FIRST
DIVISION
|
DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS’ MULTI-PURPOSE
ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED (DESAMA), MANUEL BUTIC, CESAR MARIANO, LAURO
ABANCE, BEN TAYABAN, ANTONIO DINGCOG, TEDDY B. KIMAYONG, ALONZO ANANAYO,
ANTONIO MALAN-UYA, JOSE BAHAG, ANDRES INLAB, RUFINO LICYAYO, ALFREDO CULHI,
CATALILNA INABYUHAN, GUAY DUMMANG, GINA PULIDO, EDWIN ANSIBEY, CORAZON
SICUAN, LOPEZ DUMULAG, FREDDIE AYDINON, VILMA JOSE, FLORENTINA MADDAWAT, LINDA
DINGCOG, ELMER SICUAN, GARY ANSIBEY, JIMMY MADDAWAT, JIMMY GUAY, ALFREDO
CUT-ING, ANGELINA UDAN, OSCAR INLAB, JUANITA CUT-ING, ALBERT PINKIHAN,
CECILIA TAYABAN, CRISTA BINWAK, PEDRO DUGAY, SR., EDUARDO ANANAYO, ROBIN
INLAB, JR., LORENZO PULIDO, TOMAS BINWAG, EVELYN BUYA, JAIME DINGCOG, DINAOAN
CUT-ING, PEDRO DONATO, MYRNA GUAY, FLORA ANSIBEY, GRACE DINAMLING, EDUARDO
MENCIAS, ROSENDA JACOB, SIONITA DINGCOG, GLORIA JACOB, MAXIMA GUAY, RODRIGO
PAGGADUT, MARINA ANSIBEY, TOLENTINO INLAB, RUBEN DULNUAN, GERONIMO LICYAYO,
LEONCIO CUMTI, MARY DULNUAN, FELISA BALANBAN, MYRNA DUYAN, MARY MALAN-UYA, PRUDENCIO
ANSIBEY, GUILLERMO GUAY, MARGARITA CULHI, ALADIN ANSIBEY, PABLO DUYAN, PEDRO
PUGUON, JULIAN INLAB, JOSEPH NACULON, ROGER BAJITA, DINAON GUAY, JAIME
ANANAYO, MARY ANSIBEY, LINA ANANAYO, MAURA DUYAPAT, ARTEMEO ANANAYO, MARY
BABLING, NORA ANSIBEY, DAVID DULNUAN, AVELINO PUGUON, LUCAS GUMAWI, LUISA ABBAC,
CATHRIN GUWAY, CLARITA TAYABAN, FLORA
JAVERA, RANDY SICOAN, FELIZA PUTAKI, CORAZON P. DULNUAN, NENA D. BULLONG,
ERMELYN GUWAY, GILBERT BUTALE, JOSEPH B. BULLONG, FRANCISCO PATNAAN, JR.,
SHERWIN DUGAY, TIRSO GULLINGAY, BENEDICT T. NABALLIN, RAMON PUN-ADWAN,
ALFONSO DULNUAN, CARMEN D. BUTALE, LOLITA ANSIBEY, ABRAHAM DULNUAN, ARLYNDA
BUTALE, MODESTO A. ANSIBEY, EDUARDO LUGAY, ANTONIO HUMIWAT, ALFREDO PUMIHIC,
MIKE TINO, TONY CABARROGUIS, BASILIO TAMLIWOK, JR., NESTOR TANGID, ALEJO
TUGUINAY, BENITO LORENZO, RUDY BAHIWAG, ANALIZA BUTALE, NALLEM LUBYOC, JOSEPH
DUHAYON, RAFAEL CAMPOL, MANUEL PUMALO, DELFIN AGALOOS, PABLO CAYANGA,
PERFECTO SISON, ELIAS NATAMA, LITO PUMALO, SEVERINA DUGAY, GABRIEL PAKAYAO,
JEOFFREY SINDAP, FELIX TICUAN, MARIANO S. MADDELA, MENZI TICAWA, DOMINGA
DUGAY, JOE BOLINEY, JASON ASANG, TOMMY ATENYAYO, ALEJO AGMALIW, DIZON
AGMALIW, EDDIE ATOS, FELIMON BLANCO, DARRIL DIGOY, LUCAS BUAY, ARTEMIO
BRAZIL, NICANOR MODI, LUIS REDULFIN, NESTOR JUSTINO, JAIME CUMILA, BENEDICT
GUINID, EDITHA ANIN, INOH-YABAN BANDAO, LUIS BAYWONG, FELIPE DUHALNGON, PETER
BENNEL, JOSEPH T. BUNGGALAN, JIMMY B. KIMAYONG, HENRY PUGUON, PEDRO BUHONG,
BUGAN NADIAHAN, SR., MARIA EDEN ORLINO, SPC, PERLA VISSORO, and BISHOP RAMON
VILLENA, Petitioners, - versus
- ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as
SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
HORACIO RAMOS, in his capacity as Director of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB-DENR), ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, RICHARD N. FERRER, in his capacity as Acting
Undersecretary of the Office of the President, IAN HEATH SANDERCOCK, in his
capacity as President of CLIMAX-ARIMCO Mining
Corporation.
