FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130707. July 31, 2001]
VERONICA ROBLE, LILIBETH R. PORTUGALIZA, and BOBBY PORTUGALIZA, petitioners, vs. DOMINADOR ARBASA and ADELAIDA ARBASA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO,
J.:
Petitioners appeal via
certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which set aside the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents lawful owners and
possessors of the entire parcel of land with a total area of eight hundred
eighty four (884) square meters, situated at Poblacion, Isabel, Leyte, covered
by Tax Declaration No. 67 in the name of respondent Adelaida Arbasa.[2]
On January 2, 1976,
spouses Dominador Arbasa and Adelaida Roble (hereinafter referred to as
respondents) purchased from Fidela Roble an unregistered parcel of land located
at Poblacion, Isabel, Leyte.[3] As reflected on the deed of sale, the
property had a total land area of two hundred forty (240) square meters. Due to their diligent efforts in reclaiming
a portion of the sea, using stones, sand and gravel, the original size of two
hundred forty (240) square meters increased to eight hundred eighty four (884)
square meters,[4] described as follows:
“A parcel of residential land with all the improvements thereon;
bounded on the North, by Lot Nos. 036 and 037; East, by Roxas Street; South,
Seashore and CAD Lot No. 952; and West, by Lot Nos. 024 and 025. It has an area of 884 sq. meters, more or
less, and declared in the name of plaintiff Adelaida Arbasa under Tax
Declaration no. 7068-A and later superseded by Tax Declaration No. 67. It has an assessed value of P31,870.00.”[5]
Since 1976 and until the
present, respondents have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous
possession of the entire parcel of land in the concept of owners and had it
declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent Adelaida Arbasa.
Included in the sale were the improvements found on the land, consisting
mainly of the house of Fidela.[6]
Adelaida tolerated her
sister Fidela’s continued stay at the house. Living with Fidela in the same
house were their nieces, petitioners Veronica Roble and Lilibeth Roble as well
as the latter’s spouse Bobby Portugaliza.
Veronica and Lilibeth Roble are the daughters of Gualberto Roble,
deceased brother of Fidela and Adelaida.
Shortly after Fidela’s
death on June 15, 1989, petitioners Veronica and Lilibeth Roble claimed
ownership of the house and the southern portion of the land with an area of 644
square meters. Fidela died intestate and without issue. Meanwhile, Gualberto Roble, petitioners’
father, died sometime in December 1986.
In January 1990,
petitioners had this parcel of land declared for taxation purposes in the names
of Fidela Roble under Tax Declaration No. 8141 and of Gualberto Roble under Tax
Declaration No. 8142.
As efforts to have them
vacate the house and desist from claiming the parcel of land failed, respondent
spouses Dominador and Adelaida Roble-Arbasa, referred the dispute to the
barangay authorities for conciliation.
Nothing happened at the
barangay level.[7] Hence, on February 27, 1990, spouses
Arbasa filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City an action for quieting of title
with damages.[8]
On April 4, 1990,
petitioner Veronica Roble, Lilibeth Roble and Bobby Portugaliza filed an answer
to the complaint denying its material allegations.[9] They said that the total area of the lot
which respondents bought from Fidela consisted only of two hundred forty (240)
square meters, located at the northern portion of the property. This property
was originally classified as foreshore land, but in 1957, due to the effort of
Ireneo Roble, father of Fidela, Adelaida and Gualberto, a portion of the sea
was reclaimed and filled up. This was the piece of property where respondents
exercised open, public and continuous possession in the concept of owner, and
which had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Adelaida Roble in
Tax Declaration No. 7068.[10] With the issuance of a new tax declaration
in the name of Adelaida, Tax Declaration No. 5108-R-5 originally registered in
the name of Fidela Roble, was cancelled.[11]
Petitioners attached as
an integral part of their answer a copy of the deed of sale dated January 2,
1976, executed by Fidela Roble in
favor of Adelaida
Arbasa. The property subject of
the sale was aptly described as follows:
“This is a whole parcel of residential land, located at Poblacion,
Isabel, Leyte, per Tax Declaration No. 5108-R-5, under the name of Fidela
Roble, being bounded on the North, by Matilde Evangelista; East, by Harrison
now Roxas Street; South, by Seashore; and West, by Crestito Manipes, having an
area of 240 square meters more or less, with improvements thereon.”[12]
In the late 1960s,
Ireneo, with the help of his son Gualberto reclaimed additional portion of the
seashore at the southern portion adjacent to the 240 square meters land earlier
reclaimed and declared in the name of Fidela Roble. Because of this, the
original area of two hundred forty (240) square meters increased by six hundred
forty four (644) square meters and became eight hundred eighty four (884),
including the portion sold to Adelaida.
