EN BANC
[G.R. No.
132047. December 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FELIPE PECAYO SR., accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In incestuous
rape, the death penalty may be imposed only if the age of the victim and her
statutory relationship to the rapist are alleged in the information and
proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.
The Case
Before us for
automatic review is the Judgment[1] dated December 3, 1997, promulgated
by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3)[2] of Balanga, Bataan in Criminal Case
Nos. 6595 and 6596, finding Felipe Pecayo Sr. guilty of raping his minor
daughter Kristina[3] on two occasions, and imposing upon
him the death penalty in each case.
In two
Informations,[4] both dated July 21, 1997 and
similarly worded except as to the date of the alleged commission of the
offense, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Angelito V. Lumabas charged
accused-appellant as follows:
"That in or about the month of
December 1996 at Brgy. Balut II, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Kristina L. Pecayo,
a 14 year old minor girl, who is his daughter, against the will and consent of
the latter, to her damage and prejudice."
Appellant, duly
assisted by Counsel Joey V. Saldaña, was arraigned on August 11, 1997. To both charges, he pleaded "not
guilty."[5] On August 26, 1997, he waived his
right to pretrial.[6] Trial proper thence proceeded with
dispatch.
On December 9,
1997, the trial court promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:[7]
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of the
accused having been established beyond reasonable doubt, he is sentenced in
each of Criminal Cases Nos. 6595 and 6596 to the penalty of death and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, with costs."
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor
general sums up the People’s version of the facts as follows:[8]
“At about 3:00 a.m. of January,
1996, Cristina Pecayo, x x x was asleep in her room with her youngest sister
(p. 7, supra). Suddenly, Cristina
sensed that her father, Felipe Pecayo, entered the room, stripped off her
clothes, her shorts and panty. Felipe
then removed his shorts, went on top of Cristina and inserted his organ into
hers. When Felipe saw her daughter’s
sex organ ble[e]d, he wiped it off and left (supra). Cristina did nothing as she was afraid of her father, Felipe,
who, when drunk, always threatened to kill his family (supra).
Sometime in December, 1996, at
about 3:00 a.m., Felipe again entered Cristina’s room. After removing his shorts, Felipe stripped
off Cristina’s clothing then went on top of her and inserted his sex organ into
Cristina’s. When Cristina’s sex organ
bled, Felipe wiped off the blood and left.
Cristina, aware that her father always carried a knife in his pocket,
could only cry (p. 9, supra).
Dr. Marissa Mallari examined
Cristina on June 20, 1997. The result
of said examination which was reduced into writing (Exhibit A) showed a
positive deep-healed hymenal laceration at 5:00 o’clock; x x x positive superficial
healed hymenal lacerations at 2:00, 4:00 o’clock positions which hymenal
lacerations could have been caused by penetration, masturbation, strenuous
exercise [or] instrumentation (p. 3, tsn, August 26, 1997).”
Version of the Defense
The version of
accused-appellant, the lone defense witness, is as follows:[9]
“When asked what could be the
reason why Kristina charged him of raping her, he said that she resent[s] him
because he gets angry with her everytime she comes home late from school. There was even a time when he spanked her in
the presence of several persons.
During cross-examination, Felipe
Pecayo, Sr., described himself as a good father and provider. According to him, however, his children do
not want him to work anymore because he is already old. He affirmed that his daughter Maricris works
in Mariveles starting at 5:00 a.m., prompting her to leave the house as early
as 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Felipe,
Jr., on the other hand, goes to sea and sometimes leaves at 4:00 o’clock in the
morning and returns after two or three hours.
As far as he knows, Kristina filed these cases against him because he
spanked her prior to December 1996 and after January 1996. (TSN, November 11, 1997, pp. 2-10).”
Ruling of the Trial Court
Assessing the
credibility of the private complainant as well as her testimony in open court,
Judge Lorenzo R. Silva Jr. wrote as follows:[10]
"It is obvious that the
testimony of Cristina that she was raped by her father in January and December,
1996 is positive, direct, straight forward and unadorned. The Presiding Judge was observing her while
testifying and observed that she narrated the terrible ordeal she had to bear
with anguished and pained sincerity coupled with dread of her defiler, her own
father. There was no reason for the
Court to doubt any whit her testimony given with a spat[e] of tears. The defense of the father was one of
undiluted denial; innuendo that she filed the case out of revenge because
he x x x scolded her several times and
spanked her once after the first rape and before the second rape; and
insinuat[ed] that he could not have raped her because she was sleeping with her
siblings at least with Maricris, Angie and Rolly after Felipe, Jr. went to sea
and Maricris left for work in Mariveles.