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 157882 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
petition for prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s.
1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established
under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
.
On
On
On
Previously,
however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with
AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay
Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
Subsequently,
AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now
goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
On
On
Yet
again, counsels for petitioners sent
In
a letter dated
Petitioners
thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.
In their memorandum petitioners pose
the following issues:
I
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they
allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution.
II
Whether or not the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations are void and unconstitutional for
sanctioning an unconstitutional administrative process of determining just
compensation.
III
Whether or not the State, through Republic Act
No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its primary responsibility to the full
control and supervision over natural resources.
IV
Whether or not the respondents’ interpretation
of the role of wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their
involvement in mining enterprises, violates paragraph 4, section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS
SERVICE CONTRACTS.[1]
Before going to the substantive
issues, the procedural question raised by public respondents shall first be
dealt with. Public respondents are of
the view that petitioners’ eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as
they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they
allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on
account of CAMC’s FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the
issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable
controversy which this Court can take cognizance of.
A
justiciable controversy is defined as a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application
of a law.[2] Thus, courts have no judicial power to review
cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking
cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases
that have become moot.[3] The
Constitution is quite explicit on this matter.[4] It provides that judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, courts, through the power of judicial review, are to entertain only
real disputes between conflicting parties through the application of law. For the courts to exercise the power of
judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for
adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the “standing.”[5]
An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.[6] There must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.
Closely
related to the second requisite is that the question must be ripe for
adjudication. A question is considered
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.[7]
The
third requisite is legal standing or locus
standi. It
is defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized
grievance.[8] The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”[9] Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he
has no standing.[10]
In
the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal
rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered
into. The FTAA holders have already been
operating in various provinces of the country. Among them is CAMC which operates in the
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino where numerous individuals including the
petitioners are imperiled of being ousted from their landholdings in view of
the CAMC FTAA. In light of this, the
court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.[11] Actual eviction of the land owners and
occupants need not happen for this Court to intervene. As held in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[12]:
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.[13]
Petitioners embrace various segments
of the society. These include Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an
organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws,
representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as
well as other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These petitioners have the standing to raise
the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and
substantial injury.[14] They assert that they are affected by the
mining activities of CAMC. Likewise,
they are under imminent threat of being displaced from their landholdings as a
result of the implementation of the questioned FTAA. They thus meet the appropriate case
requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on
the other hand, claim the validity of the assailed statute and the FTAA of CAMC.
Besides, the transcendental importance
of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will
have a bearing on the country’s economy which is to a greater extent dependent
upon the mining industry. Also affected
by the resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents
in the mining contract areas as well as the social existence of indigenous
peoples which are threatened. Based on
these considerations, this Court deems it proper to take cognizance of the instant
petition.
Having
resolved the procedural question, the constitutionality of the law under attack
must be addressed squarely.
First Substantive Issue: Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and DAO 96-40
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942
and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their
sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which
they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for
private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for
public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through
the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit
entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Interpreting
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40, juxtaposed with
the concept of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain in the case of
Republic v. Vda.
de Castellvi,[15]
petitioners assert that there is indeed a “taking” upon entry into private
lands and concession areas.
Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi defines “taking” under the concept of eminent domain
as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under
the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
From the criteria set forth in the
cited case, petitioners claim that the entry into a private property by CAMC,
pursuant to its FTAA, is for more than a momentary period, i.e., for 25 years, and renewable for another 25 years; that the
entry into the property is under the warrant or color of legal authority
pursuant to the FTAA executed between the government and CAMC; and that the
entry substantially ousts the owner or possessor and deprives him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
These facts, according to the petitioners, amount to taking. As such, petitioners question the exercise of
the power of eminent domain as unwarranted because respondents failed to prove
that the entry into private property is devoted for public use.
Petitioners
also stress that even without the doctrine in the Castellvi case, the nature of the
mining activity, the extent of the land area covered by the CAMC FTAA and the various
rights granted to the proponent or the FTAA holder, such as (a) the right of possession of the Exploration
Contract Area, with full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy
the same; (b) the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by
surface owners and/or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and
exploiting for minerals therein; (c) the right to enjoy easement rights, the
use of timber, water and other natural resources in the Exploration Contract
Area; (d) the right of possession of the Mining Area, with full right of
ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same; and (e) the right to enjoy
easement rights, water and other natural resources in the Mining Area, result
in a taking of private property.
Petitioners
quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical taking, at the
very least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area sufficient to deprive
them of enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden imposed by the
legal easement falls within the purview of eminent domain.
To
further bolster their claim that the legal easement established is equivalent
to taking, petitioners cite the case of National
Power Corporation v. Gutierrez[16]
holding that the easement of right-of-way imposed against the use of the land
for an indefinite period is a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Traversing
petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a
taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of
which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some
potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate
by purchase.”
Public respondents are inclined to
believe that by entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA holders do
not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment of
their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal easement upon
surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area.
Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished
from Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the
inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of
just compensation.[17] On
the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.[18] Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends
show a mingling[19] of the
two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power
is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation
shall be paid.[20] Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters
from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would result in
the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would
promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.[21] In U.S.
v. Toribio,[22]
the court upheld the provisions of Act No. 1147, a statute regulating the
slaughter of carabao for the purpose of conserving an
adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid exercise of police power,
notwithstanding the property rights impairment that the ordinance imposed on
cattle owners. A zoning ordinance prohibiting
the operation of a lumber yard within certain areas was assailed as
unconstitutional in that it was an invasion of the property rights of the
lumber yard owners in People v. de Guzman.[23] The Court nonetheless ruled that the
regulation was a valid exercise of police power. A similar ruling was arrived at in Seng Kee S Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt[24]
where an ordinance divided the City of
A thorough scrutiny of the extant
jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is
merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to
public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking.[25] However, when a property interest is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.[26]
According to noted constitutionalist,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in the exercise of its police
power regulation, the state restricts the use of private property, but none of
the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is
appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.[27] Use of the property by the owner was limited,
but no aspect of the property is used by or for the public.[28] The deprivation of use can in fact be total
and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of
the property or any interest therein.[29]
If, however, in the regulation of the
use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such
restriction constitutes compensable taking.
Thus, in City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta,[30]
it was argued by the local government that an ordinance requiring private
cemeteries to reserve 6% of their total areas for the burial of paupers was a
valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause. This court did not agree in the contention,
ruling that property taken under the police power is sought to be destroyed and
not, as in this case, to be devoted to a public use. It further declared that the ordinance in
question was actually a taking of private property without just compensation of
a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the local government. Being an exercise of eminent domain without provision for
the payment of just compensation, the same was rendered invalid as it violated
the principles governing eminent domain.
In People v. Fajardo,[31]
the municipal mayor refused Fajardo permission to
build a house on his own land on the ground that the proposed structure would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
The ordinance relied upon by the mayor prohibited the construction of
any building that would destroy the view of the plaza from the highway. The court ruled that the municipal ordinance
under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use
of their property for the benefit of the public; hence, considered as a taking
under the power of eminent domain that could not be countenanced without
payment of just compensation to the affected owners. In this case, what the municipality wanted
was to impose an easement on the property in order to preserve the view or
beauty of the public plaza, which was a form of utilization of Fajardo’s property for public benefit.[32]
While the power of eminent domain
often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property, it
need not always be the case. Taking may
include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of
the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the
property was intended such as the establishment of an easement.[33] In Ayala
de Roxas v. City of Manila,[34]
it was held that the imposition of burden over a private property through
easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested.
