FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y LANDICHO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:
On the night of November 11, 1988,
one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death.
The trial court found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her
death. However, the real victim of this
unfortunate occurrence is the spouses’ only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who
is now left to the care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia
Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with parricide
and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to
wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first securing the necessary license or permit therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced,
following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00
for the funeral, wake, burial and incidental expenses that said Alipio Eusebio
spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.
And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia
Eusebio Mendoza;
2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.
Plus costs of the proceedings.
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.
The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government together with all the ammunitions.
With costs against the accused.
Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered committed to the Bureau of Corrections.
The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant
has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in –
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable documents, in grave violation of accused’s constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the minor daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the police investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite the police investigator’s undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the decisively clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the
evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
On November 11, 1988,
accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old
daughter attended the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at
McDonald’s in Harrison Plaza. While the
party was going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried
Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer.
When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not
find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave, proceeding directly
to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona,
Las Piñas (p. 4, Appellee’s Brief.).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home
at around 7 o’clock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet
there. After a while, mother and
daughter left for the house of Cecilia’s parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring
some perfume for Cecilia’s brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 o’clock in the evening,
Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They
rode a jeepney and at the gate of the subdivision where they live, they saw the
car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilia’s god-daughter, and they hitched a ride
home. Finally home, they saw their car
already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were on but the screen door was
locked. They knocked at the window but
accused-appellant did not respond. A
moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and
daughter went straight to the master’s bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the master’s bedroom,
accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to
douse him. She willingly obliged, after
which she was told to go to her room.
She change her clothes and readied herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her
parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left
accused-appellant at the party.
Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her
mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun
under the bed in her parents’ room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping
and bleeding mother and held her. Then,
accused-appellant asked Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform
her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores
could not believe Charmaine and talked to accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to
death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently
called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had
been shot and is already dead. Gabac,
on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he
would be arriving shortly. When Gabac
finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia
into accused-appellant’s car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced
dead on arrival. The autopsy report
indicated the cause of death as follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about
the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando
Almario, proceeded to the hospital to investigate the incident, but
accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. Thereafter , the policemen invited Antonio
Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella
Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas.
While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something
tucked inside Gabac’s waist. He
promptly told Gabac “Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril.” Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38
caliber revolver with Serial No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live
rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the
gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime
scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio,
having been informed of his daughter’s death, and that valuables were being
taken out of his daughter’s house, decided to remove, together with his sons,
the remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-appellant’s
personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects
of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated November
7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting
Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor
Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt
Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December
15, 1986. There was also a Memorandum
Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L.
Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to
one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which
described the firearm as “One Colt Revolver SN 41001” (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive
for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellant’s own account of
the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night of
November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter
carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and that a few weeks earlier they
likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still supporting her
parents as well as her brothers and sisters.
Further, accused-appellant claimed
that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death threats
over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation
to her jewelry and perfumes business.
She also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her
by workers from Saudi Arabia to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines
(tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he
went home at around 7 o’clock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his
wife, Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they
proceeded to the master’s bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him
goodnight. He and his wife were then
left alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money and
uttered “Dad, okey na”. She also
brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her bag then changed her clothes, and
went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).
Thereafter, accused-appellant
declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their
room. When he went out, he saw his wife
wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the backdoor of
their house which banged. Consequently,
he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from the backdoor, but
accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his
concern over his wife’s condition.
When he went back, he woke up
Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a while, he called up his
brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34,
p. 37) and the two of them then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police
investigators from the Las Piñas Police Station asked accused-appellant about
the incident, but he refused to comment.
He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to
the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the
police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the
charges against him. While he admitted having
been married to Cecilia on February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife was
killed by somebody else. Further, even
as he denied possession of a .38 caliber revolver, he admitted to have been
authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968 and 1969 (tsn,
November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he
had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to have sired children by another woman
(tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give
credence and weight to the defense’s theory that the victim was engaged in
illegal activities which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the
opportunity and the propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence
was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all
elements which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant
killed his wife were present and that no proof had been established by him to
overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the
evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are
convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly
established.
Although the judgment of
conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]).
During the trial of the case, it
was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street,
Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas, were the Mendozas, namely,
accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter Charmaine, and his now deceased wife
Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot
to death, no one was there except these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the
trial court of his innocence by denying that he killed his wife, insinuating
that another person is the killer. This
stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The
insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated the
killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought, a devised
plot to escape just punishment. In
fact, accused-appellant even refused to give any statement or comment to the
police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by
somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but
natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the
speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged
intruder-killer. But he did not and
instead, he took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent
about the incident when the police conducted the investigation, which is rather
odd if he really were innocent. Verily
it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came
out with the story about the handy intruder.
He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to
persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony
of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine
Mendoza. But having been in a better
position to observe the witnesses, the trial court’s appreciation of their
testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect
(People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).
As established by the prosecution,
and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family went
to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several
occasions of altercation. Such fact was
shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without
informing them where he would be. The
victim’s father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant
and his daughter, Cecilia, had been quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit
relationship with another man. He
contends that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of
his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on account of his
having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that
relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily
mean he is biased. The Court finds
improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellant’s claim that
Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive,
thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that
she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to
believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory
that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear
to be a naturally spontaneous narration, but rather evidently a coached
one. According to to him, this theory
was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public
view.
On the contrary, the fact that
Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this,
being in accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for
her, at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she
loves and respects as shown by the act of embracing him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks,
for acquittal, on Charmaine’s retraction.
But the trial court correctly disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness
stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after her mother’s death. Her recantation was made two years later
when she was already in the custody of accused-appellant who was allowed to go
out on bail. Charmaine’s first
testimony was to the effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding
a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such
act. Such contradictory statements
should not discredit Charmaine as a witness.
The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part
and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and
probabilities and improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA
234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction
by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony. Testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully
compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully
and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly
analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the
testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony
for the prosecution. The second declaration
was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither are we persuaded to hold otherwise
for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon
her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates
against accused-appellant’s denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin
test conducted on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting
incident.
Accused-appellant also denied
having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal
weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had
been a dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun
which his wife carried wherever she went, and not about the fact that his wife
was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the
overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the
fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that
the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her
mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she
said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked
by the Las Piñas police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the
same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting
incident. The possession of the fatal
gun by accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt
signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to
carry the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo).
But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally
procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct
in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies. The case
in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference
by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the
memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant’s
father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to
accused-appellant’s claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45
caliber pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief,
Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated
December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm
holder of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no
direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by
accused-appellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however,
constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the
hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other
hypotheses that he is not. And when
circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational
circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and
doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA
546 [1996]). The unbelievable story of
accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the “smuggling
syndicate’s man” is all too plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant
designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established
that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No.
1866 was committed, fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294
which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now
merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs.
Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be
held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use
of an unlicensed firearm. This
notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating
circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion
perpetua, may no longer be increased.
The death penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the
killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty
was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Martinez, and Pardo, JJ., concur.