SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129899. April 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO VILLA, JR. y
DELGADO, accused-appellant. ALEX
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO appeals from
the Decision of the trial court convicting him of four (4) separate crimes of
Murder qualified by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
for each murder. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of his four (4)
victims in the amount of P50,000.00 for each group of heirs or a total
of P200,000.00.[1] Ncmmis
The antecedents: In the early morning of 22
June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New Cabalan,
Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor
of Dionito, suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle[2] and shot Dionito from behind killing him instantly.
Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their
father’s rescue after hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them
fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father, and mortally wounding
Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the
Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel too was
gunned down.
Scncm
After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr.
surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino of S2 OMDC (Olongapo Metropolitan
District Command).[3] Rodolfo was accordingly charged with multiple
murder. When arraigned on 3 October 1991 he entered a plea of not guilty. Later
however his counsel, Atty. Cipriano Dumpit, manifested in open court that the
accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused
invoked self-defense insofar as Dionito Fernandez was concerned, as the latter
tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus, according to the accused, he was forced to
shoot Dionito with his rifle.[4] The trial court then proceeded to propound searching
questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and
consequences of his change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers
given by the accused who was assisted by counsel, the court allowed the change
of plea.[5]
Meanwhile, on 16 July 1992, the trial court
issued an order appointing Atty. Romeo Alinea as counsel de oficio for
the accused, as his counsel de parte Atty. Cipriano Dumpit was
unavailable due to his ongoing medical treatment.[6] Before the defense could present its evidence,
however, counsel de oficio Alinea manifested his inability to confer
with the accused but moved that a psychiatric examination of the accused be
made at the National Center for Mental Health to determine his mental
condition. The motion was granted and the accused was examined at the Olongapo
City General Hospital to ascertain whether he was suffering from mental illness
before, during and after the commission of the crimes.[7] Sdaamiso
Dr. Romeo Enriquez, the examining
psychiatrist at the Olongapo City General Hospital, recommended that the
accused be confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Forensic
Pavillion, where an evaluation process for the possibility of insanity could be
made.[8] Thus, on 4 November 1994, the accused was confined
and treated at the National Center for Mental Health, under the direct
supervision of Dr. Celeste A. C. Peña, Medical Officer III, and Dr. Isagani S.
Gonzales, Medical Specialist II, Physician-in-charge Male Court Case Pavillion.
On 21 December 1994, after more than a month
of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to the trial
court a psychiatric evaluation report,[9] which stated in part -
PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION RESULTS: Sdaad
Evaluation
shows that the patient is suffering from Insanity or Psychosis classified as
Schizophrenia. This is a mental illness characterized by deterioration in
social and occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought
disturbances and poor judgment. He is at present incompetent to stand trial.
REMARKS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:
He is
recommended for further confinement and treatment.
Six (6) months later, or on 5 June 1995, a
follow-up report on the patient’s psychiatric status was made, this time by Dr.
Cheryl Zalsos, with remarks that the patient’s status had improved enough for
him to withstand the rigors of the trial. Thus, Adoracion Manuit,
Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Section, National Center for Mental Health,
filed a Petition for Release praying that the accused be discharged and
returned to jail for the speedy disposition of his case, and further
recommending that he be allowed to undergo periodic check-up to sustain his
improved mental state as well as to prevent a relapse of his illness.[10] In its Order of 21 June 1995 the trial court granted
the petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a
defense.
Jjlex
On 3 April 1997 the trial court disregarded
the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the crimes
charged. Thus -
The court is
not convinced that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic
type before or during the killing. The evaluation reports do not say so in
unequivocal terms. Dr. Zalsos, during her direct testimony, did not testify to
that effect. In her cross examination, she, however, mentioned in passing that
the accused was suffering from schizophrenia during the commission of the
offense. The court noted that she was unsure of her allegation. The said
reports and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos simply revealed that the accused
suffered from insanity or psychosis classified as schizophrenia. In order that
insanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must be shown to
exist just before or during the commission of the offense (People v. Aquino,
186 SCRA 851). Also, in order to exempt the accused from criminal liability it
must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of
the crime (People v. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275). These the accused failed to prove.