On this score, the testimony of Cristina was clear that it was only the
youngest, aged eleven who was near her when she was ravished. The Supreme Court has held that lust is no
respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside
a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping.
(People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234)
While there seem[ed] to be no resistance by the daughter when she was
raped by her father, the Court is convinced that the lack of resistance was due
to fear or to the novelty of a harrowing experience. Moreover, in rape committed by a father against his own daughter,
the father's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for
violence and intimidation x x x. The
cross-examination of the complainant did not dent any bit her credible
testimony given in a forthright manner.
The simple answers of this witness on the stand exude candor and
sincerity. Since the complainant is of
tender years and not exposed to the ways of the world, it is improbable that
she would impute a crime as serious as rape to her own father if it were not
true."
The lower court
concluded that, without doubt, "the accused father had carnal knowledge of
his daughter against her will[,] taking advantage of his moral ascendancy and
influence."
Hence, this
Court's automatic review of the judgment.[11]
Issues
In his Brief,[12] accused-appellant assigns the
following errors to the court a quo:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight
and credence to the testimony of the private complainant and disregarding the
theory of the defense.
II
The trial court erred in adopting the prosecution's
theory which is incongruous and contradicts human experience and ordinary
behavior of men.
III
The trial court gravely erred in holding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both charges."
In brief, these
issues boil down to the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict
appellant.
The Court’s Ruling
We affirm the
conviction of appellant for two counts of rape, but reduce his penalty in each
count to reclusion perpetua for failure of the prosecution to present
sufficient proof of the victim's age.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution
Evidence
Appellant
contends that the testimony of Kristina Pecayo has "too many loose
ends, x x x resulting in the failure of her case to meet the test of moral
certainty [in establishing the] guilt of the accused." First, it
was allegedly improbable for the rapes to have taken place in an 8-by-12-foot
room where the victim's siblings were also sleeping. Second, Kristina did not shout for help or awaken her
siblings who were in the same room where she was being raped. Third, nearly a year passed between
the alleged two instances of rape, during which the victim failed to report the
matter to anyone. There was no showing,
however, that in the interval, appellant continued to intimidate or instill
fear in the victim. Finally, the
uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant allegedly failed to support
the conviction of appellant.
After a careful
scrutiny of the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense, the Court
finds that the objections raised by appellant are unworthy of belief. The testimony of Kristina Pecayo, as
corroborated by the medical findings, are sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of Felipe Pecayo Sr. Her testimony was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing,
thereby manifesting truth. We quote it
at length, as follows:
"PROS. MENDOZA:
Q. You
said that you were raped by your father at 3:00 a.m. of one day of January,
1996[;] will you please tell the Court how that rape happened?
WITNESS:
A. Just
after my sister working at Mariveles left the house, I felt that my father
entered our room and then I felt that he stripped off my clothes, removing my
shorts and panties; and then he put himself on top of me; he removed his shorts
and then he inserted his sex organ [in]to mine; after that when he saw that I
bled, he wiped the blood and left, sir.
Q. Who
was with you at that time that this rape incident happened?
A. My
youngest sibling, sir.
Q. How
old is your youngest sibling?
A. 10
or 11 years old, sir.
Q. At
that time that your father went on top of you, remov[ed] his shorts, and put
his sex organ inside your organ, what were you doing?
A. None,
sir.
Q. Why?
A. I
was afraid of him, sir.
Q. Why
were you afraid of him?
A. Everytime
he would get drunk, he would say, he would kill us all, sir.
PROS. MENDOZA:
May we make it of record, Your
Honor, that the witness is crying while testifying.
Q. You
said that your father wiped the blood which he found on you[;] what part of
your body bled?
A. My
sex organ, sir.
PROS. MENDOZA:
Q. You
said also that your father wiped the blood and then left you[;] where did he
go?
WITNESS:
A. He
went outside because he slept outside, and then he slept there, sir.
Q. In
December, 1996, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened in a day of
that month?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What
was that unusual incident?
