SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No.
129365. December 4, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ALBERTO MALACURA y MALIGRO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
On appeal is the
decision dated May 16, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 170, in Criminal Case No. 16762-MN, finding appellant Alberto
Malacura y Maligro, a 35-year-old sales supervisor, guilty of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay complainant Mary Rose Alonzo, his 18-year-old drinking
companion, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and the costs of suit.
There being two
different versions of the incident, both sides of the story were succinctly
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor-General in its brief. The version of the prosecution is as
follows:[1]
…[P]rivate complainant Mary Rose
Alonzo testified that on February 11, 1996 at around three o’clock in the
afternoon, she was at the house of appellant in Catmon, Malabon (p.3 TSN, May
14, 1996), together with appellant and a certain “Mang Leoding” [Leodegario
Merino]. (p. 20, TSN, May 14, 1996). The two (2) invited Mary Rose to join them
drink a bottle of gin which they had started drinking (pp. 20-22, TSN, May 14,
1996). Mary Rose accepted the
invitation and joined the two (pp. 4-5, TSN, May 21, 1996). While drinking the liquor, the three (3)
engaged in conversation and exchanged stories (p. 5, TSN, May 21, 1996).
Sometime thereafter, Mary Rose
stood up and went to the toilet (p. 5, TSN, May 21, 1996). When she came out of the comfort room, there
was no light in the house (p. 9, TSN, May 21, 1996). Then, she went back to the sala of the house of appellant
(p. 5, TSN, May 21, 1996). She
continued drinking the gin. After three
(3) rounds of gin, she felt dizzy, her mind went blank, lost consciousness (pp.
6-7, TSN, May 21, 1996) and fell down (p. 8, TSN, May 21, 1996).
Still feeling weak due to the
amount of alcohol she had imbibed, Mary Rose felt she was being sexually
molested (pp. 6-7, TSN, May 21, 1996).
Mary Rose claims that, after forcing her eyes to open, she saw the face
of appellant in front of her (p. 16, TSN, May 14, 1996).
When Mary Rose woke up at about
five o’clock in the morning of the following day (p. 16, TSN, May 14, 1996),
she was already on the sofa and not at the place where she lost consciousness
(p. 10, TSN, May 21, 1996). She also
noticed that her shorts and underwear were “no longer in [its] proper place and
it was crumpled” (p. 10, TSN, May 21, 1996).
Mary Rose did not tell anybody of
her ordeal. She chose to keep the
matter to herself because she was afraid.
Allegedly, appellant threatened to harm her and her family if she will
report the sexual assault (p. 13, TSN, May 21, 1996 and p. 16, TSN, May 14,
1996).
On March 26, 1996, Dr. Armie M.
Soreta-Amil, Medico-Legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, (p.
12, TSN, May 14, 1996), performed a medico-genital examination on Mary Rose on
the basis of a written request of the aunt of Mary Rose (p. 5, TSN, May 14,
1996). Dr. Umil found that Mary Rose
has a distensible hymen which was intact.
This means that the hymen is elastic and allows penetration by an average-sized
adult Filipino male organ without producing any laceration (pp. 6-7, TSN, May
14, 1996).
On May 6, 1996, Mary Rose was
admitted at the Jose Reyes Medical Center (p. 11, TSN, May 28, 1996). She was diagnosed as undergoing incomplete,
non-septic, non-induced abortion.
Consequently, a complete curettage was performed on her (p. 8, TSN, May
28, 1996).
The version of
the defense, however, is as follows:[2]
Appellant Alberto Malacura
testified that in the morning of February 11, 1996, he was at his house in
Catmon, Malabon (pp. 3-7, TSN, December 16, 1996). With him were Anastacio Malacura, Zaldy Siatco [should be RIZAL
DESIATCO], Mary Rose Alonzo, Rosy (the mother of Mary Rose) and his wife and
three kids (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 16, 1996).
Appellant was having a drink with Anastacio, Mary Rose, Rosy, and Zaldy
(p. 8, TSN, December 16, 1996). At
about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, Mang Luding (Leodegario
Merino) joined them in their drinking spree (p. 9, TSN, December 16,
1996). They ran out of liquor at
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Mary Rose and Mang Luding [(sic) MANG LEODING] volunteered to buy
gin. However, Zaldy, told them not to
buy more liquor as he and appellant had work the following day and he wanted to
rest. Mary Rose, her mother Rosy, Mang
Luding and Zaldy left appellant’s house after which, appellant, his wife and
three (3) kids fixed their house.
Thereafter, appellant’s wife prepared their dinner (pp. 10-11, TSN,
December 16, 1996).
On March 30, 1996 at around 10:00
o’clock in the morning, appellant was arrested while at the barangay hall of
Gulayan, Catmon, Malabon (p. 14, TSN, December 16, 1996).
On April 1,
1996, the complainant filed her complaint[3] charging appellant with the crime
of rape, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of
February, 1996 in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
lewd design and by giving a glass of gin laced with drugs causing the victim to
lose partial consciousness and while partially unconscious accused did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
MARY ROSE ALONZO Y SAN JUAN against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by
counsel de parte, appellant on arraignment entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
For the
prosecution, the following witnesses testified: (1) complainant Mary Rose
Alonzo; (2) Armando Alonzo, father of complainant, who testified that he is
separated from the mother of the victim, and that he lives in Sampaloc, Manila,
while complainant and her mother live in Malabon. He also stated that he was not familiar with the friends of his
daughter;[5] (3) Dr. Armie M. Soreta Umil,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who
conducted the physical examination on complainant on March 26, 1996. Dr. Umil found that complainant's hymen is
distensible, which means it is elastic and can allow full penetration of a
normal size male organ without any genital injury. Hence, Dr. Umil opined that she could not tell whether or not
complainant had prior sexual intercourse;[6] and (4) Dr. Maria Isabelita L.
Maligaya, medical resident at the Jose Reyes Medical Center, who examined
complainant on May 6, 1996. Dr.
Maligaya testified that complainant was diagnosed to have non-septic,
non-induced abortion, and that she performed a completion curettage
("raspa") on complainant.[7]
For the defense,
the following witnesses testified: (1) appellant, (2) Rizal Desiatco, a
drinking companion; and (3) Rowena Malacura, appellant’s 12 year-old daughter.
Appellant flatly
denied raping complainant. He claimed
that on February 11, 1996, at around 9:00 A.M., he had a drinking session with
his brother Anastacio Malacura and Rizal Desiatco. At around 9:30 A.M., complainant (allegedly a tomboy) and
her mother joined them. At about 2:00
P.M., Leodegario Merino joined the group.
Sometime thereafter, appellant's brother left. At around 4:00 P.M., the group ran out of liquor. Complainant and
Merino offered to buy some more, but appellant and Desiatco declined because
they had to work the next day. The
group dispersed and left the house.
Appellant, his wife, and their children started cleaning up. After having dinner, they slept at around
7:00 P.M. Appellant woke up at about
4:00 A.M. the next day and went to work.
On March 30, 1996, he was arrested while inside the barangay hall
located at Gulayan, Catmon, Malabon, Metro Manila.[8]
Rizal Desiatco
corroborated the testimony of appellant.
He testified that complainant was the tanggera (server) during
the drinking session, and that he rejected complainant's offer to buy gin
because he had to work the next day. He
left appellant's house at 4:00 P.M..[9]
Appellant's
daughter, Rowena, testified that on February 11, 1996, she saw complainant,
complainant's mother, Merino, and Desiatco having a drinking session at their
house. She said complainant and the
mother had lunch at their house, but Merino had lunch at his own house and came
back later. At around 4:00 P.M., the
drinking session broke up. She closed
their doors at around 6:00 P.M. After
that, she never saw complainant return to their house. She went to sleep at 7:00 P.M. beside her
father, mother and siblings. On
February 12, 1996, she woke up at around 4:00 A.M. to prepare for school, but
she did not see complainant at their house.
She left for school at 5:30 A.M.[10]
On June 3, 1997,
the trial court rendered judgment[11] finding appellant guilty as
charged, disposing thus -
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court finds accused Alberto Malacura y Maligro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which is twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years and to pay Mary Rose Alonzo the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant now
contends that the trial court gravely erred in –[12]
… CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MARY ROSE ALONZO DESPITE ITS GLARING
INCONSISTENCIES, RECANTATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, SURMISES, SUSPICIONS, GUESSES AND
CONTRADICTIONS.
… NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
In support of
the first assignment of error, appellant points out material inconsistencies
between complainant's sworn statement and her testimony on direct examination
during the bail hearings, and her subsequent inconsistencies in the course of
cross-examination. Complainant wavered
in her testimony as to what happened after she drank the gin offered by appellant:
did she fall on the sofa or on the floor?
Did she join the group again for another three rounds of drinking? According to the defense, complainant was
unclear whether she was conscious or not when the alleged offense took
place. Further, complainant allegedly
vacillated on whether appellant threatened her to keep quiet about the
incident, or merely looked at her when she regained consciousness.
In support of
the second assignment of error, appellant insists that the medical findings
show that complainant's hymen was intact, and she sustained no genital or
extra-genital injuries. Therefore,
appellant argues, the medical findings raise doubt as to the element of carnal
knowledge. Further, the absence of an
outcry from complainant and her delay in reporting the incident detract from
the truthfulness of her charge.
We note, at the
outset, that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable
element in rape.[13] When the victim has been rendered
unconscious, obviously, she cannot raise an outcry while she is being
raped. Delay in reporting a rape
incident, when properly explained, does not affect the credibility of the
victim.[14] Lastly, the Court has taken
judicial notice that the crime of rape can be committed in any place for lust
is no respecter of time or place.[15]
For the State,
the Office of the Solicitor-General recommends in its brief the acquittal of
appellant, primarily on the ground that the prosecution failed to positively
identify appellant as the perpetrator of the rape. Hence, in our view, the crucial issue in this case is whether the
prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the offense of rape was committed by the appellant.
In the review of
rape cases, we consider as guiding principles the following: (1) to accuse a
man of rape is easy, but it is difficult for the accused to disprove it, though
he may be innocent; (2) since only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[16] While it may be true that in a rape
case the lone testimony of the victim could suffice to sustain a conviction,
such testimony must meet the test of credibility, which means that the
testimony should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should
likewise be credible and reasonable in itself, that is to say, candid,
straightforward, and in accord with human experience.[17]
On direct
examination, complainant testified that when she came out of the bathroom,
appellant had handed her a glass of gin.
After drinking it, she felt dizzy and fell down on the sofa. Even in her weakened state, she managed to
see the face of appellant who was on top of her, and she felt him having sexual
intercourse with her, viz:[18]
PROSECUTOR NEPTALI ALIPOSA TO
COMPLAINANT
Q: What
happened to you next when you felt dizzy?
A: I
felt very weak and I can no longer think what was placed in the glass which I
drank.
Q: What
happened next when you felt dizzy?
A: I
fell down to the floor of the house, sir. (witness demonstrating a leaning
position)
Q: What
did the accused do to you when you lie down on the floor?
A: I
fell on the sofa, sir.
Q:
How long is the sofa where you laid yourself?
A: It
was long, sir.
Q:
While on the sofa what did the accused do to you?
A: I
saw Alberto on top of me. I saw his
face, sir.
Q: What
was he doing on top of you?
A: (witness
crying and telling something unintelligibly)
Q: What
was that that Malacura was doing to you?
A: “Niyayari
niya po ako”, sir.
Q: When
you say ‘niyayari niya po ako” does it mean that the accused was having sexual
intercourse with you?
A: Yes,
sir.
During the
cross-examination, however, complainant declared that after going to the
bathroom, she merely rejoined appellant and Merino for three more rounds before
she felt dizzy. After she fell on the
floor, she felt someone having sexual intercourse with her, and she saw the
shadow of appellant’s face, viz:[19]
ATTY. BERNARDO ATIENZA TO
COMPLAINANT
Q: After
coming from the bathroom, did you drink again?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: How
much did you drink?
A: After
three rounds, sir.
Q: And
after three rounds, you continued to converse with the people around you.
A: I
suddenly felt dizzy, sir.
Q: What
do you mean by dizzy, you mean you lost your consciousness?
A: Yes
sir, it seems that my mind went blank.
Q: And
at that time the wife of the accused was still there near you?
A: I
could no longer recall if the wife of the accused was still around, sir.
Q: How
about Mang Luding, can you still remember if he was still there or you cannot
remember?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: You
said also that “niyari ka” – (that accused abused you)
A: Yes,
sir, because I saw the shadow of his face.
Q: In
other words, you were not unconscious at that time?
A: I
lost consciousness, sir, in fact may mind went blank and I was no longer in my
real self.
Upon further
cross-examination, however, complainant said that after drinking the glass of
gin, she immediately lost consciousness, and woke up the following morning, viz:[20]
ATTY. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ TO
COMPLAINANT
Q: Did
you fall down on the same spot?
A: Yes,
sir I fell down exactly at the same spot where the glass of gin was handed to
me.
Q: When
you fell down you lost consciousness completely, correct?
A: Yes,
sir, but I just felt dizzy.
x x x
Q: When
you woke up it was already 5:00 o’clock in the morning, correct?
A: Yes,
sir I was already on the sala set.
Subsequently,
complainant testified that she was conscious enough to see the shadow of the
person who was pulling her shorts down, but she did not know who was that
person, viz:[21]
ATTY. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ TO WITNESS
Q: You
also did not see the face of the person on top of you because it was dark?
A: I
can see (aninag), the shadow of his face because I tried my very best to open
up my eyes and I saw his face in front of me, sir.
Q: You
just stated about a minute ago somebody was pulling your shorts down but you
cannot see who that person was?
A: Yes,
sir I do not know who was removing my shorts but I saw him in front of me.
Q: Did
you or did you not see the face of the person who pulled your shorts down?
A: I
saw the shadow of that person, sir.
Q: Only
the shadow?
A: Yes,
sir.
Noteworthy, the
above-mentioned inconsistencies pertain to the identity of the person
committing the crime itself. Such
discrepancies in the testimony of complainant seriously impair her
credibility. As enunciated in People
v. Galera, 280 SCRA 492 (1997):
A significant, if not perhaps the
primordial concern in the criminal prosecution of an accused is the correct
identification of the author of the crime and the other, of course, would be
the actuality of the commission of the offense in which he is shown to be
responsible or has participated. The
guilt of the accused must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the
strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense. Thus, even if certain
inculpatory facts appear imputable to the offender, the same are
inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution fails to discharge the
onus on his identity and culpability.
The constitutional presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
prosecution to demonstrate the guilt, and for the indictee to establish
innocence.”[22]
Moreover, other
inconsistencies pertaining to the events before and after the alleged rape
further taint the credibility of complainant.
First, complainant testified that on
February 11, 1996, at around 3:00 P.M. while she was on her way to the store to
buy merienda, appellant invited her to join their drinking session.[23] However, upon further
cross-examination, complainant admitted that as early as 9:30 A.M., she and her
mother already went to the house of appellant to watch television, albeit
uninvited.[24]
Second, complainant stated on direct
examination that appellant's wife was around while the group was having a
drinking session.[25] On cross-examination, she said that
appellant's wife was not around during the drinking session.[26] But upon further cross, she stated
that she left appellant's house at 12:30 P.M. and came back at around 3:00
P.M., and appellant's wife was present at that time.[27]
Third, complainant, on direct
examination, testified that she woke up the following day at around 5:00 A.M.
and appellant threatened her not to report the incident or he would kill her
and something bad would happen to her family.[28] On cross-examination, however, she
said that when appellant saw her regain consciousness early in the morning, he
merely looked at her and then she went out of the house alone.[29] Yet, later, she said that when she
woke up, she did not know where accused was at that time.[30] Further, it is also against human
experience for the wife and children not to have known of complainant's
presence in the one-bedroom house had she really spent the night there
unconscious on the sofa. As appellant's
daughter testified, she even woke up at around 4:30 A.M. to prepare for school
and complainant was not in their house.
Fourth, complainant initially admitted
that after regaining consciousness she could not recall where the appellant was
situated.[31] Then, she categorically stated that
appellant was inside his bedroom when she woke up.[32] Later on, she declared that she did
not know the whereabouts of appellant when she regained consciousness.[33]
We have
repeatedly stressed that the resolution of a rape case often hinges on the
credibility of the victim. If her
testimony does not meet the test of credibility nor clearly establish the
identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, the acquittal of the
latter is inevitable.[34]
A judgment of
conviction demands the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime and the same must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Unless the identity of the
culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt, the charge against the accused
must be dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not been overcome.[35] Hence, we are constrained to acquit
appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of appellant
with moral certainty.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant ALBERTO
MALACURA is hereby ACQUITTED for lack of sufficient evidence to convict him of
the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the
immediate release of appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
(Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 104-105.
[2] Id. at 106.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Id. at 21.
[5] TSN, November 11,
1996, pp. 4-7.
[6] TSN, May 14, 1996,
pp. 5-11; Medico-Legal Report, Exh. "A," Records, p. 51.
[7] TSN, May 28, 1996,
pp. 8-16; Medical Report, Records, p. 54.
[8] TSN, December 16,
1996, pp. 5-13, 24-34.
[9] TSN, January 14,
1997, pp. 5-12.
[10] TSN, January 16,
1997, pp. 6-22.
[11] Records, pp. 426-432.
[12] Rollo, p. 30.
[13] People v.
Celis, 317 SCRA 79, 95 (1999).
[14] People v.
Batoon, 317 SCRA 545, 554 (1999).
[15] Id. at 555.
[16] People v.
Aguinaldo, 316 SCRA 819, 829 (1999).
[17] People v.
Torion, 307 SCRA 169, 175-176 (1999).
[18] TSN, May 14, 1996,
pp. 15-16.
[19] TSN, May 21, 1996,
pp. 6-7.
[20] TSN, November 19,
1996, p. 25.
[21] TSN, December 5,
1996, p. 11.
[22] 280 SCRA 492, 504-505
(1997).
[23] TSN, May 14, 1996, p. 20; TSN, May 21, 1996, p. 4.
[24] TSN, November 19,
1996, p. 9.
[25] TSN, May 14, 1996, p.
21.
[26] TSN, November 19,
1996, p. 28.
[27] TSN, December 5,
1996, pp. 6-7, 16.
[28] TSN, May 14, 1996, p.
16, TSN December 5, 1996, p. 9.
[29] TSN, May 21, 1996, p.
11.
[30] Id. at 21.
[31] Id. at 16.
[32] Id. at 19
[33] Id. at 21
[34] People v.
Ibay, 312 SCRA 153, 155 (1999).
[35] People v.
Fontanilla, 199 SCRA 897, 904 (1991).