THIRD DIVISION
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JOAQUINITA
P. CAPILI, Petitioner, -
versus - |
G.R. No. 157906 Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga,* and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and
ROSALITA CARDAÑA, Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review assailing the Decision[1]
dated
The facts are
as follows:
On
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as
Petitioner denied
the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had
only offered to buy the tree. She also
denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who
attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers
during a meeting on
In a Decision[3]
dated
On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found the appellee
(herein petitioner) liable for Jasmin’s death, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared
liable for negligence resulting to the death of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby ordered to indemnify
appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts:
1. For the life of
Jasmin D. Cardaña P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses
15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorney’s fees and litigation 10,000.00.
expenses
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner
now comes before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS VIS-À-VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN
FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE
2206 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENTS; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[5]
On the
other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals,
Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 … should be
affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed.[6]
Primarily, the issue is whether
petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña.
Petitioner
asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had
assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its disposal;
that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe
any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers
inform her that the tree was already rotten;[7]
and that moral damages should not be granted against her since there was no
fraud nor bad faith on her part.
On the other
hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.
To begin, we
have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of
fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and when this
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and
binding on this Court.[8] However, there is an exception, that is, when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the
lower court.[9] In our view, the exception finds application
in the present case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely
informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was an
absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care
more than that required by the attendant circumstances.[10] The Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its
mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have
had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito
tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon after petitioner had
chanced upon it.[11]
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done
from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation
involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of
the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances,
would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to
do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.[12]
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall
and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was
tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the
children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch
had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
In every tort
case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant
or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[13]
The fact,
however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and
rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an
obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle
of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.[14]
The effect of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the
dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a
result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case
of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily
inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury
will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an
injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had
its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care.
The
procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply.
Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites,
the burden shifts to petitioner to explain.
The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.[16]
Was
petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed
immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of
the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to be
vigilant.
Petitioner
contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because
Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its
condition. Neither did any of her
teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the
immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the
other teachers conducted ground inspections.
She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of the
danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another
teacher.
We find petitioner’s explanation wanting.
As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the
school’s premises. The fact that she
failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she
failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even
if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she
exercises supervision over her assignee.[17] The record shows that more than a month had
lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on
Lastly,
petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded if the following elements
exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[18] However, the person claiming moral damages
must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the
law always presumes good faith. It is
not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and
serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.[19] Under the circumstances, we have to concede
that petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’
daughter’s death. The award of moral
damages is therefore not proper.
In line with
applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin,[20]
and P15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses.[21]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
(On Leave) DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
* On Leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-40.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 67-73.
[4] Rollo, p. 39.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Heirs of Simeon Borlado v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 114118, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 753, 756.
[9] See Vera Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No.
160748,
[10] Rollo, pp. 192-193.
[11]
[12] 65 C.J.S. § 1(14), p. 462.
[13] Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio,
G.R. No. 150920,
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 137873,
[16]
[17] See Panuncio
v. Icaro-Velasco, A.M. No. P-98-1279,
[18]
[19] Ace Haulers Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127934,
[20] See San Miguel Corporation v. Heirs of
Sabiniano Inguito, G.R. No. 141716,
[21] See People v. Alcantara, G.R. No.
157669,