FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No.
132810. December 11, 2000]
ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioner,
vs. HELEN S. GONZALES, EDGARDO S. GONZALES, MARINA N. GONZALES, ROMANO S.
GONZALES, DARIA GONZAGA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an
appeal[1] from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[2] dismissing petitioners’ special
civil action for certiorari which assailed the order of the Regional Trial
Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65[3] issuing a writ of demolition in
favor of private respondents.
Factual Background
On November 28,
1968, Severo Sales (hereinafter referred to as “Severo”) and his daughter,
Esperanza Sales Bermudez (hereinafter referred to as “Esperanza”) filed with
the Court of First Instance, Tarlac, Branch 3 a complaint for “Annulment of
Deed” against Leonilo Gonzales (hereinafter referred to as “Leonilo”).[4]
In the
complaint, Severo and Esperanza alleged:
(1) That Severo was the
owner of an unregistered parcel of land located in the Municipality of
Bugallon, Province of Pangasinan with an approximate area of five thousand two
hundred and twenty nine (5,229) square meters.
(2) That on December 24,
1968, Severo donated a portion of property (nine hundred (900) square meters)
to Esperanza.
(3) That sometime in January
1959, Severo entered into an agreement with the late Ernesto Gonzales for the
lease of the remaining portion of the land, with an approximate area of four
thousand three hundred thirty nine (4,339) square meters in the amount of
P2,700.00.
(4) That pursuant to this
lease agreement, Ernesto Gonzales made Severo
and his wife,
Margarita Ferrer sign a document.
They were not given a copy of this document.
(5) That in the later part
of October 1968, Severo received a photostatic copy of a Deed of Sale covering
an area of five thousand seven hundred and thirty three (5,733) square meters
of the subject land, signed by him and his wife at San Manuel, Tarlac and
ratified before a Notary Public.[5]
Severo claimed
that he never signed the deed of sale and that if ever there was a transaction
over the subject land, it was one of mortgage and not of sale, thus the
complaint for “Annulment of Deed”.
Leonilo is the
son and predecessor-in-interest of the late Ernesto Gonzales. Before the Court of First Instance, Leonilo
claimed:
(1) That the subject land
was transferred to him by virtue of the assailed Deed of Sale;
(2) That Severo and
Esperanza have been staying on the said land not as its owners but as ordinary
occupants, without rent and only because of his tolerance;
(3) That he paid for the
real estate taxes on the said land from 1960 to 1968. [6]
On October 27,
1969, the Court of First Instance[7] decided the case in favor of
Leonilo, stating that the testimonies of Severo and Esperanza were not
convincing enough to overthrow the deed of sale as a public document and that
convincing evidence did not support the fraud.
We quote the dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the
latter.
“1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;
“2. Declaring that the defendant is the lawful owner of the land
described in Exhibit “2” and “2-A (Same as exhibit “H”) and is, therefore,
entitled to the possession thereof;
“3. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the
defendant the sum of P2,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees;
“4. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally to pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[8]
Unsatisfied,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.[9]
On October 27,
1972, defendant Leonilo passed away.
On December 19,
1974, the Court of Appeals[10]promulgated its decision affirming
the afore-quoted decision, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed with the sole modification that the plaintiffs shall
only pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000.00 to the defendant as
attorney’s fees, without pronouncements as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[11]
Again aggrieved,
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.[12]
On July 29,
1992, this Court, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero,[13] promulgated a decision upholding
the validity of the deed of sale and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.[14]
On October 28,
1992, the decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory and entry of
judgment was made.[15]
On August 11,
1993, Leonilo’s heirs, respondents Helen Santos Gonzales, Edgardo Gonzales,
Marina Gonzales and Romano Gonzales (hereinafter referred to by their first
names, “Helen”, “Edgardo”, “Marina”, and “Romano” respectively) filed with the
trial court a “Notice of Substitution of
Parties.”[16]
On August 20,
1993, petitioner received copy of the notice of substitution.[17]
On March 3,
1994, the trial court granted respondents’ “Motion for Execution and
Appointment of Special Sheriff.”