A. I
was raped by my father again, sir.
Q. Do
you still remember what day was that in December, 1996 that you were again
raped by your father?
A. No,
sir.
Q. Do
you still remember the time?
A. At
the same time about 3:00 a.m., sir.
Q. Why
do you remember that it was about 3:00 a.m.?
A. It
was again just after my sister working at Mariveles ha[d] left, and I have a
brother who goes to the sea, sir.
Q. At
that time, in December, 1996, who was with you aside from your father?
A. My
youngest brother, sir.
Q. What
was he doing there?
A. He
was asleep, sir.
Q. Will
you please tell the Court how did that rape incident occur?
WITNESS:
On that particular day and time, my father appeared
to be drunk, I felt him [enter] the room again, and then he was then already
naked; he again stripped off my clothing and then put himself on top of me,
inserted his penis [in]to my sex organ, sir.
PROS. MENDOZA:
Q. What
happened after your father inserted his penis into your vagina?
A. He
made an up and down motion, and then when I bled again, he wiped the blood and
then he left, sir.
Q. Did
you do anything while this happened?
A. I
simply cried, sir.
Q. Why
did you just cry?
A. I
was afraid of him because it is his habit of possessing in his pocket a knife
everywhere he goes, sir."[13]
The victim’s
clear, positive and forthright testimony, punctuated by her tears, could only
spell truth. She vividly recounted her
humiliating experiences at the hands of her own father. Even during cross-examination, she remained
steadfast in her testimony. Unless she
was telling the truth, she could not have admitted in public that she had been
defiled by her own father, thereby compromising her own honor and dignity. Needless to state, it is undeniable that an
incestuous sexual assault is a psychosocial deviance that inflicts a social
stigma upon the victim and her family.[14]
It has also been
oft said that a rape victim's testimony against her parent is entitled to great
weight since, customarily, Filipino children revere and respect their
elders. These values are so deeply
ingrained in Filipino families[15] that it is unthinkable for a
daughter to concoct brazenly a story of rape against her father, if such were
not true.[16]
Indeed, no
woman, especially one of tender age, would contrive a tale of defilement and
undergo the humiliating ordeal and indignity of testifying on the sordid
details of the crime, if she has not in fact been raped or been motivated by a
desire to obtain justice and vindicate her honor.[17] When straightforward and unflawed
by any material or significant inconsistency, her testimony deserves full faith
and credit and can sustain a conviction.[18] Credibility is surely enhanced when
the accusing words are directed against a close relative, especially the father
as in the present case.[19]
Well-settled is
the rule that the lone testimony of the rape victim, if credible, is sufficient
to support a conviction. This is so
because, from the nature of the offense, oftentimes the only evidence that can
be offered to establish the guilt of the appellant is the private complainant's
testimony. Rape, by its very nature, is
normally committed away from public view, without witnesses save for the
perpetrator and the victim themselves.[20] Thus, the fact that Kristina was
the only eyewitness presented in court and her testimony was therefore
uncorroborated is not fatal to the prosecution's case. Credibility does not go with numbers. The faithful testimony of a single credible
witness suffices.[21]
As the trial
judge noted, the victim “narrated the terrible ordeal she had to bear with
anguished and pained sincerity coupled with dread of her defiler, her own
father. There was no reason for the
[c]ourt to doubt any whit her testimony given with a spat[e] of tears.”
We find no
reason to deviate from the general rule that factual findings of trial courts
should not be disturbed on appeal, unless they are found to be clearly arbitrary
or unfounded; or some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially
affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood or
misinterpreted.[22] This rule is rooted in the fact
that a trial judge had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor and manner of testifying under grilling
examination. Undeniably, these factors
are significant in evaluating a witness' honesty, sincerity and credibility. Having observed the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to have determined reasonably whose testimony to
accept and which witness to disbelieve.[23] Conversely, the reviewing
magistrate has none of the advantages peculiar to the trial judge's position
and therefore relies only on the cold records of the case and on the trial
judge's discretion.
Another
time-honored doctrine is that lust is no respecter of time and place.[24] Rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate, in parks, within school premises, inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where there
are other members of the family who are sleeping. Thus, deserving scant consideration is appellant’s allegation
that it was improbable for the rape to have taken place in an 8-by-12-foot room
where the victim's siblings were also sleeping.
