
latter’s demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject
letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning
the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to
the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely
contained insulting words, i.e, “lousy” and “inutile
letter using carabao English”, “stupidity”, and “satan”, which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs.
Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written
had only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer
who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant
of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an
injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed
respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious
intent on petitioner’s part.
Moreover, the law
requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social
duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person
or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have
the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement.[17]
A written letter
containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public.[18] In this case, petitioner admitted that he
dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a
print out of the computer.[19] While petitioner
addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was
copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice
and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.[20] Such publication had
already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought
discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
Since the letter is not a
privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed
above.
Thus, we find that the CA
did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner
is guilty of the crime of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws
the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may
be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.[21] We find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory
damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to
actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting
evidence of the actual amount thereof.[22] Respondent had not presented
evidence in support thereof.
Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means
with prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.
The
courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or
conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a
penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[23]
where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for
alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we
deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them
only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:
Petitioners
are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably
contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal,
believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could
simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation
to evade prison term. It would best serve
the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of
discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.[24]
In the subsequent case of
Lim v. People,[25]
we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a
fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends
of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the
reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s
case of libel. We note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter
sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed
from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely
exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In
fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he
did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his
case. We believe that the
State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but
also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.[26]
Consequently, we delete the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand
pesos.
This is not the first
time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in
the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,[27] petitioner was convicted
of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition
filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty
imposed to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu
of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine
of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.,
concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr., and B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz; rollo, pp.
30-37.
[2]
Rollo,
p. 26.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] G.R.
No. 43186, CA,
[8] Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 60, 71 (1995).
[9]
Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 239 (1997).
[10]
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 edition, Vol.
III, p. 551 citing 36 C.J. 1223; Adamos, CA 35
O.G. 496; Dela Vega-Cayetano,
CA 52 O.G. 240; Jose Andrada, CA 37 O.G. 1782.
[11]
Novicio
v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 141332,
[12]
27 Phil. 52 (1914).
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 34.
[15]
Sazon
v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1053, 1065 (1996).
[16] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 569.
[17]
[18]
Daez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971,
October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 61, 69,
citing Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. L-74907,
[19]
TSN,
[20] Supra note 16 at 571.
[21] Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 477.
[22]
Cañal
v. People, G.R. No.163181, October 19, 2005, citing People v. Agudez,
G.R. Nos. 138386-87, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 692.
[23] 359 Phil.
187.
[24]
[25] 394 Phil.
844, 854 (2000).
[26]
De Joya
v. The Jail Warden of Batangas City, G.R. Nos.
159418-19, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 636, 645, citing People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933) .
[27]
Supra note 15 at 703.