FIRST
DIVISION
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COCA COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,
NATALE J. DICOSMO, STEVE HEATH, MARY CHUA, ALBERTO FAJARDO, JESS BANGSIL,
LITO GARCIA, NOEL ROXAS, CHITO ENRIQUEZ, FREDERICK KERULF, ARMANDO CANLAS and
DANILO DAUZ, Petitioners,
- versus - RODOLFO CABALO, JUANITO Respondents.
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G.R. No. 144180 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: January 30, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the
Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2000 which dismissed petitioners’
original action of certiorari filed
therein. Being questioned as well is the
Resolution[2]
dated
The present controversy finds its
genesis in an illegal dismissal case filed by herein respondents against
petitioners, the facts of which are narrated by the Labor Arbiter in his
Decision dated
Complainants
aver that they have been under the employ of respondent company for more than
ten (10) to thirteen (13) years as follows:
NAME DATE
HIRED DATE DISMISSED
1. Rodolfo G. Cabalo
2. Juanito E. Gerona
3. Luis T. Ocampo
4. Mario Nilo Mecua
as route helper, cargadors or pahinantes,
accompanying the salesmen/drivers in their deliveries to sari-sari stores,
restaurants, groceries, supermarkets that they were all under the supervision
and control of respondent Company which provided them with the tools, equipment
and other working material; that they worked exclusively at the plants, sales
offices, delivery truck and/or respondent Company’s premises.
Respondent Company maintains that being one of the largest softdrink manufacturer in the country, it employs a sizeable workforce all over the country; that due to the fluctuating and variable conditions in the market, e.g., unusually high volume of work and unexpected shortages in manpower complement, the Company at times is constrained to augment its workforce so as to cope with operational needs; that in order to meet its fluctuating operational needs, the Company engages the services of workers apart from its regular workforce for its different plants; that the engagement of such services is necessarily on a temporary basis due to the temporary nature of the operational needs of the Company lasting for a limited period; that if, for example, the Company anticipates or actually experiences an unusually high volume of work or an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its plants or sales offices arising from variable economic factors, it engages the services of outside workers to temporarily complement its regular workforce in the said plants or sales offices; that as part of its adaptive operational measures, the Company engaged the services of workers on a temporary basis for a limited period of five (5) months; that pursuant to the workers’ arrangement with the Company, their services were automatically terminated upon the expiration of the five-month period agreed upon by the parties. Hence, the said workers’ employment with the Company ceased thereafter; that complainants have now filed the present Complaint claiming that they worked in the Company and should, therefore, have achieved regular employment status in the Company; that however, other than their self-serving assertions, there is no document on record that will support complainants’ alleged service periods with the Company.[3]
The case
before the Labor Arbiter was decided in favor of herein petitioners for lack of
evidence as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, complainants having failed to establish their claimed employer-employee relationship with the respondent corporation by CLEAR and CONVINCING competent evidence, the Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.[4]
On appeal
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by the respondents, the NLRC
declared that any decision it will render on the matter will border on prematurity as “there is dearth of evidence on both sides
of the fence to allow this forum to judiciously decide the case meritoriously.”[5] It added that “(t)he issue of
employer-employee relationship has not been fully threshed out in the
proceedings a quo,”[6]
thus, under the circumstances, it was “left with no option except to remand
this case to the Labor Arbiter a quo
for further proceedings with the sole objective of fully threshing out the
issue of employer-employee relationship.”[7] The dispositive
portion of the NLRC decision states:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and the records of this
case is hereby REMANDED to the Arbitration Branch of origin for further
proceedings to thresh out the issue of employer-employee relationship. In this regard, exhaustive efforts should be
exerted to serve summons on Lipercon Services, Inc.,
being co-respondent.[8]
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision
which motion was denied by the NLRC on
Aggrieved, petitioners
sought relief before the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari dated
For
failure to comply with Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and for failure to attach certified true copy of the assailed NLRC Resolution
dated
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied on
Petitioners
contend that they faithfully complied with Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which requires the petition to be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof. However, a review of the records indubitably
shows that this requirement had not been complied with regarding the assailed
NLRC Resolution dated December 29, 1999 which was neither a certified true copy
nor a duplicate original thereof, but a mere photocopy.
WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reason or basis to reconsider Our previous Resolution, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[11]
Petitioners
are now before us on petition for review, assigning as errors the following:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
A.
PETITIONERS REQUESTED FOR CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE
B.
PETITIONERS REQUESTED THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO
FURNISH THEM WITH CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE QUESTIONED FIRST AND SECOND
RESOLUTIONS BUT LIKE THE NLRC, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ONLY GAVE
CERTIFIED XEROX COPIES.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THAT IT ISSUED THE FIRST AND SECOND RESOLUTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES OF COURT
On The
First Issue:
The Court of Appeals based its denial
of the petition on Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that
any petition filed under Rule 65 should be accompanied by a certified true copy
of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof and that, in this
particular case, the petition was not so accompanied by a certified true copy
of the NLRC resolution dated 29 December 1999 but only by a “mere photocopy.”
