Estrada vs Sandiganbayan : 148560 : November 19, 2001 : J. Panganiban's Opinion

SEPARATE OPINION

(Concurring)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada seeks the annulment of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated July 9, 2001, which denied his Motion to Quash. He further prays to prohibit the anti-graft court from conducting the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558, on the ground that the statute under which he has been charged – the Anti-Plunder Law or Republic Act (RA) 7080 -- is unconstitutional.

In sum, he submits three main arguments to support his thesis, as follows:

1. “RA 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face and suffers from structural deficiency and ambiguity.”[1]

2. “RA 7080 reduces the standard of proof necessary for criminal conviction, and dispenses with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the crime of plunder.”[2]

3. “RA 7080 has been admitted by respondent to be malum prohibita which deprives petitioner of a basic defense in violation of due process.”[3]

I have read former President Estrada’s Petition, Reply, Memorandum and other pleadings and listened carefully to his Oral Argument. However, I cannot agree with his thesis, for the following reasons:

(1) RA 7080 is not vague or overbroad. Quite the contrary, it is clear and specific especially on what it seeks to prohibit and to penalize.

(2) The Anti-Plunder Law does not lessen the degree of proof necessary to convict its violator -- in this case, petitioner.

(3) Congress has the constitutional power to enact laws that are mala prohibita and, in exercising such power, does not violate due process of law.

^{First
Issue: “Void for Vagueness” Not Applicable}

In the main, petitioner attacks RA 7080 for being allegedly vague and ambiguous, for “wanting in its essential terms,” and for failing to “define what degree of participation means as [it] relates to the person or persons charged with having participated with a public officer in the commission of plunder.”[4]

In Dans v. People,[5] reiterated recently in Sajul v. Sandiganbayan,[6] this Court debunked the “void for vagueness” challenge to the constitutionality of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019, as amended) and laid down the test to determine whether a statute is vague. It has decreed that as long as a penal law can answer the basic query “What is the violation?,” it is constitutional. “Anything beyond this, the ‘hows’ and the ‘whys,’ are evidentiary matters which the law cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case x x x.”

^{Elements of Plunder}

The Anti-Plunder Law more than adequately answers the question “What is the violation?” Indeed, to answer this question, any law student -- using basic knowledge of criminal law -- will refer to the elements of the crime, which in this case are plainly and certainly spelled out in a straightforward manner in Sections 2 and 1(d) thereof. Those elements are:

1. The offender is a public officer acting by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons.

2. The offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth.

3. The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000).

4. Such ill-gotten wealth -- defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any of the aforesaid persons (the persons within the purview of Section 2, RA 7080) -- has been acquired directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(i) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(ii) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

(iii) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the national government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(iv) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(v) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(vi) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.[7]

Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the above-detailed statement of the elements of the crime, there is still vagueness because of the absence of definitions of the terms combination, series and pattern in the text of the law.

Citing People v. Nazario,[8] petitioner adds that “a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”

I say, however, that in that very case cited by petitioner, the Court cautioned that “the act (or law) must be utterly vague on its face.” When it can be "clarified either by a saving clause or by construction," the law cannot be decreed as invalid. In other words, the absence of statutory definitions of words used in a statute will not render the law “void for vagueness,” if the meanings of such words can be determined through the judicial function of construction.[9]

^{Solution: Simple}

^{Statutory Construction}

Indeed, simple statutory construction, not a declaration of unconstitutionality, is the key to the allegedly vague words of the Anti-Plunder Law. And the most basic rule in statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of a term from the legislative proceedings. Verily, in the judicial review of a law’s meaning, the legislative intent is paramount.[10]

Pervading the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice held on May 7, 1991 was the common understanding of combination as a joining or combining of at least two dissimilar things or acts, and series as a repetition or recurrence of the same thing at least twice.[11] As a matter of fact, the same understanding of those terms also prevailed during the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 733 (Plunder) earlier held on June 6, 1989.[12] The Records of those deliberations speak for themselves.