Under the
circumstances of the case, the victim’s failure to shout for help while she was
being ravished is of no moment. The
aggressor was the victim’s own father, who naturally had moral and physical ascendancy
over her. He even threatened to kill
not only her, but likewise her siblings.
Kristina was also aware that her father had the habit of carrying a
knife with him. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim, who then submits herself against her
will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for her life.[25] Resistance on her part need not be
carried to the point of inviting death or sustaining physical injuries in the
hands of the rapist. It suffices that
the offense is consummated against her will or that she yields because of a
genuine fear of great harm.
It has been
consistently held that no standard form of behavior has been observed when a
person is confronted by a shocking or a harrowing and unexpected incident, for
the workings of the human mind, when placed under emotional stress, are
unpredictable. Some people may cry out,
some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may yet appear
to yield to the intrusion.[26]
The moral
ascendancy of appellant, coupled with his threats against the lives of the
victim and her siblings, also adequately explain the delay in reporting the
crime to the authorities.[27] The silence of a rape victim or her
failure to disclose immediately her debasing ordeal does not prove that her
charges are unfounded and fabricated.
It is not uncommon for a young girl like Kristina to conceal for some
time the beastly assault on her virtue.
As earlier mentioned, rape is a traumatic experience, and the shock
concomitant with it may linger for a while.[28] Oftentimes, the victim would rather
bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal her shame to the world or
risk the rapist's making good the threat to harm her.[29]
In brief, the
delay in reporting the rape incidents and the lack of strong resistance against
the aggressor do not diminish the credibility of private complainant, who
testified in a straightforward, clear, consistent and truthful manner.
Kristina’s tale of
defilement is corroborated by the medical findings[30] of Dra. Marissa Mallari, who
examined her. The latter explained her
findings as follows:
“Q - Will you
please tell us the result of your examination?
A - On the physical examination, there [were] negative
findings; [on the] genitalia: negative
pubic hair, labia majora apposed, labia minora light brown, positive hymenal
laceration deep healed at 5 o’clock, positive superficial healed laceration at
2, 4 o’clock position[s]; vagina admit[ted] 1 finger with ease, cervix –
closed, uterus – small, and negative bleeding, sir.
Q - What conclusion did you reach from this examination you
conducted on the child Cristina Pecayo?
A - There was
hymenal laceration, sir.
Q - What could
have x x x caused this hymenal laceration?
A - Penetration,
masturbation, strenous exercise, [or] instrumentation, sir.”[31]
Defense of Denial
Flimsy and Unworthy of Belief
On the other
hand, appellant’s defense was flimsy, shallow and unworthy of credit. He simplistically attested thus:
“ATTY. SALDAÑA:
Q. Mr.
Witness, you are accused of having raped Cristina Pecayo in January, 1996 and
in December of 1996 in your house[;] what can you say about that?
A. I
do not know that, sir.
Q. And
do you know of any reason why Cristina Pecayo would charge you [with] that
offense?
A. I
do not know of any reason why they have to charge me with that serious
offense. What I know is that, they
refrain [sic] me from going with my friends because according to them I [would]
just get drunk, sir.
FISCAL MENDOZA:
We respectfully move for the striking out [from] the
answer of the witness, the latter portion of the same. The witness is asked what could be the
reason why Cristina charged him [with] the offense, but he is talking about
some other persons, Your Honor.
COURT:
The complaint filed before the municipal circuit
court [was] filed by Cristina only, in the person of the brother, Felipe
Pecayo, Jr. But the complainant is only
Cristina; the brother serves only as a witness.
Reform the question.
ATTY. SALDAÑA:
What could be the reason why Cristina Pecayo would
accuse you of this serious offense of you raping her?
WITNESS:
A. If
you are going to ask me, they have several reasons because they are angry with
me, especially with respect to her studies.
When she [came] home late, there was a time when I spanked her, sir.
ATTY. SALDAÑA:
Q. Do
you still remember when that spanking occurred?
A. Before
I was accused of this crime, sir.
Q. Where
did the incident happen?
A. In
the artesian well in the presence of several persons. They do not want to obey me because they are angry with me, sir.
Q. How
many times did Cristina Pecayo come home late?
A. Several
times, sir.
Q. And
what did you tell her every time that she came late?
A. I
asked her why she came home late and she answered me that they did something in
school, sir.