The 644 square meters was then divided into two (2) lots of equal
proportion, evidenced by Tax Declaration Nos. 8141[13] and 8142[14] in the names of Fidela and Gualberto,
respectively. Payment of taxes on both
tax declarations commenced in the year 1980.[15]
Constructed over the
eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters lot were three (3) concrete
houses. One of the houses was
located over the
two hundred forty (240) square-meter
parcel of land
that spouses Arbasa bought from Fidela. The other houses belonged to
Fidela, located at the central portion, and Gualberto, which was constructed
over the southernmost portion of the eight hundred eighty (884) square meters
land.
The house at the central
portion was first declared in the name of Fidela under Tax Declaration No.
3548, commencing with the year 1974.[16] This was later cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 5057, covering the year 1979, and later was cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 3638, beginning with the year 1985.[17] Meanwhile, the house at the southernmost
portion of the land was declared in Gualberto’s name under Tax Declaration No.
3549,[18] commencing with the year 1974, later
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5060,[19] then by Tax Declaration No. 5662.[20] The latest tax declaration on the
residential house, Tax Declaration No. 226[21] cancelled the previous ones and commenced in
the year 1989.
The two lots located at
the southern portion, according to petitioners, were owned by their
predecessors-in-interest Fidela (322
square meters) and Gualberto Roble (322 square meters) who had open, public and
continuous possession in the concept of owner. Like Fidela’s house, the two
(2) parcels of land had been possessed in the concept of owners by their
predecessors-in-interest, and were not included in the deed of sale.
At the pre-trial
conference held on July 4, 1990, the parties defined the issue to be: whether
the deed of sale executed on January 2, 1975 by Fidela Roble in favor of
respondents conveyed the entire eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters
parcel of land, including the house of Fidela, or it covered only two hundred
forty (240) square meters located at the northern portion of the property.[22]
On July 16, 1991, the
trial court rendered a decision finding that the January 2, 1976 deed of
absolute sale executed by Fidela Roble covered only a total area of two hundred
forty (240) square meters in favor of respondents and not the entire eight
hundred eighty four (884) square meters claimed by respondents. Moreover, the house of Fidela was not found
on the 240 square meters parcel subject of the deed of sale, and such
improvement was not included in the sale.
The trial court held that
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the deed of
sale was the best evidence of the contents of the agreement. Based on the documentary evidence consisting
of the deed of absolute sale and tax declarations issued over the property, the
house of Fidela Roble was not situated
on the part of the property that was sold to respondents. Hence, respondents’
claim has no basis. The dispositive
portion of the afore-said decision reads:
‘WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered finding the plaintiffs the
owners in fee simple of only TWO HUNDRED FORTY Square Meters (240), more or
less, of the parcel of land subject of the complaint and described in T. D.
No. 7068; dismissing the counter-claim and ordering the plaintiffs to pay
the costs.’”[23]
On August 8, 1991,
respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.[24]
On August 15, 1991,
petitioners appealed the decision insofar as it denied their claim for damages
and attorney’s fees.[25] Petitioners claimed that they were compelled
to hire the services of a lawyer because respondents filed suit against them,
which the latter knew was malicious and without basis in law or in fact.
After due proceedings, on
January 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the
finding of the trial court that the deed of sale conveyed only 240 square meters
of the parcel of land existing at the time of the sale.
The Court of Appeals
observed that from the wording of the deed of sale, Fidela Roble sold
to respondents the “whole parcel of residential land” bounded on the
“south by the seashore.” The Court of
Appeals opined that this technical description, as contained in the deed of
sale, lent credence to the claim of respondents that they were responsible for
reclaiming the 644 square meters claimed by petitioners. For if at the time of sale the 644 square
meters were already in existence, the deed of sale would have described the
metes and bounds of the property that was sold in a different way. It would have referred to the boundary at
the south as the “remaining portion of the vendor’s property” or would have
mentioned the names of Fidela or Gualberto Roble as the owners of the adjoining
properties, and not described the seashore as the boundary in the south. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads, thus:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we rule in favor of plaintiffs-appellants and SET ASIDE the judgment of the lower court. Another one is hereby entered declaring them as lawful owners and entitled to the possession of the entire parcel of land containing an area of 884 square meters, which is covered by Tax Declaration No. 67 in the name of plaintiff-appellant Adelaida Roble Arbasa.
