SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1225. April 12,
2000]
NELFA SAYLO,
complainant, vs. JUDGE REMIGIO V. ROJO, MTCC, Branch 5,
Bacolod City, respondent. ALEX
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint dated May 29, 1997,
Nelfa Saylo charged Judge Remigio V. Rojo, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, with Manifest Partiality and Gross Neglect of Duty
relative to Civil Case No. 23314, entitled "Nelfa Saylo vs. Becky Luo
Saylo, et al.", for Replevin.
Nelfa Saylo alleged in her verified
complaint that Judge Rojo is guilty of Manifest Partiality and Gross Neglect of
Duty for adamantly refusing to issue a writ of replevin despite the lapse of
six (6) months after the complaint for replevin was filed and even after her
lawyers had already filed a motion to resolve the matter. She claims that the
defendants in the aforecited civil case were still using the subject motor
vehicle and that she feared that the vehicle could be accidentally destroyed or
lost. spped
She avers that on December 5, 1996, she
filed through her lawyers, Civil Case No. 23314 raffled to Branch 5, presided
by Judge Remigio V. Rojo and that she submitted all the requirements mandated
by Rule 60, Section 2, of the Rules of Court,[1] but inspite of her compliance, the respondent judge
has not issued the writ of replevin contrary to Rule 60, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court.[2] She further alleged that Judge Rojo exhibited
manifest partiality towards defendants by his refusal to issue a writ of
replevin and his refusal to act on her motion to declare the defendants in
default. She asked that Judge Rojo be dismissed from the service. Scedp
On October 15, 1997, Judge Rojo submitted
his comment and prayed that the instant case be dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent judge stated at the outset that he did not know the parties in said
case nor was he related to any of the parties or counsels, nor has he a special
interest in the case. He insisted that a review of the orders of the court will
show that he did not favor any of the parties. In fact, he had denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss. If at all he should be accused of favoring any
party, that party favored would be the plaintiff. Respondent judge explained that
he maintains an impartial attitude on all cases in his sala. In three separate
instances he voluntarily inhibited from trying cases where his family has a
professional relationship with either party or counsel. In the case of Nelfa
Saylo when she filed through counsel a motion for inhibition on June 3, 1997,
the undersigned granted the motion.
Anent the charge of gross neglect of duty,
quoted hereunder is the explanation of the respondent judge: Calrspped
"During the
January 23, 1997 hearing Atty. Hermilo Pa-oyon was told in open court that the
writ cannot be issued because there was a defect in the complaint and the
plaintiff’s affidavit. That on or about the second week of February 1997, Atty.
Pa-oyon went inside the chamber of the undersigned alone without the presence
of counsel for the defendant. He asked the undersigned what was the defect in
the plaintiff’s complaint and affidavit. Although what Atty. Pa-oyon did was
unethical the undersigned answered him that he should read once more Section 2,
Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court, and compare it with plaintiff’s complaint and
affidavit. The undersigned cannot point out the specific defect. That would
have been unfair and unethical. The undersigned waited for Atty. Pa-oyon to
make the necessary corrections on the plaintiff’s complaint and affidavit, but
none came. Atty. Pa-oyon should have been thankful to the court for giving him
an opportunity to correct the work of his office without a written order. But
apparently counsels for the plaintiff cannot find a defect. Their minds were
set. They did not heed the oral advice of the court to make the necessary
corrections. They believed that they are correct and insisted on the immediate
issuance of the writ of replevin as shown by paragraph 4 of the verified administrative
complaint.
Sccalr
From March 11,
1997 when the court issued the order submitting for resolution the Motion to
Resolve dated March 6, 1997 to June 2, 1997 when it issued the order resolving
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin is a period of eighty three
days. From March 11, 1997 to June 3, 1997 when the court issued the order
resolving the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default is a period of eighty four
days. The undersigned did not violate Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, which requires him to resolve all pending motions within ninety days
from the date of their submission for resolution. Furthermore, nowhere in Rule
60, Revised Rules of Court, is the court required to issue a writ of replevin
immediately upon application by the plaintiff. The court has to go over the
allegations of the affidavit supporting the application for a writ of replevin
to determine whether such issuance is proper. In his order dated June 2, 1997
(Annex "13") he explained that compliance by the plaintiff of the
requirements was insufficient. Had plaintiff complied with Section 2, Rule 60,
Revised Rules of Court, the writ of replevin would have been issued. Calrsc
The undersigned is not remiss in his duty.