ATTY. SALDAÑA:
That will be all, Your Honor."[32]
Appellant’s bare
denial cannot overcome the categorical and positive testimony of the
victim. Being unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, his defense deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of Kristina, who was a
credible witness.[33]
Besides,
appellant failed to show any plausible reason why his own daughter would impute
to him a detestable, heinous charge. It
is highly inconceivable that Kristina would claim to have been raped, just
because her father usually got mad and spanked her for coming home late. Indeed, it is unthinkable that a young lady,
inexperienced in the ways of the world, would concoct a tale of rape by no less
than her father, simply to take revenge for the physical maltreatment inflicted
upon her.[34]
Mere
chastisement is not strong enough to make a daughter in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would only bring shame and humiliation upon her and her
family and make her the object of gossip among her peers and neighbors.[35] In fact, the consequences of filing
a case of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts
about doing so. Much more is required
of a provincial lass to devise such story, have her private parts examined,
subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of
shame. Even when consumed with a desire
for revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to forge a story that would put the life of her own father at stake.[36]
In view of all
the foregoing, the Court gives more credence to the complaining victim rather
than to the appellant. A witness testifying
candidly, trustworthily and consistently, without any ill motive, is surely
more credible than an accused-appellant who simply denies the charge. We have therefore determined that, together
with the other pieces of evidence on record, the victim’s testimony establishes
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Proper Penalty
Under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
pertinent statutory provision prevailing at the time of the rape incidents, the
death penalty is imposed "[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent x x
x of the victim."
To justify the
imposition of death, however, proof of the victim’s age must be
indubitable. There must be sufficient
and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the accused.[37]
In People v.
Javier,[38] the Court unanimously held:
“In a criminal prosecution
especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which an accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in
order for said penalty to be upheld. x x x.
Verily, the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty
and clearness as the crime itself.
Otherwise, failure to sufficiently establish the victim's age is fatal
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form."
A duly certified
certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some
other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate or a school record,
has been recognized as competent evidence.[39]
In the case at
bar, no documentary evidence whatsoever was offered in court to prove the age
of the complaining victim. Kristina
simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination that she was 14
years old, and that she was born on January 13, 1983.[40] In People v. Vargas, this
Court held that the victim’s casual testimony as to her age was not sufficient.[41]
The lack of
denial on the part of appellant did not excuse the prosecution from discharging
its burden.[42] As held in a recent case:
“[W]e cannot agree with the
solicitor general that appellant's admission of his relationship with his
victims would suffice. Elementary is
the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a
crime, including the qualifying circumstances."[43]
For the state’s
failure to discharge satisfactorily the burden of proving the victim’s age,
only reclusion perpetua, not death, can be imposed upon appellant.
In addition to
indemnity, however, the complaining victim should be awarded moral
damages. This Court has held many times
that a rape victim's injury is inherently concomitant to and results from the
odiousness of the crime.[44] Consistent with current jurisprudence,
the award to private complainant of P50,000 as moral damages for each
count of rape is proper.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding
Felipe Pecayo Sr. guilty of rape on two counts, is hereby AFFIRMED with
a modification as to penalty.
For each count, appellant is SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua
and ordered to PAY Kristina L. Pecayo an indemnity of P50,000 and
moral damages of P50,000. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-21.
[2] Penned by Judge
Lorenzo R. Silva Jr.
[3] Also spelled
“Cristina.”
[4] Rollo, pp. 9-12.
[5] Records, pp. 9 &
10.
[6] Ibid., p. 17.
[7] Rollo, p. 21.
[8] Brief for the
Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 65-66.
[9] Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 35-36.
[10] Ibid., pp. 19-20.
[11] This case was deemed
submitted for resolution on February 2, 1999, when the Court noted and allowed
appellant's Manifestation that he deemed it “not wise to file a Reply Brief.”
[12] Appellant’s Brief, p.
10; rollo, p. 52. (All caps in
the original.)
[13] TSN, August 26, 1997,
pp. 7-9.
[14] People v.
Burce, 269 SCRA 293, March 7, 1997.
[15] Ibid., p. 314.
[16] People v.
Alvero, GR Nos. 134536-38, April 5, 2000.
[17] People v.