On October 21,
1994, the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, through its Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Enrico G. Barin issued a writ of execution addressed to Special
Sheriffs Robert Tuquero and Antonio
Leano, Office of the Provincial Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac,
Tarlac. The writ reads:
“NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby
commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment to levy the goods
and chattels of the plaintiffs, except those which are exempt from execution;
and to make sale thereof in accordants (sic) the procedure outlined by
Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court and in such cases made and provided, together
with all your lawful fees for the service of this Writ.
“In case sufficient personal
property of the plaintiffs cannot be found whereof to satisfy the amount of
said judgment you are hereby directed to levy the real property of said
plaintiffs and to sell the same or so much thereof in the manner provided for
by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment.
“WITNESS, the HON. RODOLFO V.
TOLEDANO, Acting Judge of this Court.”[18]
On June 20,
1995, the trial court issued an “Alias Writ of Execution” in favor of
respondents.
On August 3,
1995, Sheriffs Leano and Toquero issued a certification to the effect that
respondents were placed in possession of the subject land by virtue of the June
20, 1995, alias writ of execution.[19]
Facts Subject of the Petition
On November 2,
1995, respondents filed with the trial court, a “Petition for Demolition”
alleging that Severo and petitioner Esperanza were given thirty (30) days from
August 3, 1995, to remove and transfer their house erected on the subject
property, but “since then and up to now, there is no visible effort on the part
of the said parties to comply with the execution conducted.”[20]
On November 17,
1995, Severo and petitioner filed their opposition to the petition for
demolition.[21]
On June 21,
1996, the trial court issued an order to wit:
“WHEREFORE, let a writ of
demolition be issued in favor of defendants, immediately.” [22]
On July 17,
1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
above-quoted order.
On January 24,
1997, the trial court found the motion for reconsideration to be bereft of
merit and denied it.[23]
On February 27,
1997, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.[24]
On December 12,
1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari, is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED.”[25]
On January 8,
1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration.
On February 27,
1998, finding no cogent reason to reconsider its decision, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.[26]
Hence, this
petition.[27]
Petitioner’s Submission
Petitioner
submits that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it issued a
writ of demolition without allowing her to prove her rights as a “builder in
good faith” under Article 448[28] of the Civil Code.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset,
it is necessary to state that in an appeal by certiorari to this Court, only
questions of law may be raised. For a
question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[29] This Court is not a trier of facts.[30]
In this appeal,
the issue is one of law. Did the
Court of Appeals err when it refused to issue a writ of certiorari?
We rule that it
did.
At the heart of
this case is a factual controversy which the trial court must first determine
before issuing a writ of demolition.
When it failed to do so, it disregarded basic principles of due process. Such error may be corrected by a writ
of certiorari.
The factual
question is: When was the house subject
of the writ of demolition built?
Petitioner avers
that the house was constructed long before the execution of the deed of
sale in 1959.[31] In stark contrast, the trial court
implied that the house was built after petitioner lost the case in the
Supreme Court, stating,
“Knowing fully well that they have
lost the case, they should not have built such kind of structure which is in
direct defiance of the decision of the Court.”[32]
The trial court
saw no need for the presentation of evidence on this issue stating that “what
remains is merely an implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court (dated
July 29, 1992).”[33]
We do not agree.
The actual turn over of the land to respondents and whether petitioner needs to
be reimbursed for the value of the house are two separate issues.
The trial
court’s conclusion that the house was built after petitioner had lost the case
is not supported by evidence. In fact,
in their comment filed with the Court of Appeals, respondents impliedly
admitted that the house originally existed and that petitioner and her father
merely made some “constructions, renovations and additions”[34] thereto in bad faith.
“Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.”[35] “It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest
or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.”[36]
Good faith is
presumed and the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it.[37] It is a question of fact that must
be proven.[38] The trial court’s statement is a
mere conjecture and has no support in the records.
The question
before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion in precipitately issuing a writ of demolition without a
hearing. The Court of Appeals held that
it did not. This is a reversible
error. No less than the Constitution
provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.” [39]
In Manzano v.
Court of Appeals,[40] we stated that before demolition
could be effected, the parties concerned should “at least be given a chance to
be heard concerning the interest they claim to possess on said properties.” If
demolition is involved, there must be a hearing on the motion and due notice.[41]
The right to a
hearing includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and
to submit evidence in support thereof.[42] The trial court denied petitioner
this right. The trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion as it evaded and virtually refused to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law.[43]
Above premises
considered, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on December 12, 1997 in CA-G. R. SP No. 43517 is REVERSED and the
writ of demolition issued by the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, in
Civil Case No. 4469 on June 21, 1996, is SET ASIDE.
IN LIEU THEREOF,
the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for determination of the question
of when the house, subject of the writ of demolition, was actually built and
when any additions, renovations and improvements thereon were made, and whether
petitioner has the right to be compensated or reimbursed for its value, with
instruction that the court proceed with all deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] In CA-G. R. SP No. 43517,
promulgated on December 12, 1997, Artemon D. Luna, J., ponente,
Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios, JJ., concurring.
[3] In Civil Case No.
4469, dated June 21, 1996, Judge Angel J. Parazo, presiding.
[4] Docketed as Civil
Case No. 4469.
[5] Court of Appeals Rollo,
pp. 23-26.
[6] Court of Appeals Rollo, pp. 27-29.
[7] Judge Jose C. De
Guzman, presiding.
[8] Rollo, p. 192.
[9] Docketed as CA-G. R.
No. 47753.
[10] Associate Justice
Ramon C. Fernandez, ponente, with Associate Justices Ricardo C. Puno and
Mariano Serrano, concurring.
[11] Rollo, p. 202.
[12] Docketed as G. R. No.
L-40145.
[13] Associate Justices
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Florentino P. Feliciano, Abdulwahid A. Bidin and
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., concurring.
[14] Rollo, p. 214.
[15] In G. R. No. L-40145,
Rollo., p. 216.
[16] Rollo, p. 60.
[17] Ibid., pp. 245, 280.
[18] Ibid., pp. 64-65.
[19] Rollo, p. 66.
[20] Ibid., p. 67.
[21] Rollo, pp. 71-72.
[22] Ibid., p.
48.
[23] Ibid., p. 50.
[24] Docketed as CA-G. R.
SP No. 43517.
[25] Rollo, p. 24.
[26] Rollo, p. 25.
[27] Petition filed on
March 16, 1998, Rollo, pp. 3-17.
On September 20,1999, we resolved to give due course to the petition, Rollo,
p. 146-147.
[28] Art. 448 of the Civil
Code states, “The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerable more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he
shall appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease in case of disagreements the court shall fix the terms thereof.”
[29] Serna v. Court
of Appeals, 308 SCRA 527 [1999].
[30] Don Orestes Romualdez
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Dorelco) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 319 SCRA 255 [1999].
[31] Court of Appeals Rollo,
p. 4.
[32] Ibid., p. 22.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Court of Appeals Rollo,
pp. 62-63.
[35] Tan v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., G. R. No. 135802, March 3, 2000.
[36] Magat v. Court
of Appeals, G. R. No. 124221, August 4, 2000.
[37] AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. Nos. 104769-135016, March
2, 2000.
[38] National Food
Authority v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 700 [1999].
[39] Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.
[40] 121 Phil. 803, 805
[1965].
[41] Lu v. Judge
Orlando Ana F. Sapiano, AM MTJ-99-1199, July 6, 2000.
[42] Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000.
[43] De Vera v.
Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, G. R. No. 137354, July 6, 2000.