FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109557.
November 29, 2000]
JOSE UY and his Spouse
GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is an
appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying reconsideration[2] reversing that of the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 32[3] and declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal
property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the
ostensible purpose of “financial need in the personal, business and medical
expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband.”
The facts, as
found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“This case is a dispute between
Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother
Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and
Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which
left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of
herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent
Gilda Jardeleza.
“Upon learning that one piece of
real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold,
petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex “A”)
before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred
therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him
from competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss
and dissipation of the Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need
for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of
Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma
Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the
meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or
otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the
improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered
by T.C.T. No. 47337.
“A few days later, or on June 13,
1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as
Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City,
regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption
of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to
sell the same (Annex “B”). Therein, the
petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her
husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the
Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital. She signified
to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties. She also alleged
that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling
up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one
piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the
court to sell said property.
“The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of
Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex “C”) finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No.
4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof
for June 20, 1991. The scheduled
hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda
Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s
attending physicians.
“On that same day, June 20, 1991,
Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex “D”), finding
that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale
of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition
filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was “pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code,
and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
“The said court then disposed as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, there being factual and
legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
“1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be
incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
“2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers
of administration of their conjugal properties; and
“3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No.
47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and
the buildings standing thereof.
“SO ORDERED.
“On June 24, 1991, herein
petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before
Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not
knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public
respondent.
“On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner
Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex
“F”). He propounded the argument that
the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process,
particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be prosecuted by
summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective
one. He further alleged that under the
New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his
consent. Neither can he be deprived of
his share in the conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed
earlier and pending before Branch 25.
“Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned
the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon
supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.’s hospitalization. He
alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen
Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building
thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza
Sr.’s industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his
family. Besides, argued Teodoro
Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all
financial obligations. He mentioned
that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors’
Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital
bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr.’s attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything
for their professional services.
“On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza
filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for reconsideration
(Annex “G”). He reiterated his
contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary
proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on
“Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” which contemplates of a situation
where both spouses are of disposing mind.
Thus, he argued that were one spouse is “comatose without motor and
mental faculties,” the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
“While the motion for
reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No.
4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated
July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent
ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
“On August 12, 1991 Teodoro
Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale
on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in
abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not
allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not
allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his
consent to the sale.
“Judge Amelita K. del
Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the
decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself
from further acting in this case (Annex “I”).
The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
“On December 19, 1991, the said
court issued an Order (Annex “M”) denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and approving respondent Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the
deed of absolute sale. The said court
ruled that:
“After a
careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion
for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by “oppositor”, Teodoro
L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through
counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K.
del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has
properly observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to
Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
“Also, as correctly stated by
petitioner, through counsel, that “oppositor” Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have
the personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or
properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
“In view thereof, the Motion for
Reconsideration of “oppositor” Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack
of merit.
“Considering the validity of the
decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza
to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed
and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor,
and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
“SO ORDERED.”[4]
On December 9,
1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to
dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared
void.[5]
On December 29,
1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[6] however, on March 29, 1993, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to
disturb the decision.[7]
Hence, this
appeal.[8]
The issue raised
is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose,
without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal
partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal
property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land
with its improvements, worth more than
twelve million pesos, with the approval
of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter
and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the
procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because
Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the
conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper
remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both
of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had
filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of
the Family Code provides as follows:
“ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
“In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).”
In regular
manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern
the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or
separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot
be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose
or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.[9] In such case, the proper remedy is
a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court.
Even assuming
that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply
to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that
the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.[10]
Consequently, a
spouse who desires to
sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at
bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules
of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did
not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not
require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision
rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine
consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices
to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the
impress of nullity.[11] A decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.[12] “A decision is void for lack of due
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being
heard.”[13] “A void decision may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by
means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked.”[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] In CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, promulgated on December 09,
1992, Petition, Annex "R", Rollo, pp. 193-202.
[2] Petition, Annex “T”, Rollo, pp. 233-234.
[3] Ibid.,
Annex “C”, RTC Decision, Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[4] Supra,
Note 1, at pp. 194-198.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Petition, Annex "S", Rollo, pp.
203-232.
[7] Supra,
Note 1, Marigomen, J., ponente, Rasul and Galvez, JJ.,
concurring, Rollo, pp. 233-234.
[8] Petition filed on April 14, 1993, Rollo, pp.
2-49. On March 20, 1996, we gave due course to the petition, Rollo, p.
383.
[9] Petition, Annexes “J” and “K”, medical certificates, Rollo,
pp. 145-146.
[10] Article 61, Family Code.
[11] DBP v. Bautista, 135 Phil. 201, 205-206
[1968].
[12] David v. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707, 714 [1979].
[13] The Summary Dismissal Board etc. v. Torcita, G. R.
No. 130442, April 6, 2000, citing Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA
358 [1998].
[14] Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, 86 Phil. 447, 452
[1950].