Abordo, 258 SCRA 571, July 11, 1996; People v. Corea, 269 SCRA
76, March 3, 1997; People v. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421, October 9, 1997;
People v. Lacaba, GR No. 130591, November 17, 1999.
[18] People v.
Caratay, 316 SCRA 251, October 5, 1999; People v. Penaso, GR No. 121980,
February 23, 2000.
[19] People v.
Alvero, supra.
[20] People v.
Apilo, 263 SCRA 582, October 28, 1996; People v. Pontilar Jr., 275 SCRA
338, July 11, 1997.
[21] People v. Dela
Cruz, 276 SCRA 191, July 24, 1997.
[22] People v.
Bersabe, 289 SCRA 685, April 27, 1998; People v. Pili, 289
SCRA 118, April 15, 1998; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129, March 6,
1998; People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, January 14, 1998; People v.
Siguin, 299 SCRA 124, November 24, 1998; People v. Sta. Ana, 291
SCRA 188, June 26, 1998; People v. Villamor, 284 SCRA 184,
January 16, 1998; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495, March 13, 1997.
[23] People v.
Arcilla, 256 SCRA 757, May 15, 1996; People v. Atuel, 261
SCRA 339, September 3, 1996; People v. Bragas, 315 SCRA 217, September
24, 1999.
[24] People v.
Bersabe, 289 SCRA 685, April 27, 1998; People v. Balmoria, 287
SCRA 687, March 20, 1998; People v. Garcia, 288 SCRA 383, March
31, 1998; People v. Cabillan, 267 SCRA 256, January 30, 1997.
[25] People v.
Gumahob, 265 SCRA 84, November 28, 1996; People v. Peñero, 276 SCRA 565,
July 31, 1997; People v. Pili, 289 SCRA 118, April 15,
1998.
[26] People v.
Sagaysay, 308 SCRA 455, June 17, 1999, citing People v. Soberano, 244
SCRA 467, May 29, 1995; People v. Casao, 220 SCRA 362, March 23, 1993;
People v. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530, January 27, 1989; People v.
Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995; People v. Mendoza, 163
SCRA 569, July 26, 1988.
[27] People v.
Talaboc, 256 SCRA 441, April 23, 1996; People v. Dones,
254 SCRA 696, March 13, 1996; People v. Padil, GR No. 127566,
November 22, 1999.
[28] People v.
Malabago, 271 SCRA 465, April 18, 1997.
[29] People v.
Alvero, supra; People v. Padil, supra.
[30] Exh. A.
[31] TSN, August 26, 1997,
p. 3.
[32] TSN, November 11,
1997, pp. 24-25.
[33] People v.
Belga, 258 SCRA 583, July 11, 1996; People v. Amaguin, 229
SCRA 166, 174-175, January 10, 1994.
[34] People v.
Devilleres, 269 SCRA 717, March 14, 1997; People v. Managaytay, 305 SCRA
316, March 25, 1999; People v. Sacapaño, 313 SCRA 650, September 3,
1999; People v. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317, August 17, 1998; People v.
Gayomma, 315 SCRA 639, September 30, 1999.
[35] People v.
Tabugoca, 258 SCRA 312, January 28, 1998.
[36] Ibid.
[37] People v. Cula,
GR No. 133146, March 28, 2000; People v. Tipay, GR No.131472,
March 28, 2000; People v. Brigildo, GR No. 124129, January 28,
2000; People v. Licanda, GR No. 134084, May 4, 2000; People v.
Tabanggay, GR No. 130504, June 29, 2000.
[38] 311 SCRA 122, 141,
July 26, 1999, per Melo, J. The
rule was reiterated in People v. Cula, ibid., and People v.
Tipay, ibid.
[39] People v. Llamo,
GR No. 132138, January 28, 2000; People v. Amban, GR No.
134286, March 1, 2000; People v. Balgos, GR No. 126115, January
26, 2000; People v. Magat, GR No. 130026, May 31, 2000; People
v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 425, April 18, 1989; People v. Vargas,
257 SCRA 603, 610-11, June 26, 1996.
[40] TSN, August 26, 1997,
p. 6.
[41] Supra.
[42] People v. Tipay,
supra.
[43] People v. Tabanggay,
supra, per Panganiban, J.
See also People v. Cula, supra.
[44] People v. Tabanggay,
ibid., citing People v. Mahinay, supra; People v. Prades,
293 SCRA 411, July 30, 1998.