It is true that during the deliberations in the Senate, the late Senator Neptali A. Gonzales initially raised concerns over the alleged vagueness in the use of the terms combination and series. I respectfully submit, however, that the reliance[13] of petitioner on such concerns is misplaced. That portion of the interpellations, evincing the late senator’s reservations on the matter, had taken place during the session of June 5, 1989.[14] And the clarificatory remarks of Senate President Jovito R. Salonga and Senators Wigberto Tañada, Alberto Romulo and Ernesto Maceda, which threw light on the matters in doubt, happened the following day, June 6, 1989.[15] In brief, the misgivings voiced by Senator Gonzales as to the use of the two terms were adequately addressed, answered and disposed of the following day.

Thus, Senate Bill No. 733, defining and penalizing plunder, was passed and approved on third reading on July 25, 1989, with 19 affirmative votes (including those of Senators Gonzales, Tañada, Maceda, and petitioner himself) sans any negative vote or abstention. Indeed, some of the sharpest legal minds in the country voted to approve the bill, even though it was bereft of statutory definitions. Likewise, it would certainly be inconceivable for Senator Gonzales to have voted for the approval of the Bill had he believed that it was vague to the point of constitutional infirmity; or at the very least, if he believed that his earlier reservations or apprehensions were not fully satisfied.

At this juncture, may I call attention to the Record of the Joint Conference Meeting held on May 7, 1991.[16] The portion thereof relied upon by petitioner[17] features the exchanges involving Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Tañada on the meanings of the terms combination and series. The quoted part of the Record would suggest that, somehow, particularly towards the end of the meeting, the discussion among the legislators seemed to have degenerated into a clutch of unfinished sentences and unintelligible phrases. Still, I believe that the deliberations did not actually sound the way they were subsequently transcribed or as they now appear on the Record. Even more reluctant am I to agree with petitioner that the apparent tenor of the deliberations evinced “a dearth of focus to render precise the definition of the terms,” or that the Committee members themselves were not clear on the meanings of the terms in question.

Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in courtrooms and legislative halls. Too often, lawyers, parties-litigants and even judges find themselves at the mercy of stenographers who are unfamiliar with certain legal terms; or who cannot hear well enough or take notes fast enough; or who simply get confused, particularly when two or more persons happen to be speaking at the same time. Often, transcripts of stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators and judges as blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical jargon and plain inanities in the course of a proceeding. The Record in question is no exception.

Rather than believe that the distinguished lawmakers went about their business uttering senseless half-sentences to one another, I think that these learned and intelligent legislators of both chambers knew what they were talking about, spoke their minds, and understood each other well, for the Record itself does not indicate the contrary. Neither does it show any details or minutiae that would indicate that they abandoned their earlier common understanding of the terms combination and series.

^{Specific
Number or}

^{Percentage Not Always Necessary}

Regrettably, I shall also have to take issue with petitioner’s disquisition to the effect that “when penal laws enacted by Congress make reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime,” followed by a recitation of the minimum number of malefactors mentioned in the statutory definitions of band, conspiracy, illegal recruitment by syndicate, large-scale illegal recruitment, organized/syndicated crime group, and swindling by a syndicate. Thus, he insinuates that, because RA 7080 has failed to specify precisely the minimum number of malefactors needed for an offense to be properly classified as plunder, the law is vague or has somehow failed to meet the standard for penal laws.

The aforequoted discourse would appear to be incongruous, if not totally misleading. As pointed out during the Oral Argument on September 18, 2001, the crime of plunder can be committed by a public officer acting alone. Section 2 of RA 7080 reads as follows: “Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with x x x.” Thus, the insistence on a mathematical specification or precise quantification is essentially without basis. And lest anyone believe that the Anti-Plunder Law is unusual in this respect, let me just recall that the RICO law, to which petitioner made repeated references in his Amended Petition, can likewise be violated by a single individual.[18]

^{Not
Oppressive}

^{or Arbitrary}

Neither can it be said that RA 7080 is oppressive or arbitrary for imposing a more severe penalty on a combination or series of the offenses enumerated in Section 1(d) of the law, than would otherwise be imposed if the said offenses were taken separately. As Mr. Justice Mendoza lucidly pointed out in his interpellation during the Oral Argument, the Anti-Plunder Law is merely employing a familiar technique or feature of penal statutes, when it puts together what would otherwise be various combinations of traditional offenses already proscribed by existing laws and attaching thereto higher or more severe penalties than those prescribed for the same offenses taken separately.

