THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1531. November 28, 2000]
REYNALDO MAGAT, complainant,
vs. JUDGE GREGORIO G. PIMENTEL, JR., CLERK OF COURT AVELINO S. BUAN,
SHERIFF FLORENCIO S. RAZON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Guagua, Pampanga, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
This
administrative case originated from an affidavit-complaint filed by Reynaldo
Magat charging Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel, Jr., Branch Clerk of Court Avelino
S. Buan, and Sheriff Florencio Razon, all of the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 50, with misconduct and grave
abuse of discretion.
It would appear
that Civil Case No. 687, entitled "Manuelito Bagasina and Catalina
Bagasina vs. Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Magat," was decided by the Municipal
Trial Court of Sasmuan, Pampanga, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter "and all persons claiming authority under
them to vacate the property subject of the x x x complaint x x x and to
surrender complete possession thereof to plaintiffs." A timely appeal to
the Guagua RTC was made by the defendants and the case, docketed Civil Case No.
G-254, was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge. The Bagasinas sought for an "Immediate
Execution of Judgment" pending appeal which respondent Judge granted. The defendants failed to vacate the
premises, however, prompting the plaintiffs to file a "Motion for Special
Order of Demolition of Improvements" but action thereon was deferred until
after the appeal itself would have been resolved. On 03 August 1998, the RTC affirmed the assailed decision and a
hearing on the "Motion for Special Order for Demolition of
Improvements" followed. The motion
was granted in an order of 10 March 1999, and the defendants were given twenty
(20) days from receipt of the order within which to remove and/or demolish the
improvements made and constructed by them or their agents on the property
subject matter of the case. Still, the
defendants failed to comply. Finally, a
writ of demolition was issued on 26 April 1999. The Sheriff, however, failed to enforce the order due to its
failure to specify the structures and improvements to be demolished. The plaintiffs then filed an "Ex-parte
Motion to Specify the Structures/Improvements to be Demolished and for Ocular
Inspection." In an order, dated 06
July 1999, respondent Judge granted the motion and directed the issuance of a
second writ of demolition, thus:
"WHEREFORE, let a Writ of
Demolition issue commanding the Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition
not only of the structures/improvements made and constructed by
defendants-spouses Vicente and Virginia Magat but also the structures made and
constructed by Joe and Maria Fe Magat, Reynaldo and Dominga Maninang and Tomas
and Yoly Angeles which structures are adjacent and contiguous to that
constructed by the defendants-spouses."
On 27 July 1999,
respondent Sheriff, with the assistance of several persons and armed men in
uniform, demolished the houses pursuant to the writ of demolition. Among the houses affected were those of
Jesus Tungcab and herein complainant Reynaldo Magat.
In his
administrative complaint, Reynaldo Magat averred that the demolition of his
house constitutes grave misconduct, as well as grave abuse of discretion, on
the part of respondents; he declared that -
"1. His name was not listed in the Writ of Demolition issued by
respondent Clerk of Court on July 26, 1999.
His name was merely mistaken for that of Reynaldo Maninang.
"2. Except for Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Magat, all the other persons whose
houses were demolished were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, nor were
they named defendants in the complaint filed by the plaintiffs. Neither did they receive any summons or
court orders or processes.
"3. The Order issued by respondent Judge on July 6, 1999, ordering the
demolition of the additional houses pursuant to plaintiffs' `Ex Parte Motion to
Specify the Structures/Improvements To be Demolished and For Ocular Inspection'
is arbitrary and violative of the demolition victims' constitutional right to
due process because they are strangers to the case."
Respondents
submitted their joint comment on the complaint, claiming that -
"1. It is not true that the persons whose houses were demolished were
not parties to the unlawful detainer case for, as early as April 4, 1996, when
the case was filed, John Does and Peter Does, representing all persons claiming
authority under the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Magat, were included in the
complaint. As a matter of fact, the
decision of the MTC, Sasmuan, Pampanga, explicitly ordered the defendants and
all persons claiming authority under them to vacate the property. Also, the Order of respondent Judge dated
March 10, 1999, granting the plaintiffs' 'Motion For Special Order For
Demolition of Improvements' directed the defendants-spouses to remove and/or
demolish the improvements made and constructed by them and their agents on the
property subject of the case.
"2. It is not true that complainant's name has been mistaken for that of
Reynaldo Maninang. The mistake has been
brought about by the inadvertent omission of some words when the `Ex Parte
Motion to Specify the Structures/Improvements to be Demolished and For Ocular
Inspection' was copied into the Order of the Court dated July 6, 1999 and the
Writ of Execution dated July 26, 1999.