In resolving this appeal we need not inquire
into the killing of the victims as this was already admitted by
accused-appellant, nor into his theory of self-defense which he did not pursue,
much more prove, during the trial. The only issue to be resolved is whether
accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would
exempt him from criminal liability. Misjuris
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while
committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without
the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or
that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts.[11]
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and
conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the
alleged deranged person’s general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only
be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform
to the practice of people of sound mind.[12] Jurissc
Examining the evidence on record, we are
convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time he perpetrated the
killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a
complete absence of intelligence on his part: (a) Immediately after he killed
the victims he thought of surrendering to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City;
(b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental Hospital;[13] and, (c) He was able to give a Sworn Statement
before the Prosecutor’s Office in Olongapo City immediately after the
commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident.[14] These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick
mind. In People v. Ambal[15] we held: "The fact that immediately after the
incident (accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities
is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he
was going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of remorse is
inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious
of his acts, he acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them. Scjuris
What militates heavily against his plea of
insanity is his signed statement before the Prosecutor’s Office dated 11
October 1991 which manifests on its face that he was mentally sound at the time
of the killings. The Sworn Statement is quoted hereunder for better
appreciation and ready reference -
Na humigit kumulang
ng ika-pito ng umaga, nagbibihis pa ako ng uniform para mag-duty ng marinig ko
si Mr. Dionito Fernandez na nagsabi ng ‘ninakaw ng gagong CAFGU ang mga manok
ko kagabi. Pagkarinig ko noon, ako ay lumabas para tanungin kung sinong CAFGU
ang nagnakaw ng kanyang manok, at sumagot siya ng ‘anong pakialam mo,’ tinanong
ko siyang muli na bakit nakarinig ako ng CAFGU, sinong CAFGU iyon, ako lang
naman ang CAFGU rito sa atin ah.’ Sumagot siya ng ‘Hoy putang ina mo, hindi ako
natatakot sa baril mo, walang baril-baril sa akin gago," sabay dampot niya
sa itak at paharap sa akin, nabigla ako at nag-alangan na baka ibato o itaga
niya sa akin ang hawak niyang itak at nakalabit ko ang gatilyo ng aking baril
at siya ay tinamaan; Juris
Pagkatapos ay
bigla akong nilusob ng kanyang anak na si Ronald at dinampot ang itak na nasa
kamay ng kanyang ama at tatagain ako, at sinabi pang, ‘mamamatay ka rin.’
Nagdilim na ang aking paningin at siya ay aking nabaril at hindi ko napansin
ang patakbong papalapit na si Sheila sa kanila at hindi ko sinasadyang
natamaan;
Nataranta na
ako at naisip kong magpunta sa PC Detachment para sumuko, ngunit hinarang ako
ni Mr. Samuel Eclevia, na kanyang kumpadre na may dalang kutsara ng semento at
kanyang akmang aagawin ang baril ko at nakaumang rin sa akin ang kanyang hawak,
sa nagdidilim ko pang isipan ay nabaril ko rin siya;
Pagkatapos ay
dumating ang aking ama na si Rodolfo Villa, Sr. at ako ay inaawat at parang
natauhan ako ng maulinigan ko ang kanyang boses, sinabi niya na ‘anak, tumigil
ka na, akina ang baril mo at sasamahan kita sa Detachment para sumuko.’
Natatandaan ko pa na nasabi ko na wala na akong kinabukasan itay, mabuti pang
mamatay na rin ako at itinutok ko pa ang baril sa leeg ko; Suprema
Narinig ko pa
na sinabi niya na ‘huwag anak, kapag ginawa mo iyan ay bibigyan mo kami ng
pagdurusa ng inay mo. Bayaan mo, gagawin ko ang lahat para sa iyo, ibaba mo
iyan at i-safety mo na;
Pagkatapos ay
ibinaba ko ang baril ko at sasama na sana ako sa kanya papuntang Detachment,
ngunit napakaraming tao ang nakaharang sa daan at may nakita pa akong may mga
hawak na itak, kaya’t ako ay nag-warning shot para sila ay lumayo; Scsdaad
Maya-maya ay
dumating na ang kasama kong CAFGU na si Agripino Saromo, at sa kanya ako sumuko
at sumama papunta sa P.C. Detachment at doon ko na lang nalaman na nadaplisan
pala ng bala si Mr. Bernardo Briones sa kanyang braso, ng ako ay mag-warning
shot sa mga tao na nakaharang sa daanan ko bago dumating si CAFGU Saromo;
Wala pong
katotohanan ang kanilang hinala na si tatay ko, Rodofo Villa, Sr. ay nakialam
sa aking mga ginawa. Sarili ko po lamang ang pagkabaril sa mga nasabing tao.
We find it incredible for a supposedly
deranged person to remember vividly and give such a lucid and detailed account
of the carnage, from the moment he shot his first victim up to the time he
surrendered to the authorities. Quite noticeable also, attempts to justify his
criminal acts pervade the Sworn Statement which only a perfectly sane
and intelligent person, not a demented one, would be capable of making.