Here, Mr. Justice Mendoza is referring to special complex crimes like rape with homicide or robbery with homicide. During the Oral Argument, he asked whether petitioner’s counsel was in fact suggesting that such special complex crimes -- a very important part of the Revised Penal Code and well-entrenched in our penal system -- were violative of due process and the constitutional guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment and should also be struck down. It goes without saying that the legislature is well within its powers to provide higher penalties in view of the grave evils sought to be prevented by RA 7080.

^{Innocent
Acts Not}

^{Penalized by RA 7080}

Petitioner insists that innocent acts are in effect criminalized by RA 7080, because it allegedly penalizes combinations or series of acts coming within the purview of the means or similar schemes enumerated under items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d) of the law, which reads as follows:

“4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

“5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests”

That such contention “deserves scant attention” is an understatement of the extreme sort. The claim of “innocent acts” is possible only because items 4 and 5 have been taken completely out of context and read in isolation instead of in relation to the other provisions of the same law, particularly Section 2. The above-enumerated acts, means or similar schemes must be understood as having reference to or connection with the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others. Those acts are therefore not innocent acts. Neither are those prohibitions new or unfamiliar. The proscribed acts under item 4, for instance, may to some extent be traced back to some of the prohibitions in RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft Law). Section 3, the pertinent part of such law, reads as follows:

“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

“(a) x x x x x x x x x

“(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

“(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section Thirteen of this Act.

“(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

x x x x x x x x x

“(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

x x x x x x x x x.”

On the other hand, the prohibited acts under item 5 have antecedents in the Revised Penal Code’s interdiction against monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. Clearly, the acts dealt with in Items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d) are in no wise the innocent or innocuous deeds that petitioner would have us mistake them for.

^{RA
7080 Not Suffering}

^{from Overbreadth}

In connection with the foregoing discussion, petitioner also charges that RA 7080 suffers from “overbreadth.” I believe petitioner misconstrues the concept. In the very recent case People v. Dela Piedra,[19] this Court held:

“A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished, is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

“In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place – including private vehicles – other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of ‘recruitment and placement’ that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.” (Italics supplied)

Similarly, in the instant case, petitioner has not identified which of his constitutionally protected freedoms, if any, are allegedly being violated by the Anti-Plunder Law. As Mr. Justice Mendoza pointed out to petitioner’s counsel during the Oral Argument, specious and even frivolous is the contention that RA 7080 infringes on the constitutional right of petitioner by depriving him of his liberty pending trial and by paving the way for his possible conviction because, following that line of argument, the entire Revised Penal Code would be reckoned to be an infringement of constitutional rights.

^{“Pattern
of Overt}

^{or Criminal Acts”}

Petitioner, in line with his “void for vagueness” attack on RA 7080, faults the statute for failing to provide a definition of the phrase a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy used in Section 4 of the law. This definition is crucial since, according to him, such pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder.

A plain reading of the law easily debunks this contention. First, contrary to petitioner’s suggestions, such pattern of overt or criminal acts and so on is not and should not be deemed an essential or substantive element of the crime of plunder. It is possible to give full force and effect to RA 7080 without applying Section 4 -- an accused can be charged and convicted under the Anti-Plunder Law without resorting to that specific provision. After all, the heading and the text of Section 4, which I quote below, leave no room for doubt that it is not substantive in nature:

“SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” (Boldface supplied)

As Mr. Chief Justice Davide very astutely pointed out during the Oral Argument, Section 2 in relation to Section 1(d) deals with how the crime of plunder is committed. Hence, these two sections constitute the substantive elements, whereas Section 4 deals with how the crime is proved and is therefore not substantive, but merely procedural. It may be disregarded or discarded if found defective or deficient, without impairing the rest of the statute.

Actually, the root of this problem may be traced to an observation made by Rep. Pablo Garcia, chair of the House Committee on Justice, that RA 7080 had been patterned after the RICO Law.[20] Petitioner apparently seized on this statement and on the assertions in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell[21] and other cases that a pattern of racketeering is a “key requirement” in the RICO Law and a “necessary element” of violations thereof. He then used these as the springboard for his vagueness attacks on RA 7080. However, his reliance on the RICO law is essentially misplaced. Respondent Sandiganbayan correctly held that the said legislation was essentially different from our Anti-Plunder Law, as it pointed out in its Resolution of July 9, 2001, which I quote:

“Accused Joseph E. Estrada claims that the Anti-Plunder Law does not define ‘pattern of overt or criminal acts’ indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, thereby giving prosecutors and judges unlimited discretion to determine the nature and extent of evidence that would show ‘pattern.’” (Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001, p. 13) The Court disagrees with this contention.