While the Ex Parte Motion enumerated the persons whose structures and
improvements are to be demolished as follows:
a) Vicente
and Virginia Magat
b) Joe
Velasco and Maria Fe Magat
c) Reynaldo
and Lorenza Magat
d) Pablo
and Dominga Maninang
e) Tomas
and Yoly Angeles
the Order
of July 6, 1999 and the Writ of Execution, through honest mistake, enumerated
the names in this manner:
a) Vicente
and Virginia Magat
b) Joe
and Maria Fe Magat
c) Reynaldo
( ) and Dominga Maninang
d) Tomas
and Yoly Angeles
thereby
omitting the words (marked in parentheses): `and Lorenza Magat; Pablo x x .'
"3. Assuming that the persons whose houses were demolished were not made
parties-defendants to the case, the court's process is still enforceable
against them since a writ of execution issued in a proceeding for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer binds the defendant and his privies, though the
latter have not been made parties-defendants therein. (36 CJS 210). Therefore, a judgment of eviction against the defendants-spouses
affects, and is binding against, those who are acting for and in behalf of said
defendants and/or those who claim rights and authority under them (Tan vs.
Tuazon, 57 O.G. 6259; Gozon vs. dela Rosa, 440 O.G. 1225).
"4. Only four (4) structures were actually demolished. One or two of these structures may have been
shared by two or more families, hence, complainant's reference to six (6)
houses which were allegedly demolished.
"5. When the Writ of Execution pending appeal was enforced on November
20, 1997, only two (2) structures were standing on the property. Other structures contiguous and adjacent to
the old structures sprouted thereafter to render ineffective and nugatory the
decision of the MTC of Sasmuan, Pampanga."
In reply,
complainant countered:
"1. Respondent's negligence resulted in the demolition of six (6)
instead of four (4) houses, because they failed to conduct an ocular inspection
of the subject property as prayed for by the plaintiffs in their `Ex Parte
Motion to Specify the Structures/Improvements to be Demolished and for Ocular
Inspection.'
"2. Respondent Judge failed, out of ignorance, to require the plaintiffs
to present a plan of their titled property so that the court can determine
where the property subject of the case, as well as the houses to be demolished
were exactly located. Also, despite
knowing that the plaintiffs have not established such fact (exact location of
the property), respondent Judge, once again, out of ignorance, sustained the
plaintiffs' manifestation to dispense with the ocular inspection, an essential
element in ejectment.
"3. After the issuance of the first writ of demolition on April 28,
1999, and before the issuance of the second one on July 26, 1999, respondents
already knew that the houses to be demolished were outside the subject
property, otherwise, they would not have deleted the addresses of the
defendants and the other victims of the demolition to give the sheriff
unlimited authority to carry out the demolition."
In a memorandum
to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Office of the Court Administrator
("OCA"), through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez, with Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo recommending approval,
found respondent Sheriff guilty of abuse of discretion for his arbitrary
execution of the writ of demolition and recommended that he be made to pay a
fine of P1,000.00.
The Court
sustains the findings of the OCA.
The 06th July
1999 order of respondent Judge, among other things, directed the issuance of a
writ of demolition "commanding the Sheriff to cause the removal and/or
demolition not only of the structures/improvements made and constructed by
defendants-spouses Vicente and Virginia Magat but also the structures made and
constructed by Joe and Maria Fe Magat, Reynaldo and Dominga Maninang and Tomas
and Yoly Angeles which structures are adjacent and contiguous to that
constructed by the defendants-spouses."[1] Clearly, the name of complainant
Reynaldo Magat was not included in the court order. Nevertheless, a further reading of the order, particularly
paragraph 4 thereof -
"(T)he Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan, Pampanga, dated May 8, 1997, as affirmed by
this Court, ordered the defendants and all persons claiming authority under
them to vacate the property subject of the case and to surrender complete
possession thereof to plaintiffs, follows necessarily that the defendants'
sons, daughters and corresponding in-laws, namely Joe Velasco and Maria Fe
Magat, Reynaldo and Lorenza Magat, Pablo and Dominga Maninang and Tomas Angeles
shall vacate the property and to remove and/or demolish the improvements/
structures made and constructed by them as the latter derive their rights
and/or claim their authority from defendants-spouses" -
would provide some basis for the contention of respondents that the name
of complainant was only inadvertently omitted from the list.
Be that as it
may, the demolition of complainant's house would still not be lawful. In Olac vs. Court of Appeals,[2] the Court has said:
"The dispositive portion or
the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and
which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may
be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for such a
resolution. Where there is conflict
between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text
of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing. Hence execution must
conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision."[3]
Since the name of complainant is nowhere indicated in the dispositive
portion of the decision, he could not be covered by the writ of demolition
without a proper amendment or correction thereon being first undertaken.