Moreover, if we were to follow
accused-appellant’s narration of the incident in his Sworn Statement, it
will appear that he slaughtered his victims in a fit of rage after Dionito Fernandez,
his first victim, allegedly accused him of stealing chickens and cursed him
saying, "p - t - g ina mo," and, "gago."
These negate insanity. There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane
person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he
fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. A man sometimes does
crazy things when enraged but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove
that he is insane. miso
The law presumes every man to be of sound
mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it
is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. Thus, a person
accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving it.[16] Insanity is a defense by way of confession and
avoidance, and as such the quantum of evidence required to prove that is clear
and convincing evidence.
The defense banks heavily on the findings of
the psychiatrists at the National Center for Mental Health, specifically the
pyschiatric evaluation report of Dr. Peña and Dr. Gonzales,[17] and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos, that he was
suffering from insanity or psychosis classified as schizophrenia. The doctors
arrived at this conclusion after a series of medical and psychological examinations
on accused-appellant during his confinement at the center.
However, we are still in a quandary as to
whether accused-appellant was really insane when he committed the crimes.
Firstly, we fail to discern anything from the psychiatric evaluation report
that accused-appellant’s judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as
to warrant the conclusion that his mental condition in 1991 when he killed his
victims, and in 1994 when he was admitted for psychiatric treatment at the
center, was the same so that his guilt or mental competence at the time he
committed the crimes may be reasonably doubted. Secondly, without the least
intention of casting doubt on the knowledge and integrity of expert witnesses,
we agree with the trial court that the results of the examinations conducted by
the psychiatrists on accused-appellant appear to be based on incomplete or
insufficient facts. Records show that the psychiatrists relied mainly on the
data supplied by accused-appellant and his police escort, without conducting an
independent interview of any of accused-appellant’s family members, relatives
or persons who could provide information on his state of mind before or during
the commission of the offenses. If he really was insane at the time of the
murders, certainly such a condition could not have escaped the notice of other
persons, friends and strangers alike, including the immediate members of his
family. apdc
It could be that accused-appellant was
insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability, such
insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He
was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was
troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses and
the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances
may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed,
that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the
period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is
the subject of the inquiry,[18] and his mental condition after that crucial period
or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental
condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of
the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be
appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the
burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crimes freely,
knowingly and intelligently. spped
It has been repeatedly held that this Court
does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court because it
is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the stand. Unless there is a clear
showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which might alter
the result of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be
respected and even accorded finality by this Court. We find no compelling
reason to depart from the rule.
Finally, on the penalties imposed by the
trial court, we do not agree that the aggravating circumstance of "taking
advantage of his public position" as a CAFGU member should be considered
against accused-appellant. The mere fact that he was a member of the CAFGU and
was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not sufficient to establish that he misused
his public position in the commission of the crimes.[19] miso
On the other hand, the trial court properly
credited in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of
"plea of guilty." Thus, following Art. 64, par. (2), of The
Revised Penal Code, there being one mitigating circumstance, the imposable
penalty on accused-appellant should be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period for each crime of murder, it being the minimum imposable penalty after
appreciating one mitigating circumstance in his favor. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate sentence
within the range of prision mayor maximum as minimum to reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court convicting
accused-appellant RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO of four (4) separate counts of
Murder is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION of the penalties imposed;
consequently, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
ten (10) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor
maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, for each crime of murder.
He is further ordered to INDEMNIFY the heirs of his victims in the amount of P50,000.00
in each case or for a total of P200,000.00. Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. Esä m
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr., RTC-Br. 75, Olongapo City.
[2] TSN, 2 June 1992, p. 3.
[3] Records, p. 14.
[4] TSN, 2 June 1992, pp. 1-4.
[5] Order of Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr., dated 2 June 1992; Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[6] Records, p. 72.
[7] Order dated 6 April 1993, Records, p. 128.
[8] Records, pp. 140-141.
[9] Id., pp. 152-153; Exh. "1."
[10] Records, p. 154.
[11] See People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860, 866.
[12] Id., p. 867.
[13] Decision of the trial court, p. 9; Rollo p. 265.
[14] Annex "A."
[15] G.R. No. 52688, 17 October 1980, 100 SCRA 325.
[16] See People v. So, G.R. No. 104664, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 708.
[17] Decision of the RTC-Br. 75, Olongapo City, Exh. "1;" Records, pp. 152-153.
[18] People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084; 27 June 1990, 186 SCRA 851.
[19] See People v. Pantoja, No. L-18793, 11 October 1968, 25 SCRA 468, 471-472.