“x x x. According to the sponsors of the Anti-Plunder Law in Congress, the said law is similar to the U.S. RICO (Deliberations of the House of Representatives Committee on Revision of Law and Justice, May 24, 1990). However, the similarities extend only insofar as both laws penalize with severe penalties the commission by a single accused or multiple accused of a pattern of overt or criminal acts as one continuing crime. However, the legislative policies and objectives as well as the nature of the crimes penalized respectively by the RICO and the Anti-Plunder Law are different.” (Boldface and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, a careful reading of RICO vis-à-vis RA 7080 can lead to no other conclusion than that the crimes being penalized are completely different in nature and character, and that the legislative objectives and policies involved are quite dissimilar.

In the case of RICO, legislative concern focused on the threat of continued racketeering activity, and that was why pattern was imbued with such importance. “Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct,”[22] as the following quote indicates:

“RICO’s legislative history reveals Congress’ intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.[23]

x x x x x x x x x

“What a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove is continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter. This may be done in a variety of ways, thus making it difficult to formulate in the abstract any general test for continuity. We can, however, begin to delineate the requirement.

“‘Continuity’ is both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. x x x. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept – and particularly so in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO’s predicate acts or offenses, and the relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are distinct requirements. A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement. Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought before continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated.”[24] (italics and underscoring supplied)

However, in RA 7080, precisely because of the sheer magnitude of the crimes in question and their extremely deleterious effects on society, the legislative sentiment of great urgency – the necessity of immediate deterrence of such crimes -- was incompatible with the RICO concept of “pattern” as connoting either continuity over a substantial period of time or threat of continuity or repetition. The legislative intent[25] and policy of RA 7080 centered on imposing a heavy penalty in order to achieve a strong, if not permanent, deterrent effect -- the sooner the better. The following Senate deliberations are instructive:

“Senator Paterno. Mr. President, [I’m] not too clear yet on the reason for trying to define a crime of plunder. Could I get some further clarification?

“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President.

“Because of our experience in the former regime, we feel that there is a need for Congress to pass the legislation which would cover a crime of this magnitude. While it is true, we already have the Anti-Graft Law. But that does not directly deal with plunder. That covers only the corrupt practices of public officials as well as their spouses and relatives within the civil degree, and the Anti-Graft law as presently worded would not adequately or sufficiently address the problems that we experienced during the past regime.

“Senator Paterno. May I try to give the Gentleman, Mr. President, my understanding of the bill?

“Senator Tañada. Yes.

“Senator Paterno. I envision that this bill or this kind of plunder would cover a discovered interconnection of certain acts, particularly, violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when, after the different acts are looked at, a scheme or conspiracy can be detected, such scheme or conspiracy consummated by the different criminal acts or violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, such that the scheme or conspiracy becomes a sin, as a large scheme to defraud the public or rob the public treasury. It is parang robo and banda. It is considered as that. And, the bill seeks to define or says that P100 million is that level at which ay talagang sobra na, dapat nang parusahan ng husto. Would it be a correct interpretation or assessment of the intent of the bill?

“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. X x x x x.

“Senator Paterno. Would the Author not agree that this crime of plunder should be considered a heinous crime, Mr. President?

“Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. That is why, the penalty imposed under this bill is life imprisonment, and permanent disqualification from holding public office.

“Senator Paterno. I would really ask, Mr. President, whether the Author would not consider that this is a heinous crime which, for compelling reasons, namely to try and dampen the graft and corruption, Congress should provide the death penalty for the crime of plunder.

“Senator Tañada. I personally would have some problem with that, Mr. President, because I am against the restoration of death penalty in our criminal code. I would submit that to this Body.