“No pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[26]
On August 13, 1997, the
Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. In so ruling, the court said:
“We have repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for lump sum and
not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in
the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver
all the land included within the boundaries regardless of whether the real area
should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly true when the area is
described as ‘humigit kumulang,’ that is, more or less.”[27]
Hence, this appeal.[28]
We find the appeal
meritorious.
Jurisprudence teaches us
that as a rule, jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
committed by the appellate court.[29] As the findings of fact of the appellate
court are deemed conclusive,[30] this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
However, this rule is not
absolute.[31] There are exceptional circumstances that
would compel the Court to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.[32]
Here, the Court of
Appeals’ findings and conclusions are contrary to those of the trial court.
After an assiduous
scrutiny of the evidence, we find reason to reverse the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
The sale that transpired
on January 2, 1976 between vendor Fidela and vendee Adelaida was one of cuerpo
cierto or a sale for lump sum.
Pursuant to Article 1542, Civil Code of the Philippines, in the sale of
real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a
unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price
although there be a greater or lesser area or number than that stated in
the contract. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything
within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that
distinguishes the determinate object.[33]
However, this rule admits
of an exception. A vendee of land, when sold in gross or with the description
“more or less” with reference to its area, does not thereby ipso facto
take all risk of quantity in the land.
The use of “more or less” or similar words in designating quantity covers
only a reasonable excess or deficiency.[34] In the case at bar, the parties to the
agreement described the land subject of the sale in this wise:
“This is a whole parcel of residential land, located at Poblacion, Isabel, Leyte, per Tax Declaration No. 5108-R-5, under the name of Fidela Roble, being bounded in the North, by Matilde Evangelista; East, by Harrison now Roxas Street; South, by Seashore; and West, by Cristito Manipes, having an approximate area of 240 square meters more or less, with all improvements thereon:”[emphasis supplied]
An area of “644 square
meters more” is not reasonable excess or deficiency, to be deemed included in
the deed of sale of January 2, 1976.
Moreover, at the time of
the sale, the only piece of land existing was 240 square meters, the subject of
the deed of sale. This 240 square meters parcel of land was
originally foreshore land, hence, not alienable and disposable. It was only in
1952, that Fidela applied for and was granted a foreshore lease.[35] In 1965, the provincial assessor issued a
tax declaration in her name.[36] Respondent Adelaida admitted this fact,
thus:
“ATTY ESCALON
Q Is it not a fact that this land of 280 [sic] square meters was applied by Fidela Roble for foreshore lease way back in 1952? Are you aware of that?
A I know, sir.
Q And at that time in 1952, only these 280 square meters was yet existing. Do you agree with me on that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And these 280 [sic] square meters exist because of the diligence of Fidela Roble in filling this up with boulders, rocks, sand and gravel?
A That is not correct, because that was sold to me under a Deed of sale.
Q Is it not a fact that prior to the sale and prior to the existence of the 280 [sic] square meters, this was yet part of the littoral zone or part of the sea?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you caused the reclamation of the original area?
A It
was she who did it because it was not yet sold to me.”[37]
Adela confirmed that when
the sale took place in 1976, the houses of Fidela and Gualberto, constructed
earlier in 1971, were situated on foreshore lands adjacent to the property that
Fidela sold to her. The houses, made of
concrete materials and are two-stories high, could be reached by seawater.[38] This lent credence to the claim of
petitioners that what was sold to respondents was indeed only 240 square meters
parcel of land. This also explained
why in the technical description of the property as embodied in the deed of
sale, the property was described as bounded on the south by the seashore.
As held by the trial
court, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successor-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.[39]
We find no ambiguity in
the terms and stipulations of the deed of sale. Contracts are the laws between
the contracting parties. It shall be fulfilled according to the literal sense
of their stipulations. If their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, the contracts are obligatory no
matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential requisites for their
validity are present.[40] Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual
contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
(a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is consent to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain
in money or its equivalent.[41] All these elements are present in the
instant case.
Moreover, parol evidence
rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before
the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were
agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to
writing, the parties can not be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged
practices, which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the
writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.[42]
The rule is in fact
founded on “long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and
accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be
unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to
admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the
parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed
by them.[43]
The rule is not without
exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party to an action may present evidence to
modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the
written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties
or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.[44]
None of the aforecited
exceptions finds application to the instant case. Nor did respondents raise
this issue at the proceedings before the trial court.
