People vs Tan : 129882 : Synopsis/Syllabi

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder for allegedly killing his childhood friend Rey Buzon. Their long friendship ended on a sad tragic note because of a woman named Zenaida Hermosisima, then the girlfriend of accused-appellant Fernando Tan who eloped with Rey Buzon. Zenaida and Rey eventually settled in the United States leaving behind Fernando with a grieving heart. Years passed and life went on for the trio until sixteen years later when Rey returned to the country and met his death in the hands of his childhood friend, herein accused-appellant. After trial, accused Fernando Tan was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant professed innocence of the crime for which he was convicted.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court upheld the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. The Court held that witnesses are weighed and not numbered and the testimony of one witness may suffice to warrant conviction unless it is glaringly wanting in every material respect. The Court found no reason to discredit the testimony of eyewitness Alicia Paras. Although her testimony needed no corroboration, the prosecution presented Anita Lacanlalay and the medico-legal officer to corroborate her testimony. With regard to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court agreed with the defense that it did not attend the killing because the premeditation to kill was not proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. The Court, however, upheld the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The victim had no inkling whatsoever of the forthcoming attack by accused-appellant. The Court deleted the P50,000.00 award for actual damages because no receipts were presented as proof to substantiate the award. The Court stressed that there is no such thing as “standard Supreme Court - set amount” of P50,000.00 as the lower court ruled.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NO LAW MANDATORILY REQUIRES THAT THE NAMES OF THE WITNESSES BE FIRST LISTED BEFORE ONE COULD BE CALLED TO TESTIFY IN OPEN COURT; AS LONG AS A PERSON IS QUALIFIED TO BECOME A WITNESS, HE MAY BE PRESENTED AS ONE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HIS NAME WAS INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION OR NOT.- The mere fact that the names of Paras and Lacanlalay were not listed in the information as among the witnesses for the prosecution does not mean that their testimonies could not be believed. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the prosecution has the power and privilege to determine who may be called as its witnesses. Besides, several years have passed before the trial of this case commenced. Many of the prosecution witnesses listed in the information could no longer be located. Some were already living in the United States while one was physically paralyzed. Because of these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to present witnesses other than those listed in the information. Moreover, there is no law which limits the presentation of witnesses to those listed only in the information. No law mandatorily requires that the names of the witnesses be first listed before one could be called to testify in open court. As long as a person is qualified to become a witness, he may be presented as one regardless of whether his name was included in the information or not.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS MAY SUFFICE TO WARRANT CONVICTION UNLESS IT IS GLARINGLY WANTING IN EVERY MATERIAL RESPECT.- Witnesses are weighed and not numbered. A testimony of a single witness may suffice to warrant conviction unless it is glaringly wanting in every material respect. As previously discussed, this Court finds no reason to discredit the testimony of Alicia Paras. Besides, it is not true that her testimony was uncorroborated. Precisely, Anita Lacanlalay and the medico-legal officer were presented to corroborate her testimony. More importantly, her testimony needed no further corroboration to be believed. There was also no truth to the defense’s allegation that Paras’ testimony contradicted the physical evidence.

3. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.- With regard to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, this Court agrees with the defense that it did not attend the killing. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be present: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious; it must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. In the case at bar, all the above-enumerated circumstances were not proved nor established by the prosecution. Consequently, the court below erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR; THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS VICTIM ENSURED THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME WITH NO HARM TO THE LIFE AND LIMB OF THE FORMER.- The court a quo correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. As narrated by the prosecution witnesses, the victim, Rey Buzon, had no inkling whatsoever of the forthcoming attack by accused-appellant. In fact, Paras even greeted him. Even when he uttered the words “Tarantado! Matigas talaga ang ulo mo. Babarilin kita!,” Buzon was unable to react as the former immediately drew his gun and shot him. Buzon did not in any way provoke accused-appellant into attacking him. In fact, he was already ensconced at the backseat of the owner-type jeep owned by his brother, Castor Buzon, on his way to see his accountant. The relative positions of accused-appellant and his victim ensured the execution of the crime with no harm to the life and limb of the former. Also, because of his position, there was no way for Buzon to avoid the attack nor could he effectively retaliate. Moreover, the attack was swift and unexpected, depriving Buzon of the luxury of time to run for cover or defend himself. In one case, this Court ruled that “treachery is present where the shooting was unexpected and sudden, giving the unarmed victim, no chance whatsoever to defend himself.”

5. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; AWARD FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES, FOR LOSS OF EARNINGS AND FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DELETED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.- This Court, however, finds the award of P50,000.00 for actual damages not supported by evidence. To justify a grant of actual damages, it is necessary to show the amount of actual loss with the best evidence available. In this case, no receipts were presented as proof to substantiate the award. There is no such thing as “standard Supreme Court -set amount” of P50,000.00 as the lower court ruled. As to the award of P4,390,848.00, for loss of earnings, this Court finds said amount to be likewise unsubstantiated. No proof was presented to support the claim that Buzon was earning $4,000.00 a month. The amount was a mere estimate with no documentary evidence. While there was testimony that the victim worked as a mechanical engineer at Bechtel Corporation in the United States, the prosecution failed to present a single payslip or income statement of the deceased. As such, the $4,000.00 was a rough estimate which has no evidentiary basis.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee-appellant.