“Senator Paterno. I respect the ministerial attitude and the respect for human life of the author, Mr. President, but I just feel that graft and corruption is such a large problem in our society that, perhaps, it is necessary for this Congress to express itself that this crime of plunder is a heinous crime which should be levied the death penalty, Mr. President.”[26]

Thus, it is clear and unarguable that “pattern,” a key requirement or necessary element of RICO, is in no wise an essential element of RA 7080.

This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that pattern, in the RICO law context, is nowhere to be found in the language of RA 7080 or in the deliberations of Congress. Indeed, the legislators were well aware of the RICO Act; hence, they could have opted to adopt its concepts, terms and definitions and installed pattern in the RICO sense as an essential element of the crime of plunder, if that were their intent. At the very least, they would not have relegated the term pattern to a procedural provision such as Section 4.

Second, to answer petitioner’s contention directly, the Anti-Plunder Law does in fact provide sufficient basis to get at the meaning of the term pattern as used in Section 4. This meaning is brought out in the disquisition of Respondent Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution, reproduced hereunder:

“The term ‘pattern’ x x x is sufficiently defined in the Anti-Plunder Law, specifically through Section 4 x x x, read in relation to Section 1(d) and Section 2 of the same law. Firstly, under Section 1(d) x x x, a pattern consists of at least a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Section 1(d). Secondly, pursuant to Section 2 of the law, the ‘pattern’ of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable a public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth; and [t]hirdly, there must either be an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates ‘a general plan of action or method’ which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain said common goal.

“Parenthetically, it can be said that the existence of a pattern indicating an overall scheme or a single conspiracy would serve as the link that will tie the overt or criminal acts into one continuing crime of plunder. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come into an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). To use an analogy made by U.S. courts in connection with RICO violations, a pattern may be likened to a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts which may be committed by a single or multiple accused), meeting at a common center (the acquisition or accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer) and with the rim (the over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel enclosing the spokes. In this case, the information charges only one count of [the] crime of plunder, considering the prosecution’s allegation in the amended information that the series or combination of overt or criminal acts charged form part of a conspiracy among all the accused.”[27]

^{Judiciary
Empowered}

^{to Construe and Apply the Law}

At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial.[28] Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.

Moreover, a statute should be construed in the light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and should be given such construction as will advance the purpose, suppress the mischief or evil, and secure the benefits intended.[29] A law is not a mere composition, but an end to be achieved; and its general purpose is a more important aid to its meaning than any rule that grammar may lay down.[30] A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment.[31]

As can be gleaned from the legislative deliberations, the Plunder Law was enacted to curb the “despoliation of the National Treasury by some public officials who have held the levers of power” and to penalize “this predatory act which has reached unprecedented heights and has been developed by its practitioners to a high level of sophistication during the past dictatorial regime.” Viewed broadly, “plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole.” Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of “a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently.”[32]

^{No
Patent and Clear}

^{Conflict with Constitution}

Against the foregoing backdrop, I believe petitioner’s heavy reliance on the void-for-vagueness concept cannot prevail, considering that such concept, while mentioned in passing in Nazario and other cases, has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.[33] On the other hand, the constitutionality of certain penal statutes has been upheld in several cases, notwithstanding allegations of ambiguity in the provisions of law. In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras[34] and People v. Morato,[35] the Court upheld the validity of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms), respectively, despite constitutional challenges grounded on alleged ambiguity.

Similarly, the cases cited by petitioner involving U.S. federal court decisions relative to the RICO Law did not at all arrive at a finding of unconstitutionality of the questioned statute. To repeat, reference to these U.S. cases is utterly misplaced, considering the substantial differences in the nature, policies and objectives between the RICO Law and the Anti-Plunder Law. Verily, “the RICO Law does not create a new type of substantive crime since any acts which are punishable under the RICO Law also are punishable under existing federal and state statutes.”[36] Moreover, the main purpose of the RICO Law is “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States.”[37]

On the other hand, the Plunder Law creates an entirely new crime that may consist of both (a) criminal acts already punished by the Revised Penal Code or special laws and (b) acts that may not be punishable by previously existing laws. Furthermore, unlike in the RICO Law, the motivation behind the enactment of the Anti-Plunder Law is “the need to for a penal law that can adequately cope with the nature and magnitude of the corruption of the previous regime”[38] in accordance with the constitutional duty of the State “to take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.”[39]

In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done.[40] To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication.[41] Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.