The problem presented is not
novel. In fact, it is a fairly recurrent
one in petitions for certiorari of NLRC
decisions as it seems to be the practice of the NLRC to issue certified “xerox copies” only instead of certified “true copies.”[12] We have, however, put an end to this issue
in Quintano v. NLRC[13] when we declared that there is no
substantial distinction between a photocopy or a “Xerox copy” and a “true copy”
for as long as the photocopy is certified by the proper officer of the court,
tribunal, agency or office involved or his duly-authorized representative and
that the same is a faithful reproduction of the original. We held therein:
The
submission of the duplicate original or certified true copy of judgment, order,
resolution or ruling subject of a petition for certiorari is essential to
determine whether the court, body or tribunal, which rendered the same, indeed,
committed grave abuse of discretion. The
provision states that either a legible duplicate original or certified true
copy thereof shall be submitted. If what
is submitted is a copy, then it is required that the same is certified by the
proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or his
duly-authorized representative. The
purpose for this requirement is not difficult to see. It is to assure that such copy is a faithful
reproduction of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject of the
petition.
x x x x
Indeed, for all intents and purposes, a “certified Xerox copy” is no different from a “certified true copy” of the original document. The operative word in the term “certified true copy” under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court is “certified”. The word means “made certain.” It comes from the Latin word certificare – meaning, to make certain. Thus, as long as the copy of the assailed judgment, order, resolution or ruling submitted to the court has been certified by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or his duly-authorized representative and that the same is a faithful reproduction thereof, then the requirement of the law has been complied with. It is presumed that, before making the certification, the authorized representative had compared the Xerox copy with the original and found the same a faithful reproduction thereof.[14]
A perusal
of the attached NLRC Decision easily discloses that it is not a “mere
photocopy” but is, in fact, a certified
photocopy of said decision. Each page of
the decision has been certified by the NLRC Third Division’s Deputy Clerk of
Court, Atty. Catalino R. Laderas, who is undoubtedly
a proper officer to make the said certification.[15]
Moreover, there seems to be no question
that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a faithful reproduction
thereof.
The Court
of Appeals, however, zeroed in on the copy of the NLRC Resolution denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
As correctly pointed out by it, said copy is neither a certified true
copy nor a certified photocopy of the NLRC resolution but seems to be a mere
photocopy of the duplicate original copy sent to petitioners’ counsel.
On The
Second Issue:
The petition filed before the Court of
Appeals did not contain an explanation as to why service upon the Office of the
Solicitor General (0SG) and Atty. Omar M.C. Alam,
counsel for respondents, was not made personally, albeit an affidavit of
service by registered mail was attached thereto. The failure to make such written explanation,
in violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court, was the second
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Section 11, Rule 13 states:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. – Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The requirement for personal
service is mandatory such that Section 11, Rule 13 gives the court the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service of filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to
why personal service was not done.[16] In the seminal case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort,[17]
we stressed that strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated
beginning one (1) month from the promulgation of said decision; i.e. one month from
The subject petition was filed on
We are not persuaded.
In Solar,[19]
as reiterated in the recent case of Ello v. Court of
Appeals,[20] we
explained that the court’s discretionary power to consider a pleading or paper
as not filed for violation of Section 11, Rule 13 must be exercised properly
and reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) the
practicability of personal service; (2) the importance of the subject matter of
the case or the issues involved therein; and (3) the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11.
We find
that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to
observe the requirement of a written explanation why service was not made
personally to the OSG and to Atty. Omar M.C. Alam,
counsel for respondents.
First, it cannot be said that serving
the petition on the OSG and Atty. Alam through personal
service was not practical nor realistic under the circumstances. We note that
the office of petitioners’ counsel, the firm of Bocobo
Rondain Mendiola Cruz and Formoso, is in
We have
also considered the fact that the issue presented before the Court of Appeals
is not one of first impression nor is it of such importance as to justify the
relaxation of the rules of court on the ground of inadvertence. Likewise, from a reading of the petition, it
does not appear that petitioners have a prima
facie case. It is to be recalled
that the sole issue presented by the Court of Appeals is whether or not the
NLRC, under the facts of the case, gravely abused its discretion in vacating
and setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and remanding the case to
the arbitral branch of origin for further proceedings. In Sevillana v. I.T.
(International) Corp.,[22]
we had already enunciated that the NLRC is not precluded by the rules to allow
the parties to submit additional evidence to prove their respective claims even
on appeal or to order the remand of the case to the administrative agency
concerned for further study and investigation upon such issues.
IN SUM, we
stress that petitioners’ claim of inadvertence as their reason for their
failure to provide a written explanation why service of their petition was not
made personally cannot and does not justify its omission. Such inadvertence does not constitute
excusable negligence especially since said rule had already been in effect for
three years before petitioners filed their petition before the Court of
Appeals.[23] That petitioners blithely expect this Court
to turn a blind eye to their procedural blunder underscores their utter
disregard of the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13. Verily, such disregard of the rule cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction and
substantial compliance.[24] To paraphrase Solar, if any controversy regarding a violation of Section 11 of
Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonso v. Villamor[25]
and other analogous cases, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its
sound purpose negated.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Corona Ibay Somera and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring (CA rollo, p. 79).
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring (
[3] Records, pp. 96-98.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] The resolution was received by
petitioners on
[10] Rollo, p. 105.
[11]
[12] See for example NYK International Knitwear Corporation Philippines v. NLRC, 445 Phil. 654 (2003).
[13] G.R. No. 144517,
[14]
[15]
[16] Ello v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141255, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 406, 415, citing Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, 355 Phil. 404 (1998).
[17] 355 Phil. 404 (1998).
[18] Section 6, Rule 1. Construction. – These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
[19] Solar
Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, 355 Phil.
404 (1998).
[20] Supra note 16.
[21] CA rollo, p. 76.
[22] G.R. No. 99047,
[23] MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, 412 Phil.
619 (2001).
[24]
[25] 16 Phil. 315, 321 (1910), wherein this Court, through Justice Moreland, declared that “xxx litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.” In the 2001 case MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, however, we exasperatedly declared that the doctrine laid down in Alonso v. Villamor has been much abused by lawyers and litigants.
[26] Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, supra note 16, p. 669; See also MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, supra note 23, pp. 192-193.