EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135438-39. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO DURANGO y CARCEDO,
accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, for automatic review, is
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, in Criminal
Case No. 18897-MN and Criminal Case No. 18898-MN, jointly tried, which has
found herein accused-appellant Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on two counts.
The complaints charging accused-appellant
with the crime of rape, allegedly twice committed on the same victim, read: Esmmis
"CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 18897-MN
"'That on or
about the 21st day of August, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being a father of Noniebeth Durango y Ferolino, with
lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously did then and there have sexual intercourse with NONIEBETH DURANGO Y
FEROLINO, a minor of 12 years of age against her will and without her consent.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
"CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 18898-MN
"'That on or
about the 21st day of September, 1996, in the Municipality of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being a father of Noniebeth Durango y
Ferolino, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have sexual intercourse with
NONIEBETH DURANGO Y FEROLINO, a minor of 12 years of age against her will and
without her consent.
‘CONTRARY TO
LAW.’"[1]
During the arraignment on 22 January 1998,
the public prosecutor moved for a joint trial of the two cases. Accused
Bonifacio Durango, with the assistance of counsel and after having been
informed, in a language and dialect known to him, of the nature and cause of
the indictment, voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty to the criminal
complaints. On 14 May 1998, after the prosecution had barely started with the
presentation at the witness stand of private complainant, the defense counsel
manifested to the court that the accused wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of
not guilty and to substitute it with a plea of guilty to the crimes charged. On
the basis of the manifestation, accused was re-arraigned, and this time accused
pleaded guilty. The trial court thereupon proceeded to hear the testimony of
private complainant. Esmso
On 11 August 1998, after the prosecution had
concluded its presentation, the trial court rendered the now questioned
decision, the pertinent portions of which read -
"As
established by the testimony of Noniebeth Durango, the first charge of rape was
committed on the night of September 21, 1996 while she was already sleeping
inside their house located at 214 Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon Metro
Manila. She was with her seven (7) years old sister Zeny but then the latter
was also sound asleep on the floor. Her father at that instant went beside her
and forced her to undress. In fact, it was the accused who removed her
clothings, after which, stripped himself of his apparels before allowing his
penis to touch the private part of Noniebeth. On the following night, the
accused finally penetrated his daughter. Noniebeth felt his penis inside her
genital during which moment the accused threatened her not to tell her mother
about the incident otherwise they would be killed. That initial sexual coupling
was repeated for several times while the mother of Noniebeth was still working
in Taiwan.
"The second
charge of rape was committed August 21, 1997. This time it happened at around
10:00 a.m. and the mother of Noniebeth was around after returning home in July,
1997. Noniebeth was in her room and her mother was then cooking. The accused
went inside and begun to violate her daughter under practically the same
circumstances as the first. But this time the threat did not work because
Noniebeth by now had gained enough courage to inform her mother about the ordeal
she went through in the hands of the accused. Finding it to be an easy way in
order to get out of their house, Noniebeth and her mother went to Mindanao to
visit her sick grandmother. And upon their return, Noniebeth was examined by a
doctor in Manila."[2]
The trial court then adjudged:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"1. In
Criminal Case No. 18897-MN, the Court finds accused Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of DEATH;
"2. In
Criminal Case No. 18898-MN, the Court finds accused Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of DEATH.
"Likewise, the
accused is hereby ordered to indemnify Noniebeth Durango in the amount of
P50,000.00, the additional sums of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and cost of the suit in each of the crime charged. Msesm
"SO
ORDERED."[3]
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant
submitted a lone assignment of error, to wit:
"The Court a
quo manifestly erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite his improvident plea of guilty."[4]
The imposition of the death penalty tasks
anew this Court to closely review the judgment of conviction not only whether
or not an accused did commit the Crime imputed against him but also whether or
not his constitutional rights have been duly protected before and during his
trial.
Initially, the accused entered a plea of
"not guilty." Just as Noniebeth was called to the witness stand, the
defense manifested its intention to substitute the plea of "not
guilty" to one of "guilty."
When an accused enters such a plea of
"guilty," the trial court is mandated to see to it that the exacting
standards laid down by the rules therefor are strictly observed. Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, in part, provides:
"Section 1.
Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether
he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
"(b) The
accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Exsm
"(c) If the
accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him."
"Section 3.
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
This Court, in the recent case of People vs.
Tizon,[5] has expressed the rationale behind the rule and it
is, at bottom -
"x x x that
no accused is wrongly convicted or erroneously sentenced. It constantly
behooves the courts to proceed with utmost care in each and every case before
them but perhaps nothing can be more demanding of judges in that respect than
when the punishment is in its severest form - death - a penalty that, once
carried out, is irreversible and irreparable. It cannot be said that when a
person pleads guilty to a crime there is no chance at all that he could, in
fact, be innocent. Statistics (See People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421, citing
People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, and 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 251, p.
951) can easily dispel that notion."
The records of the case at bar would
disclose that the trial court issued a curt joint order, dated 14 May 1998, to
the following effect; viz:
"J O I N T...O R D E R
"At the
hearing today, defense counsel manifested that the accused is intending to
withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute the same with that of
guilty to the offenses charged, to which manifestation the Trial Prosecutor
interposed no objection.
"Accordingly,
the accused withdrew his former plea and was re-arraigned in these two (2)
complaints in the language and dialect known to him. With the assistance of his
counsel from the PAO, the accused voluntarily entered a plea of guilty in these
two (2) complaints.
"Considering
that the charges are capital offenses, the Trial Prosecutor was directed to
present the complainant, whose testimony was terminated. Thereafter, Trial
Prosecutor formally offered his evidence.
"WHEREFORE,
these cases are now submitted for decision. Kyle
"SO ORDERED.