^{Second Issue:}

^{Quantum of Evidence}

^{Not Lowered by RA 7080}

I will now tackle petitioner’s impassioned asseverations that the Anti-Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Section 4 of RA 7080 provides that, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. This is because it would be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Hence, petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law “eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy.” He thus claims that the statute penalizes the accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder, without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused. From these premises, he precipitately, albeit inaccurately, concludes that RA 7080 has ipso facto lowered the quantum of evidence required to secure a conviction under the challenged law. This is clearly erroneous.

First, petitioner’s allegation as to the meaning and implications of Section 4 can hardly be taken seriously, because it runs counter to certain basic common sense presumptions that apply to the process of interpreting statutes: that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law; that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail;[42] and that the legislature aimed to impart to its enactments such meaning as would render them operative and effective and prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.

Second, petitioner’s allegation is contradicted by the legislative Records that manifest the real intent behind Section 4, as well as the true meaning and purpose of the provision therein. This intent is carefully expressed by the words of Senate President Salonga:

“Senate Pres. Salonga. Is that, if there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove all of those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the meaning of this.”[43] (italics supplied)

All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder -- that “the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the ‘stealth and secrecy’ in which it is committed and the involvement of ‘so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units.’”[44] Hence, establishing a pattern indicative of the overall unlawful scheme becomes relevant and important.

^{Proof
of Pattern}

^{Beyond Reasonable Doubt}

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the indicative pattern must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To my mind, this means that the prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in an ordinary criminal case. The prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal acts, must necessarily show a combination or series of acts within the purview of Section 1(d) of the law.

These acts which constitute the combination or series must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On top of that, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt such pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other elements thereof.

Thus, Respondent Sandiganbayan was correct in its ratiocination on that point:

“The accused misread the import and meaning of the above-quoted provision (Sec. 4). The latter did not lower the quantum of evidence necessary to prove all the elements of plunder, which still remains proof beyond reasonable doubt. For a clearer understanding of the import of Section 4 of the Anti-Plunder Law, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the legislative deliberations on the subject:

‘MR. ALBANO. Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

‘MR. GARCIA (P). Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved only two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

‘MR. ALBANO. I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt (or) criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

‘MR. GARCIA (P). With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption and in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in these transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder.’ (Deliberations of House of Representatives on RA 7080, dated October 9, 1990).’

x x x x x x x x x

“According to the Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, the crime of plunder, which is a ‘term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed through a series [or combination] of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth or secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units.’ For this reason, it would be unreasonable to require the prosecution to prove all the overt and criminal acts committed by the accused as part of an ‘over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy’ to amass ill-gotten wealth as long as all the elements of the crime of plunder have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such as, the combination or series of overt or criminal acts committed by a public officer alone or in connivance with other persons to accumulate ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least Fifty Million Pesos.

“The statutory language does not evince an intent to do away with the constitutional presumption of guilt nor to lower the quantum of proof needed to establish each and every element or ingredient of the crime of plunder.”[45]

In connection with the foregoing, I emphasize that there is no basis for petitioner’s concern that the conspiracy to defraud, which is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code, may have been criminalized under RA 7080. The Anti-Plunder Law treats conspiracy as merely a mode of incurring criminal liability, but does not criminalize or penalize it per se.

In sum, it is clear that petitioner has misunderstood the import of Section 4. Apropos the foregoing, I maintain that, between an interpretation that produces questionable or absurd results and one that gives life to the law, the choice for this Court is too obvious to require much elucidation or debate.

Even granting arguendo that Section 4 of the Anti-Plunder law suffers from some constitutional infirmity, the statute may nonetheless survive the challenge of constitutionality in its entirety. Considering that this provision pertains only to a rule on evidence or to a procedural matter that does not bear upon or form any part of the elements of the crime of plunder, the Court may declare the same unconstitutional and strike it off the statute without necessarily affecting the essence of the legislative enactment. For even without the assailed provision, the law can still stand as a valid penal statute inasmuch as the elements of the crime, as well as the penalties therein, may still be clearly identified or sufficiently derived from the remaining valid portions of the law. This finds greater significance when one considers that Section 7 of the law provides for a separability clause declaring the validity, the independence and the applicability of the other remaining provisions, should any other provision of the law be held invalid or unconstitutional.