And in the case of National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[35] despite
the NPC’s protestation that the owners were not
totally deprived of the use of the land and could still plant the same crops as
long as they did not come into contact with the wires, the Court nevertheless
held that the easement of right-of-way was a taking under the power of eminent
domain. The Court said:
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
A case exemplifying an instance of
compensable taking which does not entail transfer of title is Republic v. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co.[36] Here, the Bureau of Telecommunications, a government
instrumentality, had contracted with the PLDT for the interconnection between
the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, so that the former could
make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. In its desire to expand services to government
offices, the Bureau of Telecommunications demanded to expand its use of the
PLDT lines. Disagreement ensued on the
terms of the contract for the use of the PLDT facilities. The Court ruminated:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way.[37]
In Republic v. Castellvi,[38]
this Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in eminent
domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
As shown by the foregoing
jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his
proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public
use amounts to compensable taking. In
the case under consideration, the entry referred to in Section 76 and the easement
rights under Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC
under its FTAA are no different from the deprivation of proprietary rights in the
cases discussed which this Court considered as taking. Section 75 of the law in question reads:
Easement Rights. - When mining areas are so situated that for purposes of more convenient mining operations it is necessary to build, construct or install on the mining areas or lands owned, occupied or leased by other persons, such infrastructure as roads, railroads, mills, waste dump sites, tailing ponds, warehouses, staging or storage areas and port facilities, tramways, runways, airports, electric transmission, telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal flood and catchment areas, sites for water wells, ditches, canals, new river beds, pipelines, flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or mills, the contractor, upon payment of just compensation, shall be entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas or lands.
Section 76 provides:
Entry into private lands and concession areas – Subject to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires when conducting mining operations therein.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC
the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be
prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof
when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
The entry referred to in Section 76
is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the
provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the
holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining
activities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds,
storage areas and vehicle depots, install their
machinery, equipment and sewer systems.
On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them
where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission,
railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or
occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining
operations commence.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a Taking Provision
Moreover, it would not be amiss to
revisit the history of mining laws of this country which would help us
understand Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.
This provision is first found in
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 which took effect on
Before entering private lands the prospector shall first apply in writing for written permission of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of refusal by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or in case of disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of such compensation shall be fixed by agreement among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the surface owner, and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to the amount of compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined by the Court of First Instance.
Similarly, the pertinent provision of
Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known as “The Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974,” provides:
SECTION 12. Entry to Public and
Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface
rights for the entry into private lands for purposes of mining operations, Presidential
Decree No. 512 dated
SECTION 1. Mineral prospecting, location, exploration, development and exploitation is hereby declared of public use and benefit, and for which the power of eminent domain may be invoked and exercised for the entry, acquisition and use of private lands. x x x.
The
evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who
are qualified to own lands were granted the authority to exercise eminent domain
for the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining
operations. This grant of authority
extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly repealed by
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942; and neither are the
former statutes impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can stand together even
if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the grant of the
privilege to exercise eminent domain which was present in the old law.
It
is an established rule in statutory construction that in order that one law may
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent.[39] The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. Simply because a latter enactment may relate
to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
As has been the ruled, repeals by implication are not favored, and will
not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.[40] As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is
but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to
interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless
the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later
act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for
the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.[41] Hence, every effort must be used to make all
acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
latter act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
Considering
that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining
operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of
authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision.
While
this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this
does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking
of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of
just compensation.
The
taking to be valid must be for public use.[42] Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest,
public benefit, public welfare and public convenience.[43] It includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. Public use
as traditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already been
abandoned.[44]
Mining
industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is
a vital tool in the government’s thrust of accelerated recovery.[45] The importance of the mining industry for
national development is expressed in Presidential Decree No. 463:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the national economy, and therefore the intensified discovery, exploration, development and wise utilization of the country’s mineral resources are urgently needed for national development.
Irrefragably,
mining is an industry which is of public benefit.
That public use is negated by the
fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit of
private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true. In Heirs
of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,[46]
petitioners therein contended that the promotion of tourism is not for public
use because private concessionaires would be allowed to maintain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc., inside the tourist
area. The Court thus contemplated:
The rule in Berman v. Parker [348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27] of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as well in the Philippines.
“. . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established. x x