SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001]
CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM,[1] petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition[2] for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44442, reversing and setting aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23, dated
November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February
21, 1997, denying the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of
Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No.
IX-6-40 covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, the Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas
Trabasas bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of
said land. In 1984, Trabasas discovered
that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land.
Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola’s homestead patent before
the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson’s advice, Trabasas repurchased
the land from Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September 24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a new
transfer certificate of title.
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas
Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery
of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that
they were the true and registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom
should vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they
purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in possession for
almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heard,
the Regional Trial Court issued its decision on November 15, 1993 declaring
that neither respondents herein nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in
possession of the land. Citing Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17
SCRA 71 (1966), Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983) and
Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992), the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no equitable right to the possession of the land under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff-
1) Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the possession of the land in litigation.
2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of the land under litigation in the name of the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from the date this decision becomes final and executory, and upon their failure to so comply, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of conveyance over the said land in favor of the defendants which deed would be considered sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof, to issue another in the common names of the defendants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Private respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Pending the
appeal, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Region IX
dismissed Omandam’s protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.[4] It said that Omandam failed
to prove that Lasola, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, committed fraud and
misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for its
revocation and cancellation of its corresponding title.
On October 29,1996, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court. It decided thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land and surrender it to plaintiff -appellant.
Cost against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals declared that
petitioners’ collateral attack on the homestead title, to defeat private
respondents’ accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the
patent and title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents’
predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977;
and that petitioners’ action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest
with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for
recovery of possession, already prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied on February 21,1997. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners make the following
assignment of errors, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I. ...HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IS THAT “ On April 28,1983, plaintiff bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson who presented herself to be the true owner of the subject land;
II. ...HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT “...sometime in 1984 plaintiff discovered that defendants had entered and had occupied the subject land. Upon instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;
III. ...IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH
THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE
SUBJECT LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESION MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.[6]
In the first two assigned errors,
petitioners apparently question
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of
possession by private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated firstly that
respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented herself
as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise
questions of fact. Well-entrenched is
the rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally
conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over
again.[7] There are instances where
the Court departs from this rule.[8] However, petitioners did
not show that involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not
tarry on the first two assignments.
In the third assignment of error,
petitioners aver that public respondent erred in ignoring the trial court’s
finding that private respondents had no equitable possession of the subject
land. Again, we are confronted with a question of fact. But petitioners claim
the appellate court had disregarded or even contradicted our holdings in the
cited cases of Director of Lands ,
Abanilla, and Padre.
In Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71(1966), we ruled that a void title may be
cancelled. A title over a disposable
public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed
by law. In Director of Lands vs.
Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title
acquired through fraud. These two cases
refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated by the government, through
the Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214
SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for quieting of title, the court may
determine incidentally the right to the possession thereof, in order to provide
complete relief to the parties. The
last case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions.
Notwithstanding the formulation by
the petitioners in the third assigned error, the real issue raised in this case
involves the trial court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis administrative
agencies. What is the effect of the trial court’s decision in a possessory
action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and
decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent?
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the
Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands.[9] In this regard, courts have
no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration
issued by the Director of Lands.[10] Only the DENR Secretary can
review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the
Bureau of Lands approved Lasola’s homestead application on May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom. Nineteen years
after, or on July 9, 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands.
Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and Bonilla instituted the present action in
the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. As
mentioned earlier, the trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a
declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. Said trial court
then ordered the cancellation of respondents’ title and the issuance of a new
one. In effect, the court’s order reversed the award made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper
administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over the
patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.
DENR’s jurisdiction over public
lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions
of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not
settled the respective rights of public land claimants.[11] But once the DENR has
decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT
and then TCT later, its decision prevails.
In this case, Lasola applied for a
homestead patent over the contested area in 1967. His application was granted
on May 21, 1968. The Order for the issuance of the patent was issued by the
Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 and the corresponding Original Certificate
of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28, 1976. From the three
latter dates, no appeal was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years
from the date of the Order directing the issuance of the patent that
petitioners protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of Lands. Despite the
said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest relying
on our ruling in Director vs. Abanilla[12] that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not apply when the
grant is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation. From this date, Lasolas’
right of possession based on his OCT and eventually that of respondents were
put on issue. In their desire to get possession of the property, respondents
instituted an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership on April 16,
1990 with the Regional Trial Court. Said court rendered its decision against
respondents on November 15, 1993. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the DENR-Region IX dismissed
petitioners’ protest on the ground of absence of fraud and misrepresentation
committed by respondents’ predecessors-in-interest.[13] On October 29, 1996, the
Court of Appeals promulgated the decision subject of this petition in favor of
respondents. Petitioners then brought the instant case to us.
We note that the parties did not
manifest as to whether an appeal was made from the decision of the Regional
Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention was ever made in their pleadings
regarding the matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Director up to
the present, five years have lapsed.
From this, we can conclude that no appeal has been made and that the
DENR decision dismissing the petitioners’ protest and upholding respondents’
right on the contested area has attained finality.
By now it appears indubitable that
private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in
their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed by
OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas,
who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents
clearly have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and
Itom. The appellate court did not err
in upholding the right of private respondents, and in ordering the petitioners
to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21,
1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] “Itom”
in the petition for review, but “Etom” in the signature portion of the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, Rollo, p. 20.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 6-25.
[3] Rollo,
p. 42.
[4] Executive Order No. 192 providing for the reorganization of the
Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, transferred to the
regional field offices the line functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands.
[5] Id
at 31.
[6] Id.
at 7.
[7]Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247
SCRA 195, 200 (1995); Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472
(1995).
[8] Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16
(1994).
[9] CA
141, Sec. 3: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the
executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through
the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4: Subject to
said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions
as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
[10] Maximo
vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 182 SCRA 420, 426
(1990).
[11] Rallon
vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 331, 339 (1969).
[12] 124
SCRA 358 (1983).
[13] Rollo,
pp. 110-113.