^{Third Issue:}

^{The Constitutional Power of
Congress}

^{to Enact}^{Mala Prohibita Laws}

Petitioner maintains that RA 7080 “eliminated the element of mens rea from crimes which are mala in se and converted these crimes which are components of plunder into mala prohibita, thereby rendering it easier to prove” since, allegedly, “the prosecution need not prove criminal intent.”

This asseveration is anchored upon the postulate (a very erroneous one, as already discussed above) that the Anti-Plunder Law exempts the prosecution from proving beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder, including the element of criminal intent. It thus concludes that RA 7080 violates the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-Plunder Law eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of plunder, my bottom-line position still is: regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the prerogative of the legislature -- which is undeniably vested with the authority -- to determine whether certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.

^{The
Power of the Legislature}

^{to Penalize Certain Acts}

Jurisprudence dating as far back as United States v. Siy Cong Bieng[46] has consistently recognized and upheld “the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, ‘the great master of things,’ to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.” Even earlier, in United States v. Go Chico,[47] Justice Moreland wrote that the legislature may enact criminal laws that penalize certain acts, like the “discharge of a loaded gun,” without regard for the criminal intent of the wrongdoer. In his words:

“In the opinion of this Court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B’s death, but upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, the society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and its institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.”

Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) -- bribery, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like -- cannot be committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined and penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or more instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if each of the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in se, even if the defense of lack of intent be taken away as the solicitor general has suggested.

In brief, the matter of classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden of proof -- proof beyond reasonable doubt -- would apply.

Furthermore, I also concur in the opinion of the solicitor general: if it is conceded that the legislature possesses the requisite power and authority to declare, by legal fiat, that acts not inherently criminal in nature are punishable as offenses under special laws, then with more reason can it punish as offenses under special laws those acts that are already inherently criminal. “This is so because the greater (power to punish not inherently criminal acts) includes the lesser (power to punish inherently criminal acts). In eo plus sit, semper inest et minus.”[48]

^Epilogue

“The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality x x x. To doubt is to sustain.’ x x x.”[49]

A law should not be overturned on the basis of speculation or conjecture that it is unconstitutionally vague. Everyone is duty-bound to adopt a reasonable interpretation that will uphold a statute, carry out its purpose and render harmonious all its parts. Indeed, the constitutionality of a statute must be sustained if, as in this case, a ground therefor can possibly be found. For the unbending teaching is that a law cannot be declared invalid, unless the conflict with the Constitution is shown to be clearly beyond reasonable doubt.

To lend color and vividness to the otherwise boring legalese that has been used to dissect RA 7080, the parties to this case laced their arguments with interesting little stories. Thus, petitioner opened his Oral Argument with an admittedly apocryphal account of a befuddled student of law who could not make heads or tails of the meanings of series, combination and pattern.

On the other hand, the solicitor general compares petitioner with Hans Christian Andersen’s fabled tailors who tried to fool the emperor into walking around naked by making him believe that anyone who did not see the invisible garment, which they had supposedly sewn for him, was “too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its quality.” This is no doubt a parody of the alleged vagueness of RA 7080, which is purportedly “invisible only to anyone who is too dull or dense to appreciate its quality.”[50]

I do not begrudge petitioner (or his lawyers) for exhausting every known and knowable legal tactic to exculpate himself from the clutches of the law. Neither do I blame the solicitor general, as the Republic’s counsel, for belittling the attempt of petitioner to shortcut his difficult legal dilemmas. However, this Court has a pressing legal duty to discharge: to render justice though the heavens may fall.

By the Court’s Decision, petitioner is now given the occasion to face squarely and on the merits the plunder charges hurled at him by the Ombudsman. He may now use this opportunity to show the courts and the Filipino people that he is indeed innocent of the heinous crime of plunder – to do so, not by resorting to mere legalisms, but by showing the sheer falsity of the wrongdoings attributed to him.

I think that, given his repeated claims of innocence, petitioner owes that opportunity to himself, his family, and the teeming masses he claims to love. In short, the Court has rendered its judgment, and the heavens have not fallen. Quite the contrary, petitioner is now accorded the opportunity to prove his clear conscience and inculpability.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition and to uphold the constitutionality of RA 7080.