"Malabon,
Metro Manila, May 14, 1998.
"(SGD) BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO
J u d g e"[6]
The order was preceded by a brief and
abbreviated exchange of remarks between the defense counsel and the trial judge
hereunder fully quoted; viz:
"ATTY. DE LAS
ALAS
For the accused
Your Honor
"FISCAL
ALIPOSA
For the people
Your Honor, we are ready to present the victim, Noniebeth Durango, whose
testimony is being offered to establish the allegations in the Informations and
particularly to the fact that she is the victim Your Honor.
"COURT
Duly noted. Swear
in the witness.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
"ON THE
WITNESS STAND: NONIEBETH DURANGO, 12 years of age, single, a student, and
residing at No. 214 Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon, Metro Manila, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, testified:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
"FISCAL
ALIPOSA Kycalr
Considering the
nature of the offense Your Honor, may we request that the public be excluded
except the accused and the mother of the victim.
"COURT
Yes, exclude the
public except the accused and the mother of the victim.
"ATTY. DE LAS
ALAS
If your Honor
please, a while ago the accused intimated to me that he intends to withdraw his
former plea not guilty and substitute the same with that of guilty to these two
cases Your Honor.
"COURT
Mr. Durango,
according to your counsel you are intending to withdraw your former plea of not
guilty in these 2 cases and substitute the same with that of guilty, do you
confirm that?
"ACCUSED
Yes Your Honor.
"ATTY. DE LAS
ALAS
In view of this
development Your Honor, the accused is now withdrawing his former plea of not
guilty to be substituted with guilty Your Honor.
"COURT
Alright,
re-arraign the accused. (Accordingly, the accused was re-arraigned in these 2
complaints in the language and dialect known to him. With the assistance of his
counsel from the PAO, the accused pleaded guilty in these two complaints.)
Even though the
accused has already pleaded guilty to the offenses charged, I will require you
to continue presenting your evidence Fiscal."[7]
The records would show that thenceforth
defense counsel spoke not one word. Nor would it appear that the trial court
gave defense counsel or the accused any chance to talk for when the prosecutor
ended his direct examination of Noniebeth, the latter was thereupon simply
excused and the court forthwith declared the case submitted for decision. Thus
- Calrky
"FISCAL
ALIPOSA
No further
question Your Honor.
"COURT
You are excused.
"FISCAL
ALIPOSA
We are now ready
to formally offer the following exhibits:
Exhibits ‘A,’
‘A-1,’ the medico-legal report, to establish the fact of examination on victim
Noniebeth Durango;
Exhibits 'B' and
'B-1,' sworn statement of the victim, as part of the testimony of the witness;
Exhibit 'C,'
request for examination;
Exhibit 'C-1,'
stamp mark of the PNP Crime Laboratory, to establish the fact that the police
intervened to have the victim examined?
Exhibit 'D,'
preliminary interview made by the doctor showing that the victim was sexually
molested;
Exhibit 'E,'
consent for examination upon the request of the mother of the victim;
Exhibit ‘F,’ birth
certificate of the victim showing that she is a minor below 12 years of age at
the time of the incident;
Exhibit 'G,'
complaint in Crim. Case No. 18897-MN Mesm
Exhibit 'G-1,’
signatures of the victim and her mother;
Exhibit 'H,'
complaint in Crim. Case No. 18898-MN and
Exhibit
'H-1," signatures of the victim and her mother, as part of the testimony
of the witness.
"COURT
Alright, these
cases are now submitted for decision."[8]
The improvident plea, followed by an
abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role at all played by the defense,
is just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process
at work enough to forfeit a human life. It may be opportune to invite attention
to the disquisition of the Court in People vs. Bermas,[9] thus:
"x x x The
right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
"The right to
counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The
right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer
of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation." Slx
Of most troublous concern is the fact that
the accused has not been apprised at all of the consequences of the
plea, let alone specifically warned that, given his plea of guilt, the death
sentence decreed under Republic Act 7659 would nevertheless have to be imposed,
contrary to what he might have entertained or been advised. It is essential
that a searching inquiry is conducted after the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, and it must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea and
(2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects of the plea so that the plea
of guilt can be truly said as being based on a free and informed judgment. So
indispensable is this requirement that a plea of guilt to a capital offense can
be held null and void where the trial court has inadequately discharged the
duty of conducting the prescribed "searching inquiry."[10] The trial court should also be convinced that the
accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats or physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters, and this
it can do either by eliciting from the accused himself the manner in which he
has been brought into the custody of the law and whether he had the assistance
of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations or by
ascertaining from him the conditions of his detention and interrogation during
the investigation. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel
on whether or not counsel has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilt are well-taken steps along
those lines.[11]
Similarly, just as in People vs. Estomaca,[12] which has ruled that no valid judgment can be
rendered upon an invalid arraignment, there is here no showing that appellant
or his counsel de oficio has been furnished with a copy of each
complaint with the list of witnesses against him.
All things considered, the Court is left
with little recourse except to remand the case to the court a quo for
further and appropriate proceedings conformably with the opinion heretofore
expressed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 18897-MN and No.
18898-MN convicting accused-appellant Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo of two crimes
of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of death is SET ASIDE. Said cases are
REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Scslx
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[2] Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[3] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[4] Rollo, p. 28.
[5] G.R. No. 126955, 28 October 1999.
[6] Records, p. 35.
[7] TSN, 14 May 1998, pp. 2-3.
[8] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[9] G.R. No. 120420, 21 April 1999, p. 15.
[10] People vs. Tizon, supra, citing People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293.
[11] People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421 citing People vs.
Badilla, 138 SCRA 513; People vs. Parba, 142 SCRA 158; People vs.
Petalcorin, 180 SCRA 685.
[12] 256 SCRA 421.