With regard to the
ownership over the 644 square meters of land located at the southern portion of
the original 240 square meters conveyed to Adela, there is a question regarding
the true nature of the land, which has the features of a foreshore land.
Even though respondents
claim that they were responsible for reclaiming the portion of the foreshore
land adjacent to the property they bought from petitioners’ predecessor in
interest, there is no evidence that respondents subsequently filed an
application for lease with regard to the 644 square meters of reclaimed
land.
Foreshore land is a part
of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease
and not otherwise.[45] It is the strip of land that lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the
flow of tide.[46] It is that part of the land adjacent to the
sea, which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides.[47]
There is a need,
therefore, to determine whether the lands subject of the action for quieting of
title are foreshore lands. The classification of public lands is a function of
the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the
director of the Lands Management Bureau). Due to the dearth of evidence on this
particular issue, we cannot arrive at a conclusive classification of the land
involved. The instant case has to be
remanded to the trial court for that determination.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. CV No. 38738 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Leyte for further
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official business.
[1] In CA-G. R. CV No.
38738, promulgated on January 15, 1997, Jacinto, J., ponente,
Montoya and Demetria, JJ., concurring. Rollo, pp. 95-101.
[2] Court of Appeals
Decision, Rollo, at pp. 100-101.
[3] Exhibit “A”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 1.
[4] TSN, September 6,
1990, pp. 8-10.
[5] Complaint, Annex
"A", Rollo, pp. 30-34, at pp. 30-31; Regional Trial Court
Records pp. 1-4, at pp. 1-2.
[6] TSN, September 6,
1990, p. 11.
[7] Ibid., pp.
14-16.
[8] Docketed as Civil
Case No. 2924-O, entitled “Dominador Arbasa and Adelaida Arbasa, versus
Veronica Roble, Lilibeth R. Portugaliza, and Bobby Portugaliza; Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 30-34; Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 1-4.
[9] Answer, Regional
Trial Court Records, pp. 13-15.
[10] Annex “2,” Regional
Trial Court Records, p. 17.
[11] Rollo, p.
13-a.
[12] Annex “1,” Regional
Trial Court Records, p. 16.
[13] Annex “3,” Regional
Trial Court Records, p. 18.
[14] Annex “4,” Regional
Trial Court Records, p. 19.
[15] Exhibits “19” and
“20,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 26-27.
[16] Exhibit “11,” Folder
of Exhibits, p. 18.
[17] Rollo, p. 14.
[18] Exhibit “15”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 22.
[19] Exhibit “16”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 23.
[20] Exhibit “17”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 24.
[21] Exhibit “18”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 25.
[22] Regional Trial Court
Records, pp. 72-73.
[23] Court of Appeals
Decision, Rollo, pp. 95-96; Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 172-178.
[24] Regional Trial Court
Records, p. 180.
[25] Regional Trial Court
Records, p. 187.
[26] Rollo, pp.
100-101.
[27] Rollo, pp.
93-94, at p. 93.
[28] Petition for Review
on Certiorari, Rollo, pp. 4-27.
[29] Castillo v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 374, 380 [1996].
[30] Liberty Construction
& Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 696 [1996].
[31] Cuizon v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, 657 [1996].
[32] Among the exceptions
are: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when
the inference made by the Court
of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (4) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making
its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the
Court of Appeals
is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7)
when the Court of Appeals fails
to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when
the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
the specific evidence on
which they they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record; Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, 708-709
[1997].
[33] Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Volume V, 1992 Edition, p. 94.
[34] Ibid.
[35] TSN, September 7,
1990, p. 8.
[36] TSN, September 21,
1990, pp. 8-9.
[38] TSN, September 7,
1990, pp. 15-16.
[39] Rule 130, Section 9,
Rules of Court.
[40] Salvatierra v.
Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 45, 56-57 [1996].
[41] Coronel v.
Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15, 26
[1996].
[42] CKH Industrial and
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 333, 346 [1997].
[43] Inciong, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, 585 [1996].
[44] Santiago v. Court
of Appeals, 278 SCRA 98, 109 [1997].
[45] Republic v.
Imperial, Jr., 303 SCRA 127, 139 [1999].
[46] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199, 228 [1998].
[47] Ibid., at p.
229.