The Court agrees
with the OCA that respondent Judge and respondent Clerk of Court have had no
hand in the execution of the writ of demolition. The liability for the execution of the writ lies with respondent
Sheriff alone. The Court finds it
necessary to reiterate that Sheriffs and deputy-sheriffs, being ranking officers
of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care
and diligence. In serving and
implementing court writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they
cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation of
justice.[4]
The OCA observes
that respondent Judge, based on the records of this case, has acted with gross
ignorance of the law when he deferred action on the "Motion for Special
Order for Demolition of Improvements" without a supersedeas bond being
first filed by the defendants and when he himself ordered the execution of
judgment, after affirming the decision of the court a quo, instead of
remanding the case for execution.
Elucidates the OCA:
"In the first place, his act
of deferring the resolution of plaintiff-appellees' `Motion for Special Order
For Demolition of Improvements' constitutes ignorance of the law. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides, among others, that 'if judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant, to stay execution, files a
supersedeas bond.' Indeed, basic is the
rule that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the execution of the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory. The duty to order the immediate execution is
ministerial and imperative; it cannot be avoided. The only way to stay execution is by perfecting an appeal from
the decision and filing a supersedeas bond, depositing from time to time with
the Regional Trial Court, during the pendency of such appeal, the amounts of
rent or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the property as
fixed by the court of origin. The
reason for this is to prevent further damages to the plaintiff caused by the
loss of his possession of the property (Hualam Construction and Development
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612 [1992]).
"Respondent Judge should have
thus ruled on the plaintiff-appellees' motion instead of deferring resolution
thereon to await the outcome of the appeal.
The records of the case do not disclose that a supersedeas bond had been
filed by the defendants to stay execution pending appeal. In fact, the evidence of the case tends to
show that none has been filed, for when 'Notice For Immediate Execution of
Judgment' was filed by the plaintiff-appellee on September 1, 1997, respondent
Judge, through an Order dated September 5, 1997, directed the issuance of a
Writ of Execution, which writ was issued on September 10, 1997. Surely, if a supersedeas bond had been
filed, no writ of execution would have been issued. One then wonders why, after directing the issuance of a writ of
execution, Judge Pimentel had to defer action on the motion for special order
until the appealed case has been resolved.
Respondent Judge should have simply ascertained from the records the
veracity of plaintiff-appellees' allegations in their motion, and on that
basis, resolved the motion.
"Likewise, Judge Pimentel's
act of proceeding with the execution of the judgment appealed from, by
directing the issuance of a writ of demolition after affirming in toto
the decision of the lower court, is indicative of ignorance of the law. In ejectment cases, the rule is explicit
that the execution of the judgment, or the issuance of a demolition order,
falls within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court which rendered the
decision. The appellate court which
affirms a decision brought before it on appeal cannot decree its execution in
the guise of an execution of the affirming decision. The only exception to that is when said appellate court grants an
execution pending appeal. (Sy vs.
Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [1992]). In the
case at bar, however, it cannot be claimed that the execution ordered by
respondent Judge is one pending appeal.
Judgment, affirming the lower court's decision, had already been
rendered before the order resolving the motion for special order and directing
the issuance of a writ of demolition was given. The decision of the appellate court was rendered on August 5,
1998. The Order directing the issuance
of a writ of demolition was made on April 26, 1999. By the latter date, therefore, the judgment of the RTC had
already become final and executory, depriving the said court of jurisdiction to
issue the order. It is to be noted that
no appeal was interposed by the defendants from the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court. But even assuming that one
had been filed, the proper court to execute the judgment would still be the
Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
The rule is that if the judgment of the MTC is appealed to the RTC and
the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision thereafter became final, the case should be remanded THROUGH the RTC
to the MTC for execution (City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362
[1991]). After affirming the lower
court's decision, therefore, respondent Judge should have remanded the records
of the case to the MTC of Sasmuan, Pampanga, instead of directing the execution
of the case himself."
The Court, nevertheless, adopts the light penalty recommended by the OCA
since it is not shown that respondent Judge has acted in bad faith or with
malice.
The charges
against respondent Clerk of Court should be dismissed; indeed, the issuance of
the writ of demolition was merely ministerial on his part.
WHEREFORE, for his utter lack of
circumspection, hereinabove recited, Judge Gregorio S. Pimentel is ordered to
pay a FINE of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos; and for his arbitrary execution
of the writ of demolition resulting in the demolition of complainant's house,
Sheriff Florencio S. Razon is ordered to pay a FINE of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos. The charges against Branch Clerk
of Court Avelino S. Buan are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,
(Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.