He acted timely on the application for a writ of replevin, although at first in
the form of an oral order and suggestion."[3]
Respondent judge theorized that the hatred
between the plaintiff and defendants, who are members of the same family,
spilled over into the court and it was unfortunate for him to be placed between
families on the warpath.
In a Memorandum dated August 23, 1999, the
Office of the Court Administrator after evaluation, found no clear and
convincing proof to support the charge of Manifest Partiality. However, the OCA
is convinced that respondent judge was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Accordingly, they recommended an imposition of FINE in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a warning that a repetition or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Sppedsc
After careful examination of the records of
the case, and a thorough evaluation of the respective contentions of the
parties, we agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that there is
indeed no clear and convincing proof to support the charge of Manifest
Partiality against the respondent judge. In the instant case, the allegation of
bias and partiality are not substantiated by evidence. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed from the circumstances stated by the complainant in her
verified complaint. Apart from her bare allegations, there must be convincing
proof to show that respondent judge is indeed biased and partial. We held in
Zamudio vs. Penas, Jr.,[4] that in administrative proceedings, the burden of
proof that respondent judge committed the act complained of rests on the
complainant. Complainant in this case failed to substantiate her allegations. Sdjad
However, on the charge of Gross Neglect of
Duty, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Court
Administrator that respondent judge is liable as charged.
As observed in the memorandum of the Court
Administrator dated August 23, 1999:
"Respondent
argued that he resolved the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Motion
to Declare Defendants in Default within the 90-day reglementary period. He
stated that the two motions were resolved within 83 days and 84 days
respectively. However, a perusal of the records shows that the resolution of
the motions were made beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
The Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Replevin was filed on December 5, 1996 the same being
incorporated in the complaint. It was resolved only on June 2, 1997 or after
179 days, contrary to the allegation of respondent that it was resolved within
83 days. The marked difference between the two figures could be traced to the
respondent’s error of reckoning the period from the date the Motion to Resolve
was filed by the parties. It should be noted that the counting of the 90-day
period must commence from the filing of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Replevin and not from the filing of a Motion to Resolve which is not necessary
to authorize respondent to resolve the original motion."[5] Misact
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to
attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases and its incidents
within the time fixed by law. The failure of a judge to render the decision
within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days from submission of a case for
decision constitutes serious misconduct, to the detriment of the honor and
integrity of his office and in derogation of speedy administration of justice.
Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable; it
constitutes gross inefficiency.[6] We cannot countenance undue delay, at a time when
clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. Judges are
expected to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their
judicial functions and the discharge of their duties. The failure or inability
of a judge to decide a case within the period fixed by law subjects him to
administrative sanctions.[7] Acctmis
WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold
respondent judge GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty. Accordingly, as recommended,
a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED. Newmiso
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] SEC. 2. Affidavit and bond.—Upon applying for
such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of some other
person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the
property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained
by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to his best
knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That it has not been taken for a tax
assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution, or an
attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure; and
(d) The actual value of the property.
The plaintiff must also give a bond, executed to the defendant in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the defendant of such sum as he may recover from the plaintiff in the action.
[2] SEC. 3. Order.—Upon the filing of such affidavit and bond with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending, the judge of such court shall issue an order describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained, and requiring the sheriff or other proper officer of the court forthwith to take such property into his custody.
[3] Comment, pp. 3-4.
[4] 286 SCRA 367, 376 (1998).
[5] OCA Memorandum dated August 23, 1999, p. 4.
[6] Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac, A.M. No. 97-6-182-RTC, March 19, 1999, pp. 8-9.
[7] See Sanchez vs. Vestil, 298 SCRA 